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Abstract
This thesis aims at improving our understanding of the constraints under which
poor households make decisions. The first two chapters deal with the exposure
of rural poor households to extreme weather events, using the cases of Tan-
zania and Peru as examples. Using a panel of Tanzanian farms, I first show
that a combination of satellite data, for temperature, and reanalysis data, for
precipitation, successfully captures the impact of weather variables on yields.
I then explore some of the margins of adjustment available to farmers when
exposed to temperature shocks, and discuss my results within the existing the-
ory and evidence. Chapter 2, co-authored with Fernando Aragón and Juan
Pablo Rud, takes a closer look at farmer reactions after experiencing a tem-
perature weather shock. Using data from a representative sample of Peruvian
farmers, coupled with satellite weather data, we study how high temperature
affects farmer yields. Then, using a model of producer-consumer households,
we tease out the negative impact of shocks on productivity, net of farmer reac-
tions during the course of the growing season. Chapter 3 was co-authored with
Laura Abramovsky, Britta Augsburg, Melanie Lührmann and Juan Pablo Rud.
Using data from a randomised controlled trial designed by the team, we study
how households make sanitation investments. We show that an information
campaign increased toilet ownership in the short, but not the medium term.
We also find that the intervention was successful at increasing expected bene-
fits from toilet ownership related to pride and social status, but did not affect
household’s perceptions of other benefits, such as private health or privacy,
nor increased their awareness of health externalities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies two aspects affecting the economic lives of the poor that
present serious challenges in the XXI Century. The first two chapters deal with
the exposure of rural poor households to extreme weather events, using the
cases of Tanzania and Peru as examples. Climate change is expected to bring
dramatic shifts in agricultural activities at a global scale, and affect the pattern
of extreme weather, particularly around the tropics (IPCC [2014]). Quantify-
ing the exposure of rural households to weather related risk and understanding
their reactions to shocks is a timely challenge. A precise understanding of their
degree of exposure, and their margins of reaction and adaptation, is needed
for the design of climate and poverty alleviation policies.
A significant constraint in the analysis of weather impacts and agricul-
ture in developing countries is data availability. As discussed by Auffhammer
et al. [2012], weather monitoring stations are scarce and sparsely distributed,
and their temporal coverage is patchy. In order to construct balanced panels
of weather conditions over space and time, researchers must rely on alterna-
tive sources, generally in the form of gridded datasets. Chapter 1 addresses
this issue. Using a panel of Tanzanian farms between 2008 and 2012, I show
that a combination of satellite data, for temperature, and reanalysis data, for
precipitation, successfully captures the impact of weather variables on yields.
I verify the importance of precipitation for yields widely studied in the lit-
erature, and document a land surface temperature threshold of 22℃ beyond
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which additional heat is detrimental for yields. I show that this is comparable
to an average daily air temperature of 25℃ and this is in line with recent find-
ings from developing countries such as Burgess et al. [2017]. Each additional
degree above this threshold during the growing season decreases output per
hectare planted by 8 percentage points, controlling for precipitation. In turn,
a reduction of one standard deviation in precipitation over the growing season,
results in 15 percentage point lower yields.
The second section of Chapter 1 explores some of the margins of adjust-
ment available to farmers when exposed to temperature shocks. High tem-
peratures affect yields of staples, grown by at least 80% of the farms in our
sample and mainly for own consumption, but do not significantly affect cash
crops, grown by 10% of the farms. This makes it clear that a majority of the
households in our sample experience drops in the production and income, when
exposed to higher temperatures. However, high temperatures do not appear to
affect consumption per capita, suggesting that households successfully smooth
out consumption. I discuss several possible risk coping mechanisms discussed
in related studies, and find evidence of 1) increased land being allocated to
more heat resistant staples such as sweet potato and rice, and 2) increased
areas planted with cash crops and a higher number of trees of permanent
crops. Nonetheless, these reactions appear to be driven only by households
who already had these crops as part of their portfolio, as there is no evidence
of additional households adopting them. I also find that households are more
likely to take out (mostly informal) loans for subsistence purposes after hot
seasons, although the share of households who declare to have access to any
type of credit is just 10%. Overall, while changing crop shares and taking up
credit seem like feasible mechanisms to part of the farmers in our sample, this
does not appear to apply to the majority of farms.
The final strategy I explore is that of migration. Rosenzweig and Stark
[1989] showed that migration patterns induced by marriage among a sample
of Indian villages are consistent with risk mitigation strategies that aim to di-
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versify spatially correlated weather risk. In the Tanzanian context, migration
has been shown to result in increases of up to 36% in individual consumption,
by Beegle et al. [2011]. I find indeed that after a growing season with high
temperatures, households are 1 percentage point more likely to see one of their
members migrate, particularly young men and middle aged women. Nonethe-
less, I show that this does not translate into higher remittances received by the
household of origin after a season of high temperatures, and thus reduced crop
yields. This evidence complements the intuition behind Burgess et al. [2017],
who suggest that insurance must be limited in India, since higher tempera-
tures, by affecting agricultural productivity, severely affect mortality rates in
rural areas.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Fernando Aragón and Juan Pablo Rud,
we take a closer look at farmer reactions after experiencing a temperature
weather shock. Using data from a large and nationally representative sample
of farmers from Peru, coupled with high resolution satellite weather data for
the last decade, we study how high temperature affects farmer yields. Then,
using a model of producer-consumer households, we tease out the negative
impact of shocks on productivity, net of farmer reactions during the course of
the growing season. We document how temperatures above a region-specific
threshold impact productivity negatively, and find that farmers react to this
shock in different ways, according to their level of income.
This Chapter presents three important contributions to the existing litera-
ture studying the effects of weather shocks on agriculture. First, as in Chapter
1, we estimate impacts at the farm level, and use publicly available gridded
weather products that make our analysis replicable in most developing coun-
try contexts, as long as high quality agricultural data is available. Second,
we split the analysis along two different geographical regions which have dis-
tinct production methods and access to markets, and show that the severity
of impacts, as well as the adjustment margins available to farmers, are region-
specific. Finally, we simulate the magnitude of impacts on yields for the end
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of the Century under two different scenarios from the 4th IPCC Assessment
report, one ‘business-as-usual’ and a second in which large amounts of green-
house gas emissions are curbed. We find that yields are predicted to fall in
one region, the coast, and to increase in the other, the highlands, under both
forecasts. This disparity is an important insight about the uneven effects of
the increase in average temperatures expected, and for the design of future
policy.
This initial focus on production is complemented in Chapter 3 by a look
at how poor households invest in their own health. This chapter was co-
authored with Laura Abramovsky, Britta Augsburg, Melanie Lührmann and
Juan Pablo Rud. Low levels of investment on health-advancing durables at
the household level often results in poor health and economic outcomes, par-
ticularly in developing countries where complementary efforts by the other
agencies are scarce. Nonetheless, these investments are often low due to credit
or solvency constraints, lack of appropriate information or other externalities
at the community or household levels. Understanding the binding constraints
that hamper such health investments is key for designing interventions that
help to achieve efficient levels of household investment and provide long-run
improvements in health and longevity.
We study how households make investment decisions regarding health
improvements by designing and evaluating the results of a cluster-randomised
controlled trial (RCT) carried out in Nigeria. Nigeria faces enormous chal-
lenges in the field of sanitation, with 34% of its population practising open defe-
cation and slightly falling toilet ownership rates over the last decade (Unicef
and WHO [2015]). We look at the constraints behind the decision to con-
struct a private toilet and the types of households that respond positively to
an intervention that provides information about the health risks surrounding
the practice of open defecation. We analyse a randomly assigned information
campaign called Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), which provided no
subsidies or credit, and was originally designed to promote private toilet con-
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struction and reduce open defecation levels in rural Bangladesh, and was later
rolled out to other countries in Asia and Africa (Kar [2003]).
Our study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First,
we show that the information campaign increased toilet ownership by a mod-
erate 3 percentage points, six to twelve months after the intervention. While
small, our estimates are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to show posi-
tive and statistically significant CLTS impacts among a representative sample
of households. In a second part, we exploit rich household level data to inves-
tigate the different channels through which an information campaign such as
CLTS could operate. We find that the intervention was successful at increasing
expected benefits from toilet ownership relating to pride and social status. It
did not, however, change the household’s perceptions on other private benefits,
such as health or privacy, nor increased awareness of the externalities deriving
from toilet ownership and usage. At the same time, program impacts appear
to be stronger for households that perceived toilets not to be too expensive to
build: increasing the perceived benefits of toilet construction was more effec-
tive among households with low initial perceived costs. We find no evidence
that the impact of CLTS on toilet construction and open defecation reduction
is driven by changes in social capital nor institutional sanctions.
Finally, we investigate the effect of the information campaign on house-
holds with low initial access to sanitation: lower education or asset poor house-
holds. Because inadequate sanitation might affect women and children dispro-
portionately, we also consider female headed households and households with
children. We find no evidence of larger program impacts among households
with children compared to the rest of the sample. On the other hand, we find
that CLTS program impacts are concentrated among female-headed house-
holds, and households with lower levels of education and asset wealth. Treat-
ment effects are in the neighbourhood of 5-6 percentage points among these
groups, which also have lower levels of toilet ownership at baseline: between
33% and 21%. Estimated programme impacts suggest that an information-
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only campaign may help reduce the sanitation gap, but given the magnitude
of the sanitation challenge in the Nigerian context, it might not be enough to
close the gap completely.
The structure of the thesis will be as described in this introduction. Chap-
ter 1 will address weather shocks among Tanzanian farmers, Chapter 2 will
look into farmer responses to shocks within a sample of Peruvian farmers, and
Chapter 3 will analyse health investment decisions in the Nigerian states of
Ekiti and Enugu. Most of the Tables and Figures relevant to each Chapter are
included in the main body of the thesis, but additional Tables and robustness
checks are included in the Appendix, with a section for each Chapter.
Chapter 2
Satellite data and the impacts
of weather shocks on Tanzanian
agriculture
2.1 Introduction
Climate change is expected to bring dramatic shifts in agricultural activities at
a global scale (IPCC [2014]). The rural poor in developing countries are at the
front line of these impacts. Many reside near the tropics, or in already warm
areas, and traditional farming is their main source of livelihood. These are the
areas in which weather shocks, in the shape of extremely hot temperatures,
droughts and floods are likely to become less of a rare occurrence. Quantifying
the exposure of rural farmers to weather related risk and understanding their
reactions to shocks is important in the design of climate and agricultural policy,
as well as poverty alleviation and food security efforts.
A significant constraint in the analysis of weather impacts and agricul-
ture in developing countries is data availability. As discussed by Auffhammer
et al. [2012] weather monitoring stations are scarce and sparsely distributed,
and their temporal coverage is patchy. In order to construct balanced pan-
els of weather conditions over space and time, researchers must rely on grid-
ded datasets, from climate reanalysis or satellite-only sources. However, each
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source has its own limitations (Dell et al. [2014]), and there is little agreement
in the literature around about the appropriate choice. Reanalysis datasets
are heavily dependent on the climate models behind them and will tend to
underestimate true weather variability, particularly in areas with low station
coverage, and in high temporal resolutions (e.g. daily or higher). Satellite
data, on the other hand, provide snapshots of the weather recorded at fixed
times of the day, according to the instrument’s orbit, which may or may not
coincide with daily maximums, minimums or averages.
In this Chapter, I show that gridded products can effectively be used to
analyze the impact of weather shocks at the farm level when weather station
data is sparse or missing. At the same time, the results are consistent with
other studies that rely on monitoring station data carried out in both developed
and developing countries. Using a panel of Tanzanian farms between 2008
and 2012, I show that a combination of satellite data, for temperature, and
reanalysis data, for precipitation, successfully captures the impact of weather
variables on yields. I verify the importance of precipitation for yields widely
studied in the literature, and document a land surface temperature threshold
of 22℃ beyond which additional heat is detrimental for yields. I show that
this is comparable to an average daily air temperature of 25℃, and in line with
recent findings from developing countries such as Burgess et al. [2017]. Each
additional degree above this threshold during the growing season decreases
output per hectare planted by 8 percentage points, controlling for precipitation.
In turn, a reduction of one standard deviation in precipitation over the growing
season, results in 15 percentage point lower yields.
Recent studies from US farms document sizeable drops in crop yields due
to extreme heat, and suggest important heterogeneous effects: increments of
agricultural production in temperate regions, but significant losses in hotter
areas Deschenes and Greenstone [2007], Schlenker et al. [2005], Schlenker and
Roberts [2009]. In this context, the case of Tanzania is particularly relevant
for two reasons. First, it is a country with already high average temperatures,
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exposed to large losses if present warming trends continue. Second, it is a
country where estimates suggest as much as 76% of the population rely on
subsistence agriculture, a production method with potentially smaller margins
for adaptation than modern, capital intensive farms from developed economies
(ESRF [2014]). In a closely related study, Rowhani et al. [2011], analyze the
impact of temperature and precipitation from interpolated weather station
data, on yields for three staple crops at the regional level. They find non-
linear relationships between precipitation and yields but fail to find this for
the case of temperature, possibly due to the aggregate nature of their climate
data. The authors stress the importance of having reliable, high-frequency
weather measures to enhance our understanding. The evidence I present in
this Chapter suggests that satellite and gridded products deserve a place in
any development economist’s toolbox. I validate my results by instrumenting
satellite temperature data with a climate reanalysis source and find that the
impacts found are robust in sign and significance.
In the second section of this Chapter, I explore some of the farmers re-
actions to temperature shocks, and shed light on some of the possible ad-
justment mechanisms available to them. High temperatures affect yields of
staples, grown by at least 80% of the farms in the sample, and mainly for
own consumption, but do not affect cash crops. Extremely hot seasons, at
the same time, do not appear to affect consumption per capita, suggesting
that households partially offset the impact of lower yields and can smooth
out consumption. Salazar-Espinoza et al. [2015] follow a panel of farms from
Mozambique and study their reactions to droughts. The authors find that
farmers react by readjusting their crop choice and increasing the fraction of
land devoted to staple crops, and suggest a consumption smoothing strategy
based on the accumulation of stocks of staples for own consumption. I find
little evidence of increased land being allocated to staples after a hot season,
except among sweet potato and rice farmers, who increase their areas planted
by 18% and 9% respectively. Sweet potato in particular has been suggested by
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Dercon [1996] to be a suitable candidate for risk mitigation by sample farmers
from Western Tanzania, given its resistance to weather shocks. The evidence
I present from a nationally representative sample of farmers suggests that this
is also a strategy for reducing exposure to temperature shocks, although its
scope is limited: only 10% of the farmers grow sweet potato and this share is
unchanged by temperature experienced in the last growing season.
At the same time, I find that farmers increased areas planted with cash
crops by 10% and the number of trees of permanent crops by 6%, for each
additional HDD experienced in the past season. I also find that households
are more likely to take out (mostly informal) loans for subsistence purposes
after hot seasons. Taken together, these findings lend credence to the idea that
farming households in Tanzania are not completely credit constrained when
facing spatially correlated shocks and, while asset stocks might be playing
an important role, informal financial instruments are available. The share of
households who do rely on formal or informal credit markets, is, however, less
than 9% of the sample, so it appears that asset stocks are still the main risk
coping mechanism, as found by Chaudhuri and Paxson [2002] for the case of
rural India. The limited role of credit as a consumption smoothing mechanism
might be explained by the fact that 49% of the subsistence loans taken in the
sample came from informal sources (mainly relatives and neighbours), who are
exposed to the same, spatially correlated weather shocks.
Next, I find that after a growing season with high temperatures, house-
holds are 1 percentage point more likely to see one of their members migrate,
particularly young men and middle aged women. The average migration rate
in the sample is 7%, so this represents an increase of 14%. This finding con-
tributes to a growing cluster of evidence that proves migration is responsive
to weather shocks, notably by Munshi [2003], and more recently by Kleemans
and Magruder [2017] and Groger and Zylberberg [2016]. In the Tanzanian
context, migration has been shown to result in increases of up to 36% in in-
dividual consumption, by Beegle et al. [2011]. In this Chapter, I investigate
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instead whether migration of one of its members results in higher remittances
received by the household of origin. Burgess et al. [2017] suggest that insurance
must be limited in India, since higher temperatures, by affecting agricultural
productivity, severely affect mortality rates in rural areas. I confirm this by
presenting evidence that hot growing seasons are not followed by higher remit-
tances to the household of origin, challenging the importance of this channel
as a consumption insurance mechanism in the Tanzanian case.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. The following Section
summarizes recent findings in the literature on weather shocks and agricul-
ture, and puts this Chapter’s contribution into context. Section 2.2 describes
the data sources and Section 2.3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 2.4
presents the results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data Sources
2.2.1 Weather data
Recent efforts to study the impacts of weather shocks on agricultural yields
have mostly relied on monitoring station data (Deschenes and Greenstone
[2007], Schlenker and Roberts [2009]) This is feasible in most advanced
economies with a large number of stations covering most of their territory,
but it becomes more challenging when working in developing countries. The
NOAA National Center for Environmental Information provides historical
daily weather measurements from monitoring stations all around the globe.
The database includes information from 55,348 stations within the United
States, while for Tanzania, information is available from only 14 stations. Of
these, only 7 were active and have at least 50% coverage between 2007 and
2013.1 This means that the spatial coverage of monitoring stations in Tanza-
nia is limited: only 46% of the observations are within 100 km of their closest
station, as seen in Figure 2.1. Variation in the weather by location is generally
achieved by interpolating the information from multiple stations. This step
1Historical weather station data available here: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/
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implies imposing some structure on the behaviour or weather variables, and is
generally done by applying inverse distance weights, or the use of more sophis-
ticated interpolations, such as the one used by Rowhani et al. [2011]. In this
case only 21% of the sample lies within 100 km of at least two weather sta-
tions, the minimum number needed to achieve significant variation in weather
outcomes across households. Furthermore, these are all located in the Dar es
Salaam area, which results in an unrepresentative sample of farmers. Missing
temperature and precipitation days are also common, a problem also noted by
Burgess et al. [2017]: none of the stations contains information for more than
60% of the days in the sample. For all of these reasons weather station data
is not a suitable source in this case. I will, however, use weather station data
as a benchmark for the other sources used.
Figure 2.1: NPS observations and weather monitoring station coverage
Weather Stations
WS 100km buffer
NPS observations
Legend
Note: Blue dots represent NPS observations, and red triangles show the location of
the seven weather monitoring stations for which data is available from NOAA. Less
than 45% of the observations in the sample lie within 100 km of the nearest station.
Satellite and reanalysis data, however, are available for the whole Tanza-
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nian territory. They can be extracted from their raw raster files directly onto
the coordinate points that identify households, with no need to carry out any
spatial interpolation. The use of satellite imagery in economics has been devel-
oping fast over the last decade, for uses as wide as the monitoring of droughts
(Guiteras et al. [2015a]) or the prediction of poverty levels (Jean et al. [2016]).
I will use land surface temperature (LST) readings from the MOD11C1 prod-
uct as a proxy for air temperature. This data is collected by the Moderate
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) tool aboard the Terra satel-
lite. The product contains two daily recordings of surface temperatures on a
0.05× 0.05 degree global grid, and is already cleaned of low quality readings
and processed for consistency. The satellite passes over Tanzania at 8 am and
8 pm each day.2 The high spatial and temporal resolution of the MOD11C1
product makes it a good candidate for the estimation of weather outcomes in
areas with low monitoring station coverage such as Tanzania.
It is worth noting that while I will use MODIS LST values, the variable
measured by weather stations and modelled by most reanalysis data products
is air temperature. Evidence suggests that both variables are highly correlated,
and this was confirmed for the specific case of the MODIS product by Mutiibwa
et al. [2015]. Nonetheless, the reader should be aware of this distinction when
comparing the results of this Chapter to other studies using re-analysis or
monitoring station data.
As an additional source for robustness checks, I use a weather reanaly-
sis dataset. The ERA-Interim gridded reanalysis product, prepared by the
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), provides
daily temperature measures at 12:00 pm.3 Interim is a reanalysis project that
combines in situ measurements (from the few Tanzanian weather stations avail-
able), with satellite and other remotely sensed data, and inputs them into a
global climate model to produce daily outputs in a 0.125× 0.125 degree grid
2Several authors have carried out validation exercises to measure the reliability of using
MODIS LST data, for example Mostovoy et al. [2005]. Data available from the USGS’ Land
Processes Distributed Active Archive Center (LP DAAC).
3Data access available at http://www.ecmwf.int/.
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format. This is a lower spatial resolution than that of the MOD11C1 prod-
uct, with squares of approximately 13 km by side at the Equator. Also, as
mentioned by Dell et al. [2014], the reliability of reanalysis outputs depends
on the number of different sources of primary weather data available for each
particular region. Given the paucity of weather stations in Tanzania, weather
reanalysis products for this area will inevitably contain a high degree of uncer-
tainty, and will be very reliant on the assumptions of their underlying climate
models used (Auffhammer et al. [2013]). This challenge questions the advan-
tages of using reanalysis products, when high quality, satellite datasets are also
available.
Precipitation data comes from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Pre-
cipitation with Station data (CHIRPS). CHIRPS is also a reanalysis product
that combines 0.05×0.05 degree resolution satellite imagery with in-situ mon-
itoring station data, and builds a gridded rainfall time series (Funk et al.
[2015]). This is a much smaller grid than the one provided by Interim (which
also offers precipitation data), with squares of 5.6 km by side.
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b plot the distributions of average daily temperatures
by source, from January 1st, 2007 to December 31st, 2013. For compari-
son purposes, Figure 2.2a shows the temperatures recorded by each source
at the exact location of the seven Tanzanian weather stations with at least
50% coverage. Weather station average air temperature and satellite average
land surface temperature have similar means, although the latter exhibits a
slightly higher variance. This is reasonable, given that stations average max-
imum and minimum temperatures whenever they happen to occur within a
day, while satellite LST takes the average of temperatures recorded daily at
in its morning and evening passes over Tanzania. Interim data, which models
daily temperature at midday, is on average 3℃ higher, and exhibits the lowest
variance. This pattern can be observed in the whole sample of NPS locations,
in Figure 2.2b, as well, suggesting it is not a localized phenomenon. Given
their reliance on global climate models, reanalysis data products are prone to
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underestimate true weather variation, while satellite sources don’t. This is
important because I rely on this variation to identify the impact of changing
weather conditions over the growing season. For this reason, I use the Interim
temperature data as a supplemental source, and take the MOD11C1 satellite
product as my preferred one.
Figure 2.2: Daily temperature distributions by source
(a) Monitoring station locations (b) Whole sample of NPS observations
Note: Satellite data bars show the distribution of average daily recording by the
MODIS instrument, that overpasses Tanzania at 8 am and 8 pm. ERA-Interim
shows daily air temperature at 12 pm. Monitoring station data shows the average
between maximum and minimum daily temperatures. Both Figures show tempera-
ture distributions for the whole 2007-2013 period. Figure A: Distribution of daily
temperatures from each source at the exact location of the seven Tanzanian weather
stations used, to avoid spatial interpolation errors. Figure B: Distribution of daily
temperatures observed in all NPS locations.
On average, daily precipitation as measured by monitoring stations was
of 2.3 mm, with a standard deviation of 10.2 mm. Reanalysis data sources
have similar mean values, 2.6 mm from the Interim product and 2.7 from
CHIRPS. These sources show significantly different variations: 4.8 mm and
8.1 mm respectively.4 The CHIRPS dataset seems to have approached the
true distribution of precipitation among the weather station locations, has a
significant variation and high spatial resolution, so it will be my preferred
4Interim and CHIRPS mean and SDs correspond to data from the locations where the
weather stations are located. Over the whole sample of NPS observations, CHIRPS has a
mean 3.6 mm and a SD of 10.7 mm, while Interim has a mean of 2.6 mm and a SD of 4.5
mm. The patter of significantly lower variation within the Interim dataset is still evident.
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source. 5
2.2.2 Household and agricultural data
Tanzania’s National Panel Survey was carried out biannually from 2008 to
2012, and is a nationally representative panel of Tanzanian households. The
first round surveyed 3,265 households from 26 of the country’s 31 regions.
Rounds 2 (2010) and 3 (2012) tracked and located these same households, if
they moved. The survey also followed the initial set of individuals, tracking
those who set up new households, which are then included in the sample. In
order to achieve a balanced panel and control for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity at the farm level, I restrict the sample to those households that
did not move and were successfully located and interviewed in at least two
survey waves. This results in a panel of around 2,000 households for which I
have complete crop level information.
The NPS includes an agricultural module with questions at the plot level
regarding the type of crop and area planted, the amounts harvested, and how
much of the harvest was sold. Products that were not sold but instead con-
sumed at home were imputed with their equivalent market prices. This in-
formation refers to the Tanzanian rainy seasons (or masika), which runs from
March to June, for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012.
Table 2.1 shows the main characteristics of farming households in the
sample. Less than a third of the farms have sold part of their harvest, showing
the importance of farming for domestic consumption in this context. Irrigation
is extremely rare, as well as the ownership of tractors, and the use of fertilizers
and pesticides. Almost all the farms in the sample grow at least one staple
crop. I define staple crops as those of which farmers sell, on average, less
than 50% of their production. These include: maize, rice, sorghum, millet,
5A third, often used source for precipitation data comes from the Tropical Measuring
Mission (TRMM), launched in November 1997 and active until April 2015. Besides being
no longer active, this product has a lower spatial resolution (0.25x0.25 squares) than both
of the reanalysis sources compared. For comparison and robustness purposes, I ran my
main specifications using TRMM data instead of CHIRPS data, and estimates are similar
in magnitude, but not statistically significant due to higher measurement error.
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Table 2.1: Household characteristics by NPS wave
2008/2009 2010/2011 2012/2013
Characteristics of the Household Head
Age 48.11 49.37 50.84
Male (%) 76.85 76.84 75.86
Completed primary education (%) 68.40 71.52 70.32
Household characteristics
Household size 5.31 5.66 5.69
Below poverty line (%) 17.48 20.48 22.85
Agricultural production
Sold any crops after last harvest (%) 27.03 30.62 28.91
Total value of sold crops (in Th. Shillings) 137,362 189,949 298,562
Any irrigated plots? (%) 4.03 3.49 3.40
Used inorganic fertilizer (%) 14.37 17.33 16.74
Used pesticides (%) 14.94 12.90 14.23
Hired labour (%) 43.47 36.88 43.20
Owns a tractor (%) 0.15 2.51 2.97
Grows staple crops (%) 91.37 86.68 87.62
Grows cash crops (%) 10.73 8.65 11.23
Grows permanent crops (%) 0.60 0.65 0.65
Number of different crops grown 3.59 3.72 3.85
Weather over the last rainy season
Average daily temperature (C) 21.43 22.57 22.05
Average daily precipitation (mm/day) 414.68 441.47 394.55
Observations 1,957 2,314 2,258
Notes: Sample restricted to farming households that did not move, and were interviewed
on at least two of the survey rounds.
beans, sweet potato, ground nuts and cassava. On the other hand, the main
(non-permanent) cash crops (e.g. those of which more than 50% of production
is sold) grown in the area are sesame, cashews, tomatoes, cotton, tobacco,
onions, chickpeas, carrots and seaweed. Note that this second category includes
some traditional cash crops such as tobacco and cotton, as well as others
not commonly regarded as such, like seaweed, but that are relevant for the
Tanzanian case. A much smaller percentage of farmers grow these market-
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oriented cash crops; the highest share observed is 10.73%, from the 2008 wave.
Finally, permanent crops, mainly banana, mango, papaw and orange trees, are
very rare and account for less than 1% of households in the NPS sample.
While most characteristics show little change over time, the share of house-
holds in the sample that are below the poverty line seems to increase with each
wave of the survey. This is in line with average poverty rates in the whole NPS
sample over this period.6
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Agricultural production
In order to estimate the effect of weather shocks on agricultural yields, I start
by assuming a Cobb-Douglas agricultural production function:
Yidt = AidtTαidtL
γ
idte
idt , (2.1)
where Yidt is agricultural output of farmer i in locality d at time t. T and L
are quantities used of land and labor (hired and domestic), respectively. A is
total factor productivity. idt is a random shock that affects output after input
choice is made and thus is, by definition, uncorrelated to input use.
We can express the above equation in terms of yields as:
yidt =
Yidt
Tidt
= AidtLγidtT
α−1
idt e
idt , (2.2)
Here T and L will be the allocations of land and labour imputed into
the production function, as decided by the households at the start of growing
season. The NPS asks farmers both the total area planted with each crop
at the onset of the season, and total area harvested. I will use the first of
these two, since the second will be endogenously determined by the weather
6This does not seem to coincide, though, with the decrease in Tanzania’s poverty head-
count ratio (at US$ 1.90 in 2011) from 53% of the population in 2007 to 47% in 2011, stated
by the World Bank. The NPS uses a lower poverty line of TSh 23,933 per adult equivalent
every 28 days in 2010 prices, approximately equal to 0.57 USD a day.
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outcomes over the course of the growing season. For the case of L, I will use
household size as a proxy of available labour in the household, which will be
accounted for by household fixed effects.
I assume that Aidt depends on a function of local weather conditions dur-
ing the growing season (g(β,ωdt)), household and farm characteristics (zi),
time-invariant local economic and environmental conditions (ρd), common
shocks to productivity at the growing season level (ψt), and (potentially) other
unobserved heterogeneity (vidt). In particular:
Aidt = exp(g(β,ωdt) +φ′zi +ρd+ψt+vidt), (2.3)
where g(β,ωdt) is a non-linear function to be specified later. The parameters
of interest are denoted by β, which describes the relation between weather and
total factor productivity.
Recent work has employed a pooled cross-section of households to tackle
related questions to the ones studied here, or a panel approach at the county
level (Deschenes and Greenstone [2007]). Tanzania’s NPS is composed of a
panel of households visited over the course of three waves, and thus allows
for a more precise control for unobservable differences at the household level,
as in Salazar-Espinoza et al. [2015]. I construct a panel including only those
households that were interviewed on the three waves and did not move, in
order to be able to control for observable and unobservable characteristics at
the plot and farm levels.7 Identification will come exclusively from weather
variations from the mean at the household level, so I drop the d subscript
from all but the weather variables, which are estimated at the grid level. The
specification used will be the following:
ln(yit) = g(β,ωdt) +αi+ψt+ ξit (2.4)
7This does not reduce the sample significantly since, as I discuss later, migration of the
entire household is extremely rare: less than 1% of the households in the sample migrate
entirely between any two survey waves.
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The next section describes the different approaches used in the literature to
model g(β,ωdt) and the alternatives used in this study.
2.3.2 Measuring the weather
The next step in the estimation of weather impacts is to choose the functional
form imposed on weather variables that is the most appropriate for the purpose
of this study. In line with past efforts in the literature, I model temperature
outcomes using growing season degree-days. This approach allows for a flexible
way to model the relationship between weather and agricultural productivity
as a function of cumulative exposure to heat over the growing season, and
relies on the assumption of time separability. In other words, it assumes that
temperature outcomes have the same impact on output per hectare whenever
they occur within a given growing season. Similar to Schlenker and Roberts
[2009], I construct two measures of cumulative exposure to heat: degree days
(DD) and harmful degree days (HDD). DD measures the cumulative expo-
sure to temperatures between 8℃ and τhigh while HDD captures the exposure
to temperatures above τhigh, where τhigh is some threshold.8 The inclusion
of HDD allows for potentially different, non-linear, effects of extreme heat,
compared to lower temperatures.
Formally, I define DD = 1n
∑
m g
DD(hm), with
gDD(hm) =

0 if hm ≤ 8℃
hm−8℃ if 8℃ < hm ≤ τhigh
τhigh−8℃ if τhigh < hm,
In this case, hm will be the average land surface temperature recorded by the
MODIS instrument, as it passes over Tanzania at 8 am and 8 pm, on day m.
n is the total number of days in a growing season, which in this case is equal
8The lower threshold of 8℃ is common in the literature, and comes from the fact that
temperatures below this level do not contribute to plant development significantly. Addi-
tionally, in the Tanzanian case, average temperatures below that 8℃ are extremely rare, so
our estimates are unchanged by omitting this lower threshold completely.
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to 122. Similarly, HDD = 1n
∑
m g
HDD(hm), with
gHDD(hm) =

0 if hm ≤ τhigh
hm− τhigh if τhigh < hm
A key issue when using a degree-day approach is where to set the value of
threshold τhigh. The literature has usually assumed a threshold of around 29-
30℃ (Deschenes and Greenstone [2007], Lobell et al. [2011]) beyond which
higher temperatures become detrimental for crop development, based on
botanical evidence. Other authors have estimated crop specific thresholds
from their data, such as Schlenker and Roberts [2009] or Tack et al. [2017].
These estimates are likely to be crop and context dependent and hence might
not be transferable to the Tanzanian case. A second challenge in this case is
that optimal growing temperatures are generally estimated using maximum
daily temperatures. MODIS measures of land surface temperature are carried
out each day at 8 am and 8 pm, when the Terra satellite overpasses Tanzania,
and will presumably be lower than the actual maximum temperatures reached
during each day. Therefore I estimate what that threshold is by an iterative
regression method, as the one used in Schlenker and Roberts [2009] and Tack
et al. [2017]. This method consists of a simple algorithm by which (1) I create
DD and HDD variables with values of τhigh ranging from 20℃ to 40℃ then
(2) I estimate model (2.4) using log of output per hectare as outcome, and (3)
I pick the threshold that maximizes model fit (within R squared). Using this
data driven approach, I identify τhigh for the sample under analysis. Results
of this exercise are discussed in Section 2.4 below.
Another alternative often discussed in the literature is the ‘binned’ ap-
proach. By constructing 1℃ bins that include the share of days in a growing
season that experienced temperatures within each range, this method is more
flexible, as it does not impose any constraints on the shape of the relationship
between temperatures and yields. However, in order for these bins to contain
enough variation, one needs a detailed profile of intra-day temperatures, not
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just one or two measures a day. Cesaraccio et al. [2001] and Schlenker and
Roberts [2009] use daily maximum and minimum temperatures and impose a
sinusoidal curve on them to simulate the whole trajectory of daily tempera-
tures. With this, they then build bins for the fraction of the growing season
spent in each temperature interval, and obtain a distribution with significant
variation. On the contrary, day and night satellite land surface temperatures
are not the maximum and minimum daily temperatures, which usually occur
after midday and before sunrise. This is the case for most applications of
satellite weather data, when the user does not have a choice on the timing
of the recordings available to her. Modelling intra-day temperatures would
require making additional assumptions on the profile of daily temperatures
based on the small sample of weather stations that record them, so I disregard
this approach here.
I measure exposure to rain using average daily precipitation (PP) during
the growing season and its square. To facilitate interpretation of coefficients,
I rescale both variables to be expressed in terms of standard deviations from
the mean. The resulting function of weather outcomes is then:
g(β,ωdt) = β0DDdt+β1HDDdt+β2PPdt+β3PP 2dt. (2.5)
Several other measures of precipitation were proposed by the literature,
in recent years. Because the timing, magnitudes and distribution of rainfall
might be important for crop growth, other authors have suggested measures
that provide more information on this over the growing season. I will test the
explanatory power of several of these measures for the Tanzanian case: the
number of rainy days, the longest dry spell, and the number of heavy rainfall
(>100 mm) days. The construction of these variables is straightforward.
2.3.3 Spatial correlation
Weather phenomena exhibit varying degrees of temporal and spatial correla-
tion. If unaccounted for, this can lead to over rejection of the null hypothesis
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due to under-estimated standard errors. I estimate standard errors robust to
spatial and serial correlation following Conley [1999].9 I allow for correlation
of any kind between observations, that decays with distance up to a cut-off at
500 km, and autocorrelation for up to six years.
2.4 Weather Impacts on Agricultural Yields
2.4.1 Degree-days and optimal temperatures
Results for the iterative approach applied in the estimation of optimal tem-
perature thresholds using a panel specification are shown in Figure 2.3. The
Figure plots the resulting R2 coefficients of individual regressions with aggre-
gate crop yield at the household level on the left hand side and DD/HDD,
taking different temperature thresholds, on the right hand side, together with
controls for precipitation, household and year fixed effects. The threshold used
in each regression is plotted on the x-axis. In order to make meaningful com-
parisons, I express R2 coefficients net of the fixed effects, that is, I show only
the component explained by the independent variables of interest, namely DD,
HDD and precipitation.
Optimal temperatures for agricultural yields can be expected to lie some-
where between 21℃, the optimal temperature for human productivity esti-
mated by Seppanen et al. [2006]; and 33℃ the threshold estimated by Tack
et al. [2017] for sorghum, a highly heat resistant crop. Figure 2.3 shows that
the thresholds estimated in this case are on the low end of this range. We see
that model fit using satellite data is maximized at 22℃.
How does this threshold of 22℃ compare to other values estimates recently
in the literature? Temperatures measured at 8 am and 8 pm are usually far
from the daily maximum and generally below the daily average temperature.
To benchmark this estimate, recall that, as mentioned in the previous section,
average land surface temperatures of 23℃ were estimated from the locations
where monitoring stations were located, and where these in turn registered
9I implement these using code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo Fetzer in the
reg2hdfespatial command for Stata.
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Figure 2.3: Model fit by temperature threshold
Note: R2 coefficients of regressions of yield on DD/HDD specifications, using dif-
ferent thresholds to split between DD and HDD. These thresholds are plotted on
the x-axis. All specifications include controls for precipitation and household and
year fixed effects.
average temperatures of 24℃. Indeed, I regressed daily temperatures (from
monitoring stations) on land surface temperatures (from satellite), and found
that a land surface temperature of 22℃ predicts an average temperature of
25℃. These estimates in line with the work by Burgess et al. [2017], who find
that mortality in rural India increases during growing seasons experiencing
more days with temperatures above 24℃ (75 F). Other authors find higher
thresholds for agricultural yields using data from the US. For the case of corn
yields, for example, Schlenker and Roberts [2009] calculate the optimum at
29℃, the same as Burke and Emerick [2016] and Lusk et al. [2017]. In earlier
work, Richie and NeSmith [1991] established a 32℃ threshold as a reference
for the whole US agricultural sector, commonly used in studies that estimate
temperature impacts on aggregate yields since Schlenker and Roberts [2009].
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My findings, together with the work of Burgess et al. [2017], suggest that this
threshold may be lower in developing countries, where agriculture is less capital
intensive and more reliant on human labour.
These first results show that optimal growing temperatures can be esti-
mated using satellite products which have the resolution and spatial coverage
needed to carry out this analysis is practically any part of the globe, irrespec-
tive of the availability and quality of in situ measurements. Satellite sources
have the additional advantage of not relying on global climate models, used in
the assimilation of data for reanalysis datasets.
2.4.2 Weather impacts on aggregate yields
Using the threshold calculated above, I estimate the impact of different weather
variables on agricultural yields, measured as the quantity harvested of each
crop divided by the total area planted with it at the onset of the growing
season. The panel specification with year fixed effects controls for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity at the farm level, so identification of effects comes
from changes in weather outcomes at the household level, after controlling
for nation-wide shocks in each season. Results are presented in Table 2.2.
The dependent variable here is the logarithm of crop yields and I include all
farm-crop combinations.
Table 2.2 presents point estimates from an OLS estimation of agricultural
yields on temperature and precipitation over the course of the last, complete,
rainy season. The first panel of Table 2.2 compares the coefficients of specifica-
tions modelling temperature outcomes using the degree-day approach. Column
(1) shows the results of my preferred OLS specification. It shows no statis-
tically significant effect of degree-days on yields. Harmful degree days, on
the other hand, show negative and significant effects of 8 percentage points,
as expected from the non-linear relationship between temperature and yields
widely documented in the literature. This is consistent with what was found
by Schlenker and Roberts [2009], who note that the slope of the decline above
the optimum temperature is steeper than its incline before it. This is also a
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Table 2.2: Weather impacts on agricultural yields
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature:
Average DD 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.04) (0.30) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Average HDD -0.08∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Precipitation:
Total, std 0.16∗ 0.22 0.17∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09)
Squared, std -0.10 -0.09 -0.10
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Number of rainy days (>0.1 mm) -0.01
(0.01)
Number of rainy days, squared 0.00
(0.00)
Longest dry spell in RS (days) 0.00
(0.00)
Longest dry spell, squared -0.00
(0.00)
Number of heavy rain days (>100 mm) 0.02
(0.03)
Fixed Effects:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Observations 14,486 14,001 14,486 14,486 14,486
Notes: Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correlation following Conley [1999], using
code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo Fetzer, in parenthesis. They assume a discrete
cut-off for spatial correlation of errors at 500 km and six period lags. Stars indicate statistical
significance: *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
reasonable finding for a region in which, as can be seen from the bottom panel
of 2.3, 63% of the days have average temperatures above 22℃. This impact is
economically significant: the mean and standard deviation of average harm-
ful degree days in the sample is 1.2 and 1.0 respectively, meaning that a 1℃
increase is equivalent to a 1 SD increase.
The negative impacts of additional harmful degree days are confirmed and
are twice as high when I instrument MOD11C1 degree day variables with aver-
age temperatures from the Interim gridded product. While both data sources
contain some level of measurement error, instrumenting one with another can
recover reliable estimates, as long as errors of the two datasets are uncorre-
lated. While the sign and statistical significance of the estimates in Column
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(2) are reassuring, they also have a higher variance, possibly due to the lower
spatial resolution of the Interim product. 10 For this reason, I do not use IV
estimates as my preferred specification in the following estimations.
Columns (1) through (5) of Table 2.2 also test the explanatory power of
several measures of precipitation over the growing season. Column (1) shows
that a 1 SD increase in total precipitation results in yields 15 percentage points
higher. In this sense, additional precipitation has the potential to offset in-
creases in temperatures. The negative but statistically insignificant coefficient
for the squared term suggests a non-linear relationship between precipitation
and yields, although it is harder to detect given the skewed distribution of
daily precipitation rates towards zero. Columns (3) to (5) study the explana-
tory power of other measures often discussed in the literature. None of these
measures provides statistical significant results, and I will therefore not in-
clude them in my preferred specification, that will instead be equivalent to
that shown in Column (1).
2.4.3 Results by crop
An important concern that may arise from the results discussed so far, is the
possibility that the impacts estimated are driven by one particularly heat-
sensitive crop variety. The HDD point estimate from Table 2.2 is averaged
over all plots in the sample, and therefore over crop types so if this is indeed
the case, then our conclusions would be restricted only to farmers growing this
(or these) particularly vulnerable crops.
In order to check that this is indeed not the case, I first run the same
regression as the one presented in Column (1) of Table 2.2 introducing crop
controls. The first bar in Figure 2.4 shows that the point estimate for HDDs
in this case is -0.07, in line with the baseline estimates presented above, and
also significant at the 5% level. I then run the same analysis restricting the
10A weak correlation between MODIS and Interim weather datasets could also be behind
these larger standard errors, and potentially inconsistency of the IV estimates (Wooldridge
[2010]). This is rejected by the F-statistics from the first stage regressions of both instru-
mented variables, DD and HDD, which are F = 9.7 and F = 42.6, respectively, and by the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test for weak identification.
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sample to each of the 5 most popular crops in the NPS dataset. Four out of
five of these crops show similar HDD coefficients as the whole sample, in both
magnitude and significance. This is reassuring, as it shows that no single crop
appears to be driving the results for the whole sample.
Figure 2.4: Marginal Effect of 1 Additional HDD on Yields by Crop
Note: Bars plot the coefficients of an OLS regression at the plot level with agri-
cultural yield as the dependent variable. The leftmost bar shows the HDD point
estimate of a specification identical to that from Column (1) in Table 2.2, but in-
cluding crop controls. The remaining estimates come from crop-specific regressions.
Bars represent confidence intervals at of 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Household and
year fixed effects included. All specifications include controls for DDs, total pre-
cipitation and its square. Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correlation
following Conley [1999], using code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo Fet-
zer, in parenthesis. They assume a discrete cut-off for spatial correlation of errors
at 500 km and six period lags.
Overall, Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4 show that both temperature and precip-
itation play an important role at determining agricultural yields in Tanzania,
and that satellite and reanalysis datasets can effectively capture these effects.
Given the lack of weather monitoring station data in the developing world, it
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is hard to understate the number of potential uses of open access, high quality
weather gridded products such as those from the MODIS instrument.
While the impact of droughts and floods on subsistence agriculture con-
texts has been discussed extensively before, the effects of high temperatures
have received somewhat less attention. The precise estimation of optimal tem-
perature thresholds for Tanzanian agriculturalists, and the initial evidence dis-
cussed above suggesting important losses from higher temperatures, motivates
me to focus on these impacts in the following sections. I will aim to shed some
initial light on the different margins of adjustment that farming households in
the sample have available, and how high temperatures affect them.
2.5 Weather shocks and farmer reactions
Most of the farms in this sample are small, family owned plots, that focus on
staple crops for own consumption. Over the three years in which the NPS was
carried out, between 87% and 91% of the households declared to grow at least
one staple crop. At the same time, more than 80% of the production of staple
goods was not sold, but destined to self-consumption. It is of interest then to
establish what the impact of the weather was on the yields of staple and cash
separately, to further understand the level of exposure to weather risk of these
households.
Table 2.3 presents the results of splitting the sample according to the type
of crop, and repeating the analysis above. To this end, I define staple crops
as those of which farmers sell, on average, less than 50% of their production.
These include: maize, rice, sorghum, millet, beans, sweet potato, ground nuts
and cassava. On the other hand, the main (non-permanent) cash crops (e.g.
those of which more than 50% of production is sold) grown in the area are
sesame, cashews, tomatoes, cotton, tobacco, onions, chickpeas, carrots and
seaweed. Households may of course grow both kinds of crops, but, recall from
Table 2.1, only around 10% of the households in the sample grew any cash
crops in each survey wave.
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Table 2.3: Impacts on crop yields and farmer decisions
ln(Yields) (t) ln(Area planted) (t+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crop type: Staple Cash Staple Cash Perm
Temperature:
Average DD 0.05∗ -0.18 0.04 -0.01 -0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Average HDD -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05 0.03∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Controls:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,030 666 10,380 677 9,780
Notes: All specifications include controls for total precipitation and its
square. Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correlation following
Conley [1999], using code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo
Fetzer, in parenthesis. They assume a discrete cut-off for spatial corre-
lation of errors at 500 km and six period lags. Stars indicate statistical
significance: *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Columns (1) and (2) study the impact of weather variables on yields for
the two types of crops. Point estimates for HDDs are negative and of similar
magnitude in both cases. They are only statistically significant in the case
of staple crops, for which the non-linear relationship between temperature
and yields, characterised by a positive effect of DDs and a negative effect of
HDDs, is estimated precisely. This is a reassuring finding, since it agrees with
past studies on the impact of temperatures of yields such as Deschenes and
Greenstone [2007], Schlenker and Roberts [2009]. Cash crops do not appear to
respond in the same way to temperatures, although the sample size is signif-
icantly reduced. This difference in the relationship between temperature and
yields for staple and cash crops, does not seem to stem from differential access
to irrigation, which is extremely low for all crop types. The share of farms with
irrigated plots, among those who grow cash crops is 4.2%, only slightly higher
than the share among farms who grow staples, 3.6%. Nonetheless, the access
to irrigation might help farmers mitigate the effect of high temperatures, so
previous studies using county level data have sometimes omitted areas with
high shares of irrigated land. By using a panel at the farm level, in this case
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these characteristics are controlled for by the farm level fixed effects.
These columns suggest that, together with the well documented negative
impact of droughts, there is a meaningful effect of temperatures on yields,
particularly of staple crops, that should not be omitted from future studies.
This more nuanced approach to the meaning of weather shocks is relevant,
particularly for the line of research that uses them to instrument for household
income (for example, Hidalgo et al. [2010]) or economic growth (for example,
Miguel et al. [2004]).
Weather outcomes over the course of a growing season might also condition
the farmer’s future decisions. A common risk coping mechanism in areas with
incomplete credit markets such as rural Tanzania is the build up of stocks
(Dercon [2005]). A consumption-smoothing farmer that experiences a negative
shock to yields in year t, might reduce their stocks of staple foods for own
consumption during that year. In year t+1 this farmer could decide to increase
the area planted with staple crops, in order to replenish their stocks, at the
cost of cash crops, and therefore cash income. Salazar-Espinoza et al. [2015]
analysed a sample of farmers from Mozambique and found evidence suggesting
that indeed, they operate with a buffer stock of staple crops, and reduce areas
planted with permanent and cash crops after experiencing a drought, in order
to replenish it. An alternative mechanism could arise if formal or informal
borrowing is available and imperfectly correlated with weather shocks: farmers
might increase the planted area of cash crops in the following harvest, in order
to raise funds for postponed purchases or to repay loans taken up during the
bad growing season. Columns (3) to (5) of Table 2.3 study how farmers react to
past weather shocks by looking at their crop choice decisions. The dependent
variable in this case is the logarithm of the area planted with each crop during
the following growing season.
Column (3) shows the relationship between temperature in one season
and the area planted with staple crops in the next. Areas planted with staples
increase by 3 percentage points for each HDD experienced in the previous
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season, significant at the 5% level. In a study of farming households from the
semi arid area of Western Tanzania, Dercon [1996] found that sweet potato
provided the least risk of total crop failure when faced with droughts. The
author poses that the choice of sweet potato cultivation, a highly weather
resistant tuber, is indeed a risk management mechanism that comes at the cost
of reduced returns, given the crop’s low price. In this nationally representative
sample, around 10% of the households cultivate sweet potato in any particular
growing season.
In order to explore the effects of temperature on staple crop growing deci-
sions, I ran the same analysis as the one showed in Column (3) for three staple
crops: sweet potato and the two most popular staples, maize and paddy. I
study both intensive (e.g. increased land assigned to these crops) and extensive
(e.g. more farmers growing these crops) margins. On the extensive margin,
I find that the number of households who chose to plant each of these crops
is mostly unreactive to HDDs experienced in the past growing season, except
for the case of paddy, where households appear to be 1 percentage point more
likely to grow it for each additional HDD experienced in the previous season.
On the other hand, on the intensive margin, I find the that the total area
planted with paddy and sweet potato increases by statistically significant 9
and 18 percentage points respectively. These results, included in Table A.2
in the Appendix, complement Dercon’s, and suggest that both rice and sweet
potato play a role in risk management for farms exposed to temperature risk.
It seems, however, that this role is mostly restricted to the households who
already grew these crops in the past (22% for paddy, 10% for sweet potato).
It becomes clear that the while crop switching seems fairly rare, farmers in-
deed shift the total areas dedicated to each crop as a reaction to past weather
outcomes.
Going back to Table 2.3, strong reactions are observed when looking at
cash and permanent crops as well. Column (4) shows that the area planted
with cash crops increases by 10 percentage points with each additional HDD
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experienced in the previous growing season. Contrary to what was found by
Salazar-Espinoza et al. [2015], this finding lends support to the hypothesis
that, after a season of reduced yields, households increase cash crops area
shares in order to repay loans used for consumption smoothing. I will pursue
this channel further in the following subsection, where I will check whether
there is evidence of higher loan take up in seasons with high temperatures.
Land allocation decisions do not seem to have a clear relationship with past
rainfall outcomes.
Tanzanian agriculturalists have a third source of food and income that is
not included in these two categories: permanent crops, mainly banana, mango,
papaw and orange trees. Calculating yields for permanent crops is complicated
by the fact that farmers frequently inter-crop trees in their plots. The NPS
does, however, have information on the amount of new trees planted at the
start of each growing season I this as a proxy for the decision to invest more
resources into the production of permanent crops, and use the logarithm of new
trees as the dependent variable of Column (5). The number of trees increases
as well, by 6 pp, for each additional harmful degree day experienced in the
previous season. On the contrary, it seems like, as in the case of staple crops,
investment into permanent crops increases after a growing season with high
rainfall in a non-linear way.
To understand the implications of this reaction further, I checked whether
there was any significant increase in the amount of land owned or purchased
after a hot season and found no evidence of this. Given that the total area
owned by farmers remains stable, this increase in areas planted with both
staple and cash crops can be possible either through a more intensive use of
land, via intercropping, or by the use of land otherwise left fallow. 11 In both
cases, the higher intensity in the use of land comes at a cost: intercropping
will provide a wider range of crops but lower yields, and fallow lands are low
quality, and meant to stay out of the production function in order to recover
11Intercropping is a strategy, used by 68% of the farms in the sample, by which multiple
crops are grown in the same plot.
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the soil.
2.5.1 Lagged effects
A reasonable concern that could arise given the results presented above, is that
weather impacts might have longer term effects. Increased cultivation of cash
and permanent crops in subsequent rainy seasons might drain resources from
the growing of staples and this could propagate the drop in yields further over
time. I test for this by including lagged terms for each weather outcomes and
find no evidence of lagged effects. The results, presented in Table A.1 in the
Appendix, suggest instead that the impact of weather shocks on yields is only
detectable in the short term.
2.5.2 Impacts on household finances
The evidence presented in Table 2.3, points towards farmers reacting in two
ways to high temperature shocks. Those growing sweet potato or rice increase
their land allocations for this crop. There is no evidence of other farmers taking
up this crop, however. At the same time, those cultivating cash and permanent
crops increase the amount of land (or number of trees) planted with these,
thereby inputting more land into the production of market oriented crops.
Both reactions are consistent with consumption smoothing behaviour, but of
different kinds. The first group aims at insuring the future harvest against
total loss, the second aims at increasing market sales at the end of the harvest,
possibly to repay outstanding debts. Table 2.4 explores these possibilities in
more depth.
The risk management strategies described in the previous section aim at
reducing risk in subsequent campaigns. The question about what risk coping
strategies households rely on once they have suffered a shock is still pending.
Column (1) from Table 2.4 shows that consumption levels per capita are not
affected significantly by temperature experienced during the previous grow-
ing season. The rather precisely estimated zero coefficients for temperature
measures, when combined with the documented fall in yields of staple crops,
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Table 2.4: Impacts on Household Consumption and Debt
Cons./capita Debts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var: ln(TSh) ln(TSh) Any Subs Bus Oth
Temperature:
Average DD -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Average HDD 0.00 0.05 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% HH with debts 8.42 4.35 3.60 1.40
Observations 7,497 639 7,588 7,588 7,588 7,588
Notes: Consumption: DV is the natural logarithm of total, annual, real expenditures
per adult equivalent living in the household. This measure includes all consumed goods
and services over the past year, both in and outside the household, and including both
purchases as well as produced goods and gifts. Debts: Column (2) DV is the natural
logarithm of total debts taken up, in thousands of Shillings; Columns (3) to (6) DV
equals 1 if household took up loans for any, subsistence, business or other purposes. All
specifications include controls for total precipitation and its square. Standard errors
robust to spatial and serial correlation following Conley [1999], using code from Hsiang
[2010] and adapted by Thiemo Fetzer, in parenthesis. They assume a discrete cut-off
for spatial correlation of errors at 500 km and six period lags. Stars indicate statistical
significance: *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
suggests that households do perform some smoothing, either from relying on
their own stocks of staples or savings, or by taking loans. NPS data does
not distinguish between consumption from contemporary own production and
from accumulated stocks from previous growing seasons, and does not contain
detailed enough information on savings, so I cannot test the importance of the
former channel. The total size of loans, estimated from the sample of house-
holds who indeed had them, did not increase in a statistically significant way,
as shown in Column (2). However, Column (3) confirms that households are 1
pp more likely to have taken up loans for each additional harmful degree day
experienced in the past growing season. From an average of only 8.4%, this
represents a increase of 12% in the number of households taking up debt for
each additional HDD experienced.
Columns (4) to (6) from Table 2.4 separates loans by main purpose. Col-
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umn (4), for example, shows that households are 1 pp more likely to take up
loans directed at subsistence purposes for each additional harmful degree day
experienced, and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. Sub-
sistence loans include a general a category of “subsistence needs”, as well as
school fees and medical needs. Columns (5) shows an point estimate of similar
magnitude but not statistically significant for the take up of loans directed
at business related purchases. Business related loans include the purchase of
land for agricultural purposes, agricultural or other inputs, and agricultural
machinery.
Subsistence loans are mostly taken from neighbours and relatives, who
account for 49% of these in the sample. These loans will then have to be re-
paid, which might explain the increase in cash and permanent crop allocations
in subsequent growing seasons observed in the previous Table. Other loans,
meant to pay for celebrations, purchases of dwellings and other expenses, are
unaffected by weather outcomes. Table 2.4 established two important findings.
First, that consumption seems to be smoothed to some degree by households.
Reductions in yields from hot or dry seasons established above do not translate
into lower consumption levels. It also confirmed that, at least for a small share
of the farmers in the sample, credit is one available risk coping channel. The
scope of this channel is limited, in theory, by the fact that since most loans are
local in origin, spatially correlated shocks such as weather phenomena cannot
be effectively insured against. This might explain the low take up of these loans
in the sample (4% of the sample). The mechanism for consumption smoothing
applied by the rest of the households in the sample remains unclear so far.
2.5.3 Migration
The final margin I explore is that of migration. Migration has been considered
part of a household’s risk coping mechanisms at least since Rosenzweig and
Stark [1989]. Weather shocks have been shown to trigger migration as well by
Groger and Zylberberg [2016], Kleemans and Magruder [2017], Munshi [2003]
among others. Households might be able to attenuate the losses accruing from
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weather related income shocks by seeing one of their members move out, thus
reducing the number of dependants, and, possibly, by increased remittances
received from members living elsewhere. The NPS tracked its initial sample of
households, locating and interviewing all its members in each of the two subse-
quent waves. Full migration, meaning the displacement of all the members of
the household, is extremely rare in this sample: between 2008 and 2010, only
1% of the households moved entirely, and this was the period with the highest
share. On the other hand, migration of some members of the household is
more common. During the same period, 12% of households in the sample saw
at least one of their members move out.
Figure 2.5: Marginal Effect of 1 Additional HDD on Propensity to Migrate by Age
and Gender
(a) Men (b) Women
Note: Bars plot the coefficients of an OLS regression at the individual level with
migration as the dependent variable, and the number of DDs/HDDs experienced
in the previous growing season interacted with age group in the right hand side.
Household and year fixed effects included. All specifications include controls for total
precipitation and its square. Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correlation
following Conley [1999], using code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo
Fetzer, in parenthesis. They assume a discrete cut-off for spatial correlation of
errors at 500 km and six period lags.
To study this, I first ask whether extreme temperatures have an effect on
the propensity of household members to move. I allow for weather impacts
to vary by gender and age group, since migrations rates among age extremes
are low and might hide meaningful impacts. Figures 2.5a and 2.5b plot the
estimated effects of an additional harmful degree day on the previous growing
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season, on the probability of an individual to move. It becomes clear from the
Figures that economic migration patterns throughout the life cycle are different
by age and gender. Hot temperatures push men between the ages of 20 and
39 to migrate by an additional 1 pp for each HDD, and this is significant at
the 1% level. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that this 20 to 29 is the age
at which men migrate the most, on average, for any reason. However in the
case of women, who normally migrate when in their 20s, extreme temperatures
increase their propensity to migrate the most when they are aged 40 to 59.
These migration patterns may be related to family structure and different
labor market conditions at towns and cities, for each of the genders. In any
case, this increased rate of out-migration in the face of hot temperatures poses
another channel by which the households in the sample may avoid drops in
consumption per capita.
The second question of interest is whether migrants indeed help consump-
tion smoothing of their household of origin in the face of extreme temperatures
or precipitation shortages. This can be investigated by looking at the remit-
tances that households declare to receive. Due to coding inconsistencies across
waves, only the 2008 and 2012 waves can be used for this comparison. I find
little evidence to support the hypothesis that households use increased remit-
tances for migrant members as an instrument of consumption smoothing. As
can be seen in Table 2.5, domestic remittances do not react in a statistically
significant way to additional harmful degree days, although these do increase
with beneficial degree days. This implies that domestic remittances do not
serve as insurance against bad harvests, since they move in identical directions
(e.g. with DD), or do not change at all. This finding is in line with recent
evidence presented by Burgess et al. [2017], who show that rural households
in India are indeed very imperfectly insured against weather shocks.12
Domestic remittances might be dominated by household members living in
nearby towns or villages, and might therefore be subject to the same, spatially
12Domestic remittances also exhibit no relationship with precipitation levels at the location
of the receiving household.
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Table 2.5: Effects of the weather on remittances received by households
Dep.var.: Remittances received from: Domestic Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Sh) Yes/No ln(Sh) Yes/No
Temperature:
Average DD 0.38∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.00
(0.12) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00)
Average HDD -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Controls:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years included 2008,2012 2008,2012 2008,2012 2008,2012
Observations 7,588 7,588 7,588 7,588
Mean remittance, if received (th. Sh.) 163.57 339.05
% HHs who received 12.65 0.33
Notes: All specifications include controls for total precipitation and its square. Standard
errors robust to spatial and serial correlation following Conley [1999], using code from
Hsiang [2010] in parenthesis. They assume a discrete cut-off for spatial correlation of errors
at 50 km and six period lags. Stars indicate statistical significance (assuming district-level
clustering): *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. All models include household controls:
age, age squared, gender, and level of education of the household head.
correlated weather shocks as the household of origin. In this sense, they might
not be well suited for insuring against income shocks. While the NPS does
not contain detailed enough information on the origin of these remittances, it
does include a separate category for remittances received from abroad. Foreign
remittances are more suitable candidates for income insurance, since they are
not likely to be subject to the same shocks as the household of origin. However,
Columns (3) and (4) show that this is hardly the case. Households are not more
likely to receive higher remittances after experiencing more or less DD/HDDs,
as seen in Column (3). More importantly, just 0.33% of the households in
the sample receive remittances from abroad, and this share is not affected by
weather conditions, as seen in Column (4).
All in all, it appears that while weather shocks might indeed push Tanza-
nian individuals to migrate, particularly men in prime-working age and middle
aged women, this does not translate in detectable increases in transfers to the
households members left behind. This does not mean that individual income
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and consumption do not benefit from migration: as Beegle et al. [2011] show,
the potential gains from migration at the individual level in Tanzania are large.
The evidence I present shows instead that remittances from members living
elsewhere do not appear to be a significantly large mechanism for consumption
smoothing among household of origin, in the face of temperature shocks.
2.6 Conclusion
This Chapter makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First,
it shows that satellite data is a useful tool for capturing weather conditions in
areas where monitoring stations are sparse or completely unavailable. Satel-
lite products have a higher variation than reanalysis products in these areas,
because they don’t rely on in situ measurements nor global climate models,
and have high spatial and temporal resolutions. I show that a regular finding
in the literature, namely the non-linear relationship between temperature and
agricultural yields, can be detected using MODIS satellite temperature and
CHIRPS reanalysis precipitation data, two public datasets with almost global
coverage.
The second main contribution is the analysis of farmer responses, using
a panel of agricultural households in Tanzania. I find that as well as low
precipitation, extreme temperatures significantly affect yields of staple crops.
This has important implications for studies on rural income dynamics, as they
highlight the importance of an often omitted variable. Households react to
this by increasing the area planted with cash crops and the number of trees
of permanent crops, during the following growing season. This is consistent
with a model in which households smooth consumption during bad harvests
by taking loans, which I also observe. Finally, I document the migration
patterns driven by extreme temperatures and show that although young men
and middle aged women are indeed more likely to migrate after increased
temperatures, this does not translate in higher remittances for the household
of origin. Household consumption levels do not seem to be affected by weather
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outcomes, however, meaning that the mechanism for consumption smoothing
among the large majority of households that do not grow cash or permanent
crops remains unclear, and possibly related to asset stocks.

Chapter 3
Temperature and agriculture:
how do farmers respond to
extreme heat?
3.1 Introduction
Extreme weather events are forecasted to become a more regular phenomenon
over the course of this Century (IPCC [2014]). Subsistence farmers in devel-
oping countries will be exposed to potentially large losses, and their capacity
to adapt will be put to the test. Chapter 1 showed how weather gridded prod-
ucts, such as satellite and reanalysis data, can be useful tools for the research
community in understanding the impact of extreme weather events. Using
a simple model of production and consumption households, in this Chapter
we will aim to shed further light on the nature of temperature shocks, the
magnitude of their impact in two very different geographical contexts, and the
varying ways in which farms react to them.
This Chapter uses a unique micro-dataset of Peruvian farmers for years
2007-2015 and combines it with high resolution, daily weather data. In line
with the findings from Chapter 1, we show how satellite imagery, geo-matched
with existing household surveys, can help overcome shortcomings in meteoro-
logical data, a major constraint to study the economic effects of temperature
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in developing countries. The public availability of these data means that it is
feasible to replicate our study in different countries.
Our study then provides two key contributions to the literature. First, we
estimate the relationship between temperature and agricultural productivity
using observational data at farm level. Most previous studies have identified
this relation using controlled agronomic experiments (see for instance Abrol
and Ingram [1996] or Peng et al. [2004]) or data aggregated by administrative
units, such as U.S counties, or African countries (see for example, Schlenker
and Roberts [2009]).1 While informative, these approaches have a number of
limitations. Agronomic experiments may fail to account for relevant human,
institutional, and technological factors. Similarly, using aggregated data may
hide important within-unit heterogeneity and attenuate the estimated effects.2
This Chapter contributes to the literature by providing farm-level estimates,
from a nationally representative sample of farmers.
Second, we estimate the effect of extremely hot temperatures on agricul-
tural yields. The use of rich micro-data and a production function approach
allows us to examine how this effect is driven by changes in total factor produc-
tivity, output and input use. Thus, we can examine the short-run economic re-
sponses of farmers, that help us understand farmers’ ability to mitigate weather
shocks. As Burke and Emerick [2016] show evidence that over recent decades
farmers had a limited ability to adapt to climate change, our results are also
informative about potential long term effects.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the coast and highlands of Peru. These
two geographical regions have significantly different socio-economic and cli-
1Efforts for developed countries have flourished during recent years, as reviewed by Car-
leton and Hsiang [2016] and Auffhammer and Schlenker [2014] among others. A related
literature focuses on the relationship between rainfall and yields has received slightly more
attention. For instance, in a study of the determinants of land invasions, Hidalgo et al.
[2010] estimate the economic impact of rainfall on a sample of Brazilian households and
find a similar non-linear relationship as the one we observe with temperatures. Similarly,
Auffhammer et al. [2012] use state-level data to show that changing rainfall patterns over
the last half a century affected India’s rice yields negatively.
2A related paper is Welch et al. [2010]. They estimate the impact of solar radiation,
average maximum and minimum temperatures on rice yields in a panel of 227 irrigated
farms in South East Asia.
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matic characteristics. The coast is hotter with little rain, relatively richer, and
with a more modern, market oriented, agriculture. In contrast, the highlands
are cooler, more reliant on precipitation, and with a larger share of subsistence
farmers. This makes Peru an especially interesting case study: it allows us to
test how different forms of agriculture are affected by, and react to, extreme
heat.
We start by documenting a non-linear relation between temperature and
agricultural yields in both regions. Similar to previous studies, we find a pos-
itive effect of temperature up to certain threshold, above which extreme heat
becomes harmful. The magnitude is economically significant. For instance, in
the highlands, an increase of 1℃ in the average growing season temperature
above the optimal level would decrease output per hectare by more than 10
percent. This estimate is comparable to the 8 percent losses documented in
Chapter 1 for a sample of Tanzanian farms.
In this study, we go beyond study of impacts on yields, and exploiting
rich, farm level data, we shed light on the adjustments taking place at the
household level. Using data on input use and endowments, we estimate a
production function and document a similar non-linear effect of temperature
on total factor productivity (TFP). We then examine farmers’ responses to
extreme heat. To guide the empirical analysis, we propose a simple model
of consumer-producer households in which extreme heat enters as a negative
productivity shock. At the core of the model is the observation that some
farmers may be living close to subsistence levels and, hence, may be less able
to reduce consumption in response to lower productivity. The model provides
drastically different predictions for subsistence and non-subsistence farmers.
Non-subsistence farmers respond to the drop in productivity by reducing flex-
ible inputs (such as hired labor) and total output. In contrast, subsistence
farmers respond by using their endowments (land and domestic labor) more
intensively to offset the drop in agricultural output. To the extent that un-
cultivated land or non-working time provide a future return, for instance by
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increasing productivity via fallowing or facilitating investment in human cap-
ital, this short-run response could have detrimental effects in the long-term.
With this framework in mind, we examine the effect of extreme heat on
input use and find evidence consistent with the model predictions. In the case
of coastal farmers, we observe a significant decrease in hired workers and to-
tal agricultural output. However in the highlands, land use increases while
total output remains unchanged, despite also experiencing a drop in produc-
tivity. This last result can be explained if farmers are close to a minimum
consumption threshold. To further explore this interpretation, we distinguish
between subsistence and non-subsistence farmers using indicators of extreme
poverty. We find that the increase in land use is driven by extreme poor farm-
ers. Furthermore, we also find that, among this group, extreme heat increases
household members’ work in agricultural activities, and the likelihood of child
labor.
Evidence of this sort has not yet been documented for developing coun-
tries. Efforts to study farmer’s reactions and adaptation strategies in this
context have so far relied heavily on farmers’ self-report exposure to weather
shocks.3 However, the reliability of self-reported data has been called into
question (Guiteras et al. [2015a]).
Finally, we use our estimates to simulate the potential effect on yields of
evenly distributed increments of 1.5℃ to 3℃ in average daily temperatures.
These increments are consistent with scenarios RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 of the 4th
IPCC Assessment Report. Our simulations suggest important heterogeneous
impacts: while yields fall in the coast, they increase in the highlands. This
result is consistent with the notion that an increase in average temperatures
would have re-distributional effects across regions, with low-lying areas suffer-
ing the most and currently colder areas benefiting (see, for example, Deschenes
3For example, Hisali et al. [2011] study farmers’ self reported exposure to different kinds
of climate shocks and their stated strategies of adaptation, and find that temporary measures
like reducing consumption, borrowing and relying on savings are common. Similarly Akpalu
et al. [2015], Di Falco et al. [2011], Gbetibouo [2009] among others, find that access to credit
and awareness of climate change are important determinants of self reported farm-level
adaptation.
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and Greenstone [2007] for similar results across US states). This exercise com-
plements more sophisticated modelling efforts of global food production and
trade by providing regional adaptation margins estimated at the farm level.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the
main characteristics of Peru’s coast and highlands, and develops an analytical
framework to guide the empirical analysis. Section 3.3 describes our data and
empirical strategy. Section 3.4 presents the main results and additional checks.
Section 3.5 presents the simulations of climate change scenarios. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Peru’s climatic regions
Peru has three main climatic regions: the coast to the west, the Andean high-
lands, and the Amazon jungle to the east.4 In the present study we focus on
the coast and the highlands (see Figure 3.2 for a location map).5 These re-
gions have very different climates, average socio-economic characteristics, and
production methods. This makes Peru an especially interesting case study: it
allows us to test how different forms of agriculture are affected by, and react
to, extreme temperature.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for our sample of farming house-
holds. There are several relevant observations for the empirical analysis. First,
farmers in the highlands are poorer and closer to subsistence levels. Their av-
erage consumption is almost half of their coastal counterparts and the poverty
rates are significantly higher. For instance, the rate of extreme poverty is 20
percent in the highlands but only 4 percent in the coast.6 They are also more
4This classification is based on altitude and position relative to the Andean mountains.
The coast is the region from 0 to 500 meters above sea level (masl) on the west range of the
Andes. Highlands range from 500 to almost 7,000 masl, while the jungle is the region of low
lands (below 1000 masl) to the east of the Andes.
5We drop the jungle due to small sample size and poor quality of satellite data: many
observations are missing due to cloud coverage.
6A household is considered extreme poor if its expenditure falls below the value of a
minimum food basket. In contrast, the poverty line includes other essential goods and
services in addition to food (INEI, 2000).
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics by climatic region
Coast Highlands p-value
(1)=(2)
(1) (2) (3)
Household Characteristics
Daily per capita expenditure 4.040 2.347 0.000
Poor (%) 26.1 55.0 0.000
Extreme poor (%) 4.5 20.9 0.000
Has at least 1 unmet need (%) 29.5 38.2 0.000
Child labor (%) 13.2 39.0 0.000
Household size 4.406 4.312 0.001
HoH completed primary educ. (%) 59.0 49.8 0.000
Agricultural characteristics
Value of ag. output (in constant 2007 Soles) 3052.7 682.0 0.000
Output per hectare (in constant 2007 Soles/hectare) 2323.8 1077.3 0.000
Land used (ha) 2.381 1.906 0.000
Hire workers (%) 55.8 47.1 0.000
Nr. HH members work in agric. 2.197 2.315 0.000
Fruits (% total output) 31.8 3.5 0.000
Tubers (% total output) 5.6 35.6 0.000
Cereals (% total output) 30.2 31.4 0.010
Use tractor (%) 54.1 16.4 0.000
Use fertilizer (%) 76.8 74.4 0.000
Use pesticides (%) 65.1 41.2 0.000
Uncultivated land (% of land holding) 12.1 44.8 0.000
Irrigated land (% land holding) 82.3 28.7 0.000
Weather in last growing season
Average temperature (in C) 33.1 21.4 0.000
% days with HDD 81.9 7.6 0.000
Precipitation (mm/day) 0.907 3.514 0.000
Observations 7,969 47,026
Notes: Sample restricted to farming households in Coast and Highlands. Columns (1)
and (2) display mean values. Column (3) shows the p-value of a mean comparison test
between both regions. Expenditure and agricultural output are measured in 2007 USD.
HoH=household head, HH=household, HDD=harmful degree days
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likely to have least one basic need unmet, and experience substantially higher
rates of child labor.7
Second, there are significant differences in agricultural practices and out-
comes between both regions. Agriculture in the coast is more modern and
market-oriented than in the highlands. Coastal farmers cultivate more cash
crops, such as cereals (corn and rice) and fruit trees, obtain higher output (to-
tal and per unit of land) and are more likely to use modern, capital intensive,
inputs such as tractors, fertilizers, and pesticides. Most of their land also has
access to some form of irrigation.8
In contrast, highlands farmers have less access to irrigation and are more
reliant on subsistence crops, such as tubers (potatoes). They also have smaller
plots and use their land less intensively. For instance, the share of land left
uncultivated is around 12% in the coast, but more than 40% in the highlands.9
This last observation is consistent with crop rotation and fallowing, practices
common in traditional agriculture.
Finally, climatic conditions are also very different. The coast has a sub-
tropical climate with mild to hot temperatures and very little rainfall, while
the highlands have cooler temperatures and more rain during the growing
season. These climatic differences become more apparent when observing the
distribution of daily temperature in these two regions (see Figure 3.1).
These features suggest that coast and highland production units are sig-
nificantly different. This might, for example, limit the access that highland
farmers have to mitigation technologies or shape the response of farmers to
7The measure of poverty by basic unmet needs is widespread in Latin America since the
1980s In the case of Peru, a household is considered poor if it fulfils one of the following
conditions: it has dirt floors, there are more than three members living in one room, the
household does not have a flush toilet (connected to sewage or septic tank), there is at least
one child aged 6 to 12 not attending school, or the household head did not complete primary
school.
8Given the potential importance of irrigation as a method to counteract the damage from
high temperatures, a branch of the literature decides to exclude areas with high irrigation
coverage, see for instance Schlenker and Roberts [2009]. We prefer instead to present results
splitting the sample between two regions and controlling for the share of irrigated land.
9Uncultivated land is land without seasonal nor permanent crops. This includes land
covered with grasses, shrubs or woods, or left fallow.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of daily average temperature by climatic region
(a) Coast (b) Highlands
Notes: Figures depict share of days in growing season in each temperature bin.
extreme weather events. We argue that the Peruvian coast and highlands
serve as case studies for two different models of agriculture usually found in
developing countries: one that is more modern, market-oriented, and capital
intensive (coast), and another that has a smaller scale, less capital intensive,
and directed towards own consumption (highlands).
3.2.2 Analytical framework
We propose a simple model to examine the effect of extreme temperature on
farmers’ economic decisions, such as input use and total output. At the core
of our model is the observation that, in contrast to modern farming, some
producers in developing countries may be close to subsistence levels. This
feature creates drastically different short-run responses to extreme tempera-
ture, which we then examine in the data. Importantly, the model highlights
potential channels for weather shocks to have long-term effects on farmer’s
well-being.
3.2.2.1 Environment
Consider a producer-consumer household that lives for two periods, or agricul-
tural campaigns, t = 1,2. The household has utility in a given period t equal
to Ut(ct− s, lt), where ct is consumption, lt is leisure, and s is a minimum
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consumption threshold, below which utility is very low or undefined.10 The
farm is the only source of income of the household. The agricultural output Y
is defined by the production function f(Tt,Lht ,Ldt ,At), where At is total factor
productivity (TFP), Tt is the amount of land, Lht is the amount of labor hired
(market labor), and Ldt is the amount of labor provided by households mem-
bers (domestic labor). Households are endowed with 1 unit of domestic labor
and land. We also normalize the prices of consumption and agricultural goods
to 1.
Market labor can be hired in perfectly competitive markets at wage
w. The wage rate is defined by the opportunity cost of workers in a non-
agricultural activity.11 In contrast, domestic labor can only be used in the
household farm or consumed as leisure. This assumption could reflect, for
instance, imperfect labor markets, or input specificity.12 Note that domestic
labor does not need to include only adult workers, but could be interpreted,
for instance, as child labor.
We assume that there are no land markets.13 Land can be used for farm
production or left uncultivated. Uncultivated land generates a return r in the
next period. This return reflects the increase in future output from letting land
fallow or rotating crops. This benefit has been documented in the agronomic
and economic literature (Goldstein and Udry [2008]). We assume that this
return is equal to r(1− Tt−1), where Tt−1 is the amount of land cultivated
in the previous period. Other than letting land fallow, the household cannot
invest, save, lend, or borrow.
Total factor productivity, At, is determined by a host of variables such
as quality of soil, water availability, and farming technology. Importantly,
10A particular example of this type of preferences is the Stone-Geary utility function
U = α ln(c−s)+β ln l.
11This assumption reduces the need to worry about endogenous local agricultural wages.
12Results are similar if we assume that domestic labor can be sold in local markets but can
only be used in agriculture. In that case, weather shocks would still reduce the opportunity
cost of leisure although not by decreasing farm’s productivity but local agricultural wages.
13The assumption of imperfect land markets is not crucial for the model predictions, but
simplifies the model analysis and exposition.
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At is affected by local weather conditions. Farmers know the distribution of
weather outcomes (or climate) in their area, but are nonetheless exposed to
unanticipated weather shocks during the growing season, after they have made
her initial choice of inputs. After being exposed to a weather shock, farmers
can adjust their input choice, although limited by some inputs being fixed.
Estimating this short-run response to unanticipated weather shocks is at the
core of our empirical analysis.
3.2.2.2 Short-run input choice
We focus on farmers’ short-run decisions in period 1. These decisions are taken
after the agricultural campaign has started. At that moment, land has already
been planted (used) and farmers may adjust the amount of inputs in response
to the weather shock. We assume that labor (both market and domestic)
is flexible. However, land is not: farmers can increase its quantity, but not
decrease it. This assumption reflects a feature of Peruvian farming in which
some crops, like potatoes, have flexible planting schedules and can be planted
throughout the growing season.
The household problem is to choose a new level of inputs in response to
the weather shock. This problem can be written as:
maximize
Tt,Lmt ,L
d
t
2∑
t=1
E[Ut(ct− s, lt)] (3.1)
subject to ct = f(At,Tt,Lmt ,Ldt )−wLmt + r(1−Tt−1), (3.2)
lt = 1−Ldt , and T1 ≥ T˜1, (3.3)
where T˜1 is the quantity of land already planted, i.e. the long-run optimal
choice before the weather shock.
We start by assuming that the consumption level is above the minimum
threshold. In that case, the short run choice of inputs in period 1 is defined
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by the following conditions:
∂U1
∂c1
∂f
∂Ld1
− ∂U1
∂l1
= 0
∂f
∂Lm1
−w = 0
∂U1
∂c1
∂f
∂T1
− r∂EU2
∂c2
+λ= 0
λ(T1− T˜1) = 0
There are some relevant observations. First, the amount of market labor
depends of marginal productivity of labor and market wage, as in standard
production models. Second, the amount of domestic labor and land depend of
the opportunity cost of leisure and unused land. These opportunity costs are
increasing in the marginal productivity of the input and the marginal utility
of current consumption, in the case of leisure, and future consumption, in the
case of land.
This last observation highlights the trade-offs faced by farmers: one be-
tween farm profits (consumption) and leisure, and another between present
and future consumption. The dynamic link is created by the returns to land
fallowing, which makes not using part of the land endowment similar to an
investment decision.
3.2.2.3 Response to extreme heat
We analyze the effect of extreme heat as a negative shock to total factor
productivity.14 How do farmers respond to this shock? The response depends
of whether consumption is above or at the minimum consumption threshold, s.
We call these two types of farmers: non-subsistence and subsistence farmers,
respectively.
If the level of consumption is above the minimum threshold, then lower
productivity reduces use of hired labor. The effect on domestic labor and land
14This assumption is based on previous findings of negative effects of extreme temperature
on crop yields, as described more extensively in Chapter 1. In Section 3.4, we test empirically
this assumption for the Peruvian case.
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is, however, ambiguous. This happens because marginal productivity falls but
the marginal utility of current consumption increases. If this latter effect is
not too large, then extreme heat would reduce domestic labor and keep land
use unchanged.15 This implies a reduction in agricultural output.16
The response is different for subsistence farmers. In that case, the drop
in productivity could push consumption below the minimum threshold. This
is undesirable and forces the household to direct its resources of land and
domestic labor to increase farm output. However, the quantity of hired labor
drops, because its marginal productivity is now smaller and it still has to be
paid the non-agricultural market wage w.
Table 3.2 summarizes the model empirical predictions. Note that in both
cases, subsistence and non-subsistence farmers, crop yields (Y/T ) drop, as a
result of the productivity shock. For non-subsistence farmers this is followed
by a drop in output, while for subsistence farmers the shock triggers instead an
increase in land use. The main insight is that, in contrast to non-subsistence
farmers, subsistence farmers would respond to extreme temperature by using
their endowments (land and domestic labor) more intensively to offset the
reduction in agricultural output. To the extent that uncultivated land provides
a future return, for instance by increasing productivity via fallowing or crop
rotation, this short run response could have detrimental effects in the long-
term.17
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data
We combine household surveys with satellite imagery to construct a com-
prehensive dataset with information on agricultural, socio-demographic, and
weather variables at farm level. The dataset includes around 55,000 households
15Farmers would actually like to reduce land but this is, by assumption, not feasible in
the short run.
16We would also observe a decrease in agricultural output even if domestic labor or land
use increase, since this would happen only if consumption decreases.
17A similar argument could be made for leisure if it is used to invest in human capital.
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Table 3.2: Main empirical predictions
Effect of extreme Non-subsistence Subsistence
temperature on farmers farmers
c > s c= s
Yields (Y/T ) - -
Agricultural output (Y ) - 0
Hired labor (Lh) - -
Domestic labor (Ld) ? +
Land (T ) ? +
Notes: Empirical predictions derived from our model of agri-
cultural productions by household type.
located in Peru’s coast and highlands, and covers years 2007-2015.18
3.3.1.1 Agricultural and socio-demographic data
We use repeated cross sections of the Peruvian Living Standards Survey
(ENAHO), an annual household survey collected by the National Statistics
Office (INEI). This survey is collected in a continuous, rolling, basis. This
guarantees that the sample is evenly distributed over the course of the cal-
endar year. Importantly, the ENAHO includes the geographical coordinates
of each primary sampling unit, or survey block.19 In rural areas, this corre-
sponds to a village or cluster of dwellings. We use this information to link
the household data to satellite imagery. Figure 3.2 depicts the location of the
observations used in this study.
The ENAHO contains rich information on agricultural activities in the 12
months prior to the interview. We use this information to obtain measures
of agricultural output and input use. To measure real agricultural output, we
construct a Laspeyres index with quantity produced of each crop and local
prices.20 Land use is obtained by adding the size of parcels dedicated to
seasonal and permanent crops. We observe the size and use of each parcel,
but not which specific crops are cultivated in each one. Since most farmers
cultivate several crops, this limitation of the data prevents us from calculating
18Our sample includes households with some agricultural activity. We drop 282 farmers
reporting land holdings larger than 100 has.
19There are more than 3,400 unique coordinate points.
20As weights, we use the median price of each crop in a given department in 2007.
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crop-specific yields. Instead, our analysis focuses on output per hectare (Y/T )
and total factor productivity.
We use self-reported farm expenditures on external workers to obtain
measures of extensive and intensive use of hired labor. Labor information
on household members is available for the week prior to the interview. We
use this information to obtain the number of hours spent working in agricul-
ture, and an indicator of child labor.21 We use these variables as proxies for
domestic labor.
We complement the household survey with data on soil quality from the
Harmonized World Soil Database Fischer et al. [2008]. This dataset provides
information on several soil characteristics relevant for crop production on a 9
km square grid.22
3.3.1.2 Temperature and precipitation
Similar to other developing countries, Peru has very few and sparse weather
monitoring stations. To overcome this data limitation, we use satellite im-
agery.23 For temperature, we use the MOD11C1 product provided by NASA.24
This is same source used in Chapter 1 and provides LST data on a daily basis,
with a spatial resolution of 0.05×0.05 degrees.
Precipitation data comes from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Pre-
cipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) product Funk et al. [2015], also used
in Chapter 1. CHIRPS is a re-analysis gridded dataset that combines satellite
imagery with monitoring station data. It provides estimates of daily precip-
itation with a resolution of 0.05× 0.05 degrees. As seen in Chapter 1, these
21Information on number of hours of work is only available for individuals 14 years and
older. Child labor is an indicator equal to one if a child aged 6-14 reports doing any activity
to obtain some income. This includes helping in own farm, selling services or goods, or
helping relatives, but excludes household chores.
22The soil qualities include nutrient availability and retention, rooting conditions, oxygen
availability, excess salts, toxicity and workability.
23A more extensive discussion on the alternative weather data sources available, as well
as their respective advantages and limitations is presented in the Chapter 1.
24The satellite estimates are very precise. Validation studies comparing satellite estimates
and ground readings find a discrepancy of only 0.1-0.4 Celsius degrees Coll et al. [2005, 2009],
Wan and Li [2008].
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Figure 3.2: ENAHO observations 2007-2015
two sources can successfully capture weather conditions in areas with sparse
monitoring station coverage, and can be used to study weather impacts on
agricultural yields.
We combine the weather data with household’s location to obtain daily
measures of temperature and precipitation for each farmer during the last
completed growing season.25 We fix the growing season to months October
through March. This period corresponds to the southern hemisphere’s Spring
and Summer.
3.3.2 Empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical strategy is to estimate the effect of extreme heat on
agricultural outcomes. Guided by the analytical framework laid out in Section
25We assign the outcomes for growing season t (October t = 1 through March t), to any
household interviewed as of April t and up to March t+1. We believe this approach is
conservative since it only assigns weather outcomes to households once the growing seasons
has finished.
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3.2.2, we examine the effect of temperature on total factor productivity (TFP),
and farmers’ short run responses to this productivity shock in the form of
changes in input use.
3.3.2.1 Identification of shocks to TFP with a Production Func-
tion approach
In order to estimate the effect of weather shocks on TFP, we start by assuming
a Cobb-Douglas agricultural production function:
Yidt = AidtTαidtL
γ
idte
idt ,
where Yidt is agricultural output of farmer i in locality d at time t. idt is
a random shock that affects output after input choice is made and thus is, by
definition, uncorrelated to input use. T and L are quantities of land and labor
(hired and domestic), and A is total factor productivity. 26
We assume that Aidt depends of local weather conditions, (ωdt), in locality
d during growing season t, household and farm characteristics (φZi), time-
invariant local economic and environmental conditions (ρd), a common trend
or productivity (ψt) and (potentially) other unobserved heterogeneity (vidt).
In particular: Aidt = exp(g(β,ωdt) +φZi+ρd+ψt+vidt) , where g(β,ωdt) is a
non-linear function to be specified later. The parameter of interest is β which
describes the relation between weather and total factor productivity.
Combining these structural assumptions, we obtain the following regres-
sion model:
lnYidt = α lnTidt+γ lnLidt+g(β,ωdt) +φZi+ρd+ψt+ ξidt, (3.4)
where the error term ξidt = it+vidt. To estimate this model, we use measures
of agricultural output and inputs, include a vector of household and farm char-
acteristics as a proxy for Zi, and replace ρd and ψt with district and growing
26The inclusion of other inputs such as capital and materials (e.g. fertilizers, pesticides)
does not change any of the empirical results, as seen in the next section, so we omit them
in this exposition.
3.3. Methods 75
season fixed effects.27 The main difference between the model estimated in this
case and the one used for Chapter 1 is its cross sectional nature. We cluster
the standard errors at district level to account for spatial and serial correlation
in the error term.28
To the extent that TFP determinants are fully captured by our set of
controls variables and fixed effects (i.e.,vidt = 0 ), we can estimate (3.4) using
an OLS regression. If that is not the case, the unobserved heterogeneity would
create an omitted variables problem and render OLS estimates inconsistent.
To address this concern, we complement our OLS estimates with a 2SLS
model using endowments (i.e., household size and area of of land owned) as
instruments for input use. The motivation to use these instrument comes from
the observation that, in the absence of input markets, the quantity used of land
and domestic labor would be proportional to the household endowment.29 The
validity of these instruments would require that endowments affect output only
through its effect on input use, i.e., endowments should not be conditionally
correlated to unobserved heterogeneity, vidt.30
In line with previous studies, we also examine the effect of temperature
on other proxies of productivity, such as agricultural yields. We are unable to
calculate crop-specific yields (except for a small share of farmers) so instead
we use output per hectare. The main advantage of using this outcome is that
we do not need to estimate the contribution of inputs to total output which
reduces endogeneity concerns. The main disadvantage is that, being a partial
measure of productivity, agricultural yields capture the effect of changes in
27A district is the smallest administrative jurisdiction in Peru and approximately half the
size of the average U.S. county. Our sample includes 1,320 districts out of a total of 1,854.
28Results are robust to clustering standard errors at provincial level (see Table 3.6). A
third alternative often discussed in the literature is to correct spatial and serial correlation
using the procedure suggested by Conley [1999]. However, this approach is not feasible in
our case due to conformability errors as described in Hsiang [2016].
29With perfect input markets, we would obtain the standard result of separability of con-
sumption and production decisions and there would be no correlation between endowments
and input use Benjamin [1992]. Empirically, this would create a problem of weak instru-
ments.
30The interpretation of this IV strategy would be as a local average treatment effect, since
the coefficients would be identified from farmers subject to input market imperfections.
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TFP but also changes in input use.
To estimate the effect of temperature on agricultural yields, we estimate
a reduced form version of equation (3.4) without controlling for input use. We
use a similar specification to examine the effect of temperature on quantity of
inputs such as land, market and domestic labor. The estimated regression is:
yidt = g(β,ωdt) +φZi+ρd+ψt+ ξidt, (3.5)
where y is the outcome of interest and g(·) is a non-linear function of weather
conditions. Similar to equation (3.4) , we control for several household and
farm characteristics, and include district and growing season fixed effects.
However, the identification assumption is less restrictive: we need that, con-
ditional on the included controls, stochastic deviations from average weather
characteristics are uncorrelated to the error term.
3.3.2.2 Modelling the relation between weather and productivity
We model the relation between weather and agricultural productivity as a
function of cumulative exposure to heat and water. This approach is based
on the assumption of time separability, i.e., weather outcomes have the same
impact on output per hectare whenever they occur within a given growing
season. This assumption implies that what matters its the cumulative exposure
to heat and water, not the time when they occur.
Similar to Schlenker and Roberts [2009], and as done in Chapter 1, we
construct two measures of cumulative exposure to heat during the growing
seasons: degree days (DD) and harmful degree days (HDD).31 DD measures
the cumulative exposure to temperatures between 8℃ and an upper threshold
τhigh, while HDD captures exposure to hotter temperatures (above τhigh). The
inclusion of HDD allows for potentially different, non-linear, effects of extreme
31We complement this approach with a second, more flexible specification to examine
the robustness of our results. In particular, we define 1℃ intervals as temperature bins
containing the share of days in the growing season with daily temperatures within that
range. We recursively replace g(ω) in Equation 3.4 with each of the temperature bins and
estimate a separate effect for each one-degree temperature threshold. Results are displayed
in the bottom panel of Fig 3.3.
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heat.32
Note that we calculate degree days for an average day not for the entire
season. This is, however, simply a re-scaling and does not affect the results.
Similarly, we measure exposure to precipitation using the average daily precip-
itation (PP) during the growing season and its square. With these definitions
in mind, we parametrize the function relating weather to productivity g(β,ωdt)
as:
g(β,ωdt) = β0DDdt+β1HDDdt+β2PPdt+β3PP 2dt. (3.6)
Previous studies in U.S. have set the threshold τhigh between 29-32℃,
respectively Deschenes and Greenstone [2007], Schlenker and Roberts [2009].
These estimates, however, are likely to be crop and context dependent and
hence might not be transferable to our case.33 For that reason, we prefer to
use a data-driven approach and estimate the value of this threshold, which
consists of an iterative regression algorithm described in Chapter 1 and used
by Schlenker and Roberts [2009] and Tack et al. [2017]. We estimate an upper
threshold for the whole country but, given the substantial climatic and agro-
nomic differences between coast and highlands, also for each region.34 Our
estimates suggest using a value of τhigh equal to 32℃ for the whole sample,
27℃ for the coast, and 35℃ for the highlands.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Effect on agricultural productivity
Our first set of results examines the effect of temperature on agricultural pro-
ductivity. Following the existing literature we focus on output per unit of land
(Y/T). However, we also examine the effect on output conditional on input
use. We interpret this result as the effect on total factor productivity (TFP).
Table 3.3 presents our main results pooling all the farmers and splitting
32For a detailed description of the construction of DD and HDD variables see Chapter 1.
33In addition to differences in crop mix and agricultural technology, we use a different mea-
sure of temperature (i.e. land surface temperature). These factors make previous estimates
not applicable to our case study.
34See Appendix B.1.1 for a detailed discussion of the estimation procedure and results.
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the sample in two climatic regions: coast and highlands. Figure 3.3 plots
the estimated relation between temperature and agricultural yields. The top
panel uses the piece-wise linear specification using DD and HDD as measures
of exposure to heat, while the bottom panel uses a more flexible specification
with the share of days in a growing seasons within each 1℃ interval.
We find a clear non-linear relationship between measures of productivity
and temperature. Heat has a beneficial effect up to a certain optimal temper-
ature.35 Above this level, extreme heat has a negative effect on productivity.
The magnitude of the effect is economically significant. Our estimates imply.
for instance, that an increase of 1℃ on the average growing season tempera-
ture above the optimal level would decrease agricultural yields by more than
10% in the highlands and almost 20% in the coast.
Table 3.3: Effect of temperature on agricultural productivity
Coast Highlands
Y/T TFP TFP Y/T TFP TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temperature:
Average DD 0.149∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.104∗ 0.011 0.013 0.021∗∗
(0.059) (0.054) (0.056) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Average HDD -0.195∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.118∗ -0.103∗ -0.127∗
(0.065) (0.054) (0.054) (0.068) (0.061) (0.064)
Fixed Effects:
Input controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 7,962 7,961 7,961 47,020 47,019 47,019
R-squared 0.195 0.349 0.334 0.267 0.446 0.409
F-stat. (first stage) 311.3 1789.5
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at dis-
trict level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
All regressions include as controls: district and growing season fixed effects household
head’s demographics (age, age2, gender, and educational attainment), indicators of soil
characteristics, average precipitation, and its square. Columns 1 and 4 use log of output
per hectare as outcome, while the rest of columns use log of total output. Columns 2-3
and 5-6 include log of inputs as additional controls. Inputs include land used, house-
hold members’ hours worked in agriculture , and farms’ expenditure on hired workers.
Columns 3 and 6 use endowments (land owned and household size) as instruments for
quantities of land and domestic labor.
35As previously discussed, we estimate this point to be 27℃ in the coast, and 35℃ in the
highlands.
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Figure 3.3: Non-linear relationship between temperature and agricultural yields
(a) Coast (b) Highlands
Notes: Top panels depict piece-wise function for temperature, including degree-days and harmful
degree days at each region’s respective thresholds. Bottom panel shows coefficients of individual
regressions of model 3.5 using 1℃ bins that measure the fraction of the growing season spent in
that temperature. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
3.4.2 Farmers’ short-run responses
Our second set of results uses the richness of our micro data to examine the
responses of farmers to the productivity shock of extreme heat. This is impor-
tant not only to understand sort-term adaptation strategies, but also to better
assess the effect of extreme heat on total agricultural output. This effect is not
necessarily the same as the change in productivity, since it could be amplified
or attenuated by farmer’s change in input use.
Using the analytical framework in Section 3.2.2 as a guide, we examine
the effect of temperature on total output, land use, and hired labor. Table
3.4 displays the results for the coast and highlands. Our findings highlight
substantial differences in the response between these two regions.
80 Chapter 3
In the coast, extreme heat (HDD) reduces total output and use of hired
labor, in the extensive margin. An increase of 1℃ in the average HDD reduce
output by 17% and the likelihood of hiring workers by almost 3 percentage
points. This findings are consistent with the effects of a drop in productivity
for a non-subsistence farmer.36
A different picture emerges in the highlands, where farmers are poorer
and a larger proportion practices subsistence farming. We observe a similar
reduction in the intensive use of hired labor as in the coast. However, there
is an increase in land use and no significant effect on total output, despite
the documented drop in productivity. This last result highlights the impor-
tance of taking into account human responses when estimating the effect of
weather shocks. In this case, the increase in land use seems to offset the loss
of productivity.
Where do this extra land come from? As shown in Table 3.1, around 40%
of land in the highlands is not used for seasonal or permanent crops, but left
uncultivated: covered with grasses, shrubs and woodlands, or fallow.37 Leaving
land idle is not necessarily sub-optimal nor indicative of low quality. Instead, it
is a common practice in traditional agriculture as a way to improve future land
productivity. In that sense, it is more akin to an investment decision (Goldstein
and Udry [2008]). From this perspective, our results suggest a connexion
between short-run responses and long term impacts: the more intensive use of
land today might have negative effects on future land returns.
3.4.3 Subsistence vs non-subsistence farmers
We interpret our previous findings as evidence that subsistence farmers increase
input use to offset the loss of productivity and maintain a minimum level of
consumption. In this section we examine this interpretation in more detail.
To do so, we would need to observe how close a household was to a min-
36Interestingly, changes in DD, which are associated with increases in productivity have
an effect of similar magnitude but positive.
37Preliminary results suggest that most of the additional land comes from reduction in
areas covered with shrubs and woodlands. Note that this type of land is not necessarily
barren land, but could be land in later stages of a crop rotation process.
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Table 3.4: Effect of temperature on total output and input use
ln(output) ln(land used) Hired ln(expend. in
workers=1 hired workers)
Y T Lh Lh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coast:
Average DD 0.146∗∗ -0.004 0.029∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.062) (0.013) (0.010) (0.085)
Average HDD -0.174∗∗ 0.021 -0.028∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.071) (0.013) (0.009) (0.052)
Observations 7,962 7,962 7,962 4,436
R-squared 0.189 0.222 0.185 0.277
Highlands:
Average DD 0.005 -0.006 -0.000 0.028∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010)
Average HDD -0.046 0.073∗∗ 0.018 -0.135∗
(0.070) (0.036) (0.021) (0.080)
Observations 47,020 47,020 47,020 22,126
R-squared 0.266 0.325 0.155 0.290
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at district level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%. All regressions include district and growing season fixed
effects, average precipitation and its square, and same household and soil
controls as column 1 in Table 3.3
imum consumption threshold before the negative weather shock. We are un-
able to do this due to data limitations. Instead, we use an indicator of extreme
poverty to distinguish between subsistence and non-subsistence farmers.38 Ex-
treme poverty is highly correlated with climatic regions: incidence of extreme
poverty is 4% in the coast and more than 20% in the highlands. A potential
problem with using extreme poverty is that it may be an outcome of weather
shocks. For that reason, we complement this approach using an indicator
of having at least one unmet need, a more stable proxy for chronic poverty.
Guided by the analytical framework (see Table 3.2), we split the sample of
highland farmers between subsistence and non-subsistence farmers and exam-
ine the effect of temperature on land use (T ) and measures of domestic labor
38The extreme poverty line measures the value of a minimum food consumption.
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(Ld), such as number of hours worked in agricultural activities and child labor.
Table 3.5 displays the results. Consistent with our interpretation, we
find that the increase in land use is driven mostly by subsistence, extreme
poor, farmers. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence of a more intensive use
of domestic labor among this group. For instance, extreme heat seems to
increase the number of hours household members work in agriculture, as well
as the likelihood of child labor.39 In contrast, there is no significant effect on
non-subsistence farmers and the magnitude of the point estimates is smaller.
Table 3.5: Effect of temperature on land and domestic labor, by subsistence level
Using extreme poverty Using basic unmet needs
ln(land ln(hours Child ln(land ln(hours Child
used) agric. work) labor=1 used) agric. work) labor=1
T Ld Ld T Ld Ld
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subs. farmers
Average DD -0.010 -0.004 -0.020∗ -0.008 -0.016∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Average HDD 0.150∗ 0.120 0.197∗ 0.097∗ 0.067 0.063
(0.080) (0.077) (0.101) (0.050) (0.052) (0.056)
Observations 9,783 9,783 9,783 17,946 17,946 17,946
R-squared 0.382 0.251 0.235 0.377 0.225 0.208
Non-subs. farmers
Average DD -0.006 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Average HDD 0.056 0.011 0.016 0.032 -0.002 0.043
(0.036) (0.042) (0.029) (0.039) (0.051) (0.036)
Observations 37,173 37,173 37,173 29,023 29,023 29,023
R-squared 0.331 0.220 0.184 0.326 0.240 0.209
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district level. *
denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include
district and growing season fixed effects, average precipitation and its square, and same household
and soil controls as column 1 in Table 3.3. Columns 1-3 use an indicator of extreme poverty
to identify subsistence farmers, while columns 4-6 use an indicator of having at least 1 unmet
basic need. Sample includes only farmers located in the highlands Panel A and B split he sample
between subsistence and on-subsistence farmers. We classify farmers in these two categories using
an indicator of extreme poverty (columns 1-3) or an indicator of basic unmet needs (columns 4-6).
39Note that the reference period for these labor outcomes is the last week while exposure to
weather correspond to the last completed growing seasons. This may introduce measurement
error and an attenuation bias.
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3.4.4 Ancillary results
3.4.4.1 Robustness checks
Table 3.6 presents several robustness checks on the effect of temperature on
agricultural productivity. We focus on output per hectare, but results are sim-
ilar when estimating total factor productivity. First, we examine alternative
specifications. Column (1) adds to the baseline regression covariates of house-
hold endowments and farm controls (such as size of area owned, household size,
and share of irrigated land), while Column (2) includes department-by-growing
season fixed effects. This is a very demanding specification that flexibly ac-
counts for local trends in agricultural productivity. Column 3 estimates the
baseline model using a common HDD threshold of 32℃ for both regions, while
Column (4) clusters standard errors at province level (n=159) instead than
at district level. In all cases, the results remain similar and suggest strong
negative effects of extreme heat.
Second, we examine possible biases due to our definition of exposure to
temperature. Recall that our baseline results consider exposure to temperature
in the last completed growing season (October-March). This means, for exam-
ple, that for households interviewed in March 2010, we are assigning weather
variables for the period October 2008-March 2009. However, for households
interviewed a month later (April 2010) we would assign weather from period
October-2009-March 2010. If agricultural output is affected by the most re-
cent weather outcomes, then by assigning households the weather of the last
complete growing season we would introduce measurement error.
To examine the relevance of this issue, we first drop households inter-
viewed during the growing season (column 5). This is the group for which this
measurement error is most relevant. The magnitude of our estimates remain
comparable to the baseline result, although less precisely estimated. Note that
we are dropping almost half of the sample. Finally, we change the definition
of exposure to weather and use the 6 months prior to the interview, not the
growing season. The estimates become much smaller and statistically insignif-
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icant. These results suggest that the last completed growing season is indeed
the relevant time-frame for our analysis.
Table 3.6: Robustness checks
ln(output per hectare)
Robustness Additional Dep-GS 32℃ Clustering Drop Last 6
check controls FE threshold prov. level Oct-Mar months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coast
Average DD 0.161∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.082∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.112 0.080
(0.061) (0.064) (0.045) (0.060) (0.132) (0.079)
Average HDD -0.197∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.146 -0.021
(0.062) (0.058) (0.049) (0.069) (0.093) (0.031)
Observations 7,961 7,962 7,962 7,962 3,928 7,962
R-squared 0.204 0.213 0.195 0.195 0.231 0.191
Highlands
Average DD 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.011 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007)
Average HDD -0.125∗ -0.100 -0.067∗ -0.118 -0.124 0.025
(0.068) (0.085) (0.040) (0.094) (0.092) (0.018)
Observations 47,020 47,020 47,020 47,020 23,631 47,020
R-squared 0.280 0.280 0.267 0.267 0.290 0.267
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district
level, except column 4. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** sig-
nificant at 1%. All regressions include district and growing season fixed effects, average
precipitation and its square, and same household and soil controls as column 1 in Table
3.3. Column 1 adds log of household size and land owned, and share of irrigated land.
Column 2 includes department-by-growing season fixed effects. Column 3 uses a com-
mon threshold of 32℃ to calculate DD and HDD for both regions. Column 4 clusters
standard errors by province. Column 5 drops households interviewed during the growing
season. Column 6 calculates DD and HDD using temperature in the 6 months prior to
the interview date.
3.4.4.2 Changes in crop mix
Our analysis so far has focused on changes in input used as the main response
of farmers to extreme heat However, as discussed in Burke and Emerick [2016],
farmers may also respond to changes in temperature by changing the varieties
or crops they cultivate. We examine this possible effect in this section.
We focus on the two most important types of crops in our sample: ce-
reals (mostly maize) and tubers (mostly potatoes). The botanical literature
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shows that both crops suffer when exposed to extreme temperatures Hatfield
and Prueger [2015]. For each crop type, we estimate equation (3.5) using
as outcomes their share of total output as well as the log of total quantity
produced. Crop mixes can change for two different reasons. Unpredicted tem-
perature shocks might hurt a specific crop more than others, thus reducing
this crop’s yield at the end of the season to a larger degree than the rest. On
the other hand, farmers are able to adjust partially their initial selection of
crops planted and the hectares dedicated to each over the course of the grow-
ing season, and our impact estimates might be capturing farmer reactions,
together with weather impacts on yields. Crops like potatoes have a more
flexible growing season than others, such as corn, leaving farmers the option
to increase the amount of potatoes planted during the course of the growing
season to offset lower yields of other crops. The Peruvian agricultural calen-
dar, published by the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture, shows that 70% of the
country’s production of starchy corn is planted between the months of Septem-
ber and December. During that same period, only 40% of the total amounts of
potatoes are planted. Potato planting is relatively stable throughout the year,
with no month seeing less than 5% of the yearly production being planted. So
the decision of how much of each crop to plant has a degree of endogeneity
with weather outcomes over the growing season. This makes the interpretation
of our estimates challenging, but might reveal interesting clues about farmer
behaviour.
Table 3.7 shows the results of these regressions by region. We can see
that cereal production increases with degree-days in both the coast and the
highlands, and decreases significantly with harmful degree-days in terms of
quantity. In the highlands, however, the exposure to extreme temperatures is
associated with an increase in potato production (as a share of total production
and in quantities). This suggests that in the highlands, along with the increase
in marginal lands, farmers may be adjusting by increasing the production of
potatoes. This would represent an important channel of damage mitigation
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available to highland farmers. However, their exposure to sustained changes
in the climate is manifested in their increased dependence on what is already
their main crop.40
Table 3.7: Effect of temperature on crop mix
Cereals Tubers
% output quantity % output quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coast
Average DD 0.040∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.082
(0.011) (0.084) (0.005) (0.099)
Average HDD -0.019∗ -0.150∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.011) (0.067) (0.004) (0.054)
Observations 7,564 4,220 7,564 1,981
R-squared 0.347 0.436 0.166 0.460
Highlands
Average DD 0.012∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.019)
Average HDD -0.013 -0.106∗ 0.021∗ 0.020
(0.014) (0.061) (0.012) (0.069)
Observations 46,651 39,031 46,651 38,150
R-squared 0.396 0.342 0.475 0.377
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at district level. * denotes significant at 10%, **
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include
district and growing season fixed effects, average precipitation and
its square, and same household and soil controls as Column (1) in
Table 3.3. The outcome variable in Columns (1) and (3) is the share
of total agricultural value produced by each type of crop. Columns
(3) and (4) use instead the log of quantity (measured in kg).
3.5 Simulations of climate change scenarios
In this section, we use our estimates from the previous section to simulate
damages to yields that can be expected with higher temperatures predicted in
40An alternative explanation to the hypothesis described above would be that potatoes
simply have a different optimal temperature threshold, and that the temperatures we record
as part of HDDs are actually still beneficial for potato development and growth. To examine
this explanation, we calculate crop-specific yields using a sub-sample of farmers that obtain
at least 90% of their total production value from a single crop. Note that only 23% of
the farmers in our sample enter this category. We then run a similar exercise as the one
performed for the whole sample looking for the optimal temperature thresholds We find,
however, no evidence that the potatoes’ threshold is higher than the one for maize or rice.
3.5. Simulations of climate change scenarios 87
climate change scenarios. Even though we only estimate short-term impacts,
we consider that this exercise is still informative of potential long term effects.
This is based in previous findings from U.S. suggesting a limited ability of
farmers to adapt to climate change Auffhammer and Schlenker [2014], Burke
and Emerick [2016].
We consider two possible scenarios. First, we assume a “business as usual”
scenario where global GDP continues to grow at present levels and fossil fuel
dependence is not curbed. This corresponds to the A1B scenario of the Special
Report on Emission Scenarios, and the RCP8.5 representative concentration
pathway (RCP) used in IPCC [2014]. Under this set of assumptions, Peru is
expected to experience an increase of 3℃ to 3.5℃ with respect to its average
temperatures during the 1990-2000 period (Gosling et al. [2011]). We assume
a country-wide increase of 3℃.
Our second scenario is a more stringent one, which assumes similar GDP
and population convergence, but combined with faster adoption of green tech-
nologies and energy efficient production methods, resulting in a steep reduction
of green house gases. This is in line with the RCP2.6 scenario used in IPCC
[2014], in which Peru is expected to experience an increase of 1.5℃. Finally,
average precipitation is predicted to stay within one standard deviation of
its natural internal variability in both scenarios (IPCC [2014]), so we do not
assume any change in this respect.
For each coordinate in our sample, we calculate DDs using the average
daily temperature observed in period 2005-2015 and under each scenario k.
We call these measures DD2005−2015i and DDki . We calculate HDDs using a
similar procedure. Then, for each observation in our sample i, we estimate
damages ∆yi using the coefficients from Columns (1) and (4) in Table 3.3, and
the predicted change in DDs and HDDs under each scenario. The specification
used is the following:
∆yi = βˆ1∆DDi+ βˆ2∆HDDi
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of impacts on yields under 1.5℃ scenario
(a) Coast (b) Highlands
Notes: Distribution of impacts from an assumed increase of 1.5℃ consistent with the more
optimistic, B1 scenario of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report.
where, ∆DDi = DDscenarioi −DD2005−2015i , and similarly for the remaining
variables.
Figures 3.5 and 3.4 present the distribution of damages expected for each
of the locations in our sample in the two climate change scenarios. We observe
that the coast, initially warmer, experiences significant drops in yields, with
losses in the range of 0 to 50%. In contrast, highland farmers are predicted
to experience small increases in yield, of around 10%. This diverging results
comes from the different initial distribution of temperatures in each region, and
is consistent with other studies finding stronger negative impacts in low-lying
areas, such as Auffhammer and Schlenker [2014].
A few caveats should be mentioned regarding the above simulations. First,
climate change forecasts predict a mean average temperature for each region
but do not explicitly model the change in temperature variability that is ex-
pected. Therefore while we chose to model each scenario as an even increase
of 1.5℃ and 3℃ to the average daily temperature recorded during our pe-
riod of interest, one could think of many other mean-preserving spreads that
would still fit these mean predicted temperatures over the year while altering
the distribution of temperatures This could have drastically different effects
on our impact estimates. For example, in our “business as usual” scenario
3.5. Simulations of climate change scenarios 89
Figure 3.5: Distribution of impacts on yields under 3℃ scenario
(a) Coast (b) Highlands
Notes: Distribution of impacts from an assumed increase of 3℃ consistent with a “business
as usual” A1B-type scenario of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report.
we could increase all daily temperatures above the median by 6℃ and leave
the rest unchanged, resulting as well in an average daily temperature increase
of 3℃. However this second option will likely result in stronger negative im-
pacts since we would be skewing the distribution of daily temperatures towards
more HDDs. While we opted for the most straightforward application of cli-
mate change forecasts, there is reason to believe that variance in temperatures
will also increase over time, suggesting that our predictions could serve as a
lower bound for actual impacts.
Secondly, our modelling does not account for a multitude of factors that
might affect agricultural yields in the area and has therefore to be taken as the
forecasted effects of temperature and precipitation change only. An important
omitted factor here is the increased concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere
and its interaction with changing weather conditions. While lab experiments
suggest that higher levels of CO2 could help plant growth, there is signifi-
cant uncertainty regarding its interaction with other weather variables and its
impact on global agricultural yields remains hard to predict (Gosling et al.
[2011]). We also do not consider any impacts from increased flooding and
reduced water access due to glacial melting, nor potential changes of relative
food prices. Due to these limitations, the predictions presented in this section
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should be interpreted with caution.
3.6 Conclusion
This Chapter documents farmers’ short run responses to extreme weather in
the context of a developing country. By combining detailed micro-level agri-
cultural household surveys with daily satellite temperature and precipitation
records, we create a comprehensive dataset spanning from 2007 to 2015. We
first document a strong and robust non-linear relationship between daily tem-
peratures and agricultural productivity, which are increasing up until a thresh-
old of 27℃ in the coast and 35℃ in the highlands. Daily temperatures above
this threshold become sharply detrimental for agricultural yields. This finding
is robust to multiple estimation approaches and is consistent with the literature
for developed countries.
We then examine farmers’ short-run reactions to this productivity shock
and find drastically different responses across regions. In the coast, farmers
respond by reducing hired labor and total output. In contrast, in the highlands,
farmers increase land use and domestic labor , especially among extremely poor
farmers. These more intensive use of inputs offsets the loss of productivity and
keeps output unchanged. This a completely new set of findings for developing
countries and is specially relevant given current forecasts of extreme weather
patters caused by anthropogenic climate change.
Finally, using standard assumptions in the literature we model the dis-
tribution of impacts on yields resulting from two possible global warming sce-
narios and find that while coastal farmers seem to be exposed to yield losses
of up to 50% by the year 2080, highland farms are predicted to see moderate
increases of up to 10%. Our findings support the hypothesis that low-lying
areas will be the most severely affected by climate change over the course of
this century.
Chapter 4
Information, Social Status and
Health Investments: Evidence
from an RCT in Nigeria
4.1 Introduction
Low levels of investment on health-advancing durables at the household level
often result in poor health and economic outcomes in developing countries.
Examples of lumpy investments are, among others, improved cooking stoves
or malarial bed nets. This underinvestment may be related to liquidity or
credit constraints, as found for example in the case of malarial bed nets (Co-
hen and Dupas [2010]). An alternative reason may be a lack of information
among households about the benefits of adopting a costly new health tech-
nology. Existing evidence suggests that providing health related information
to households has a positive effect on household investments and health be-
haviour (Dupas [2011]).1 Investment decisions might also be affected by intra-
household bargaining externalities, as shown by Miller and Mobarak [2013].2
1Information has been proven to play a role in other, non-health, investment decisions
as well. For example, Jensen [2010] showed that by only providing information on market
returns to education, average schooling increased by 0.20-0.35 additional years among a
sample of students from the Dominican Republic.
2A number of studies show that intra-household bargaining power can be an important
driver to realize investments preferred by women, especially those affecting child health
and education (Hoddinott and Haddad [1995], Quisumbing et al. [2003], Quisumbing and
92 Chapter 4
Understanding the binding constraints that hamper such health investments is
key for designing interventions that help to achieve efficient levels of household
investment and provide long-run improvements in health and longevity.
In the absence of water and sewerage networks, safe sanitation is one such
investment. The United Nations missed its 2015 Millennium Development
Goal target of halving the number of people without access to basic sanitation
by almost 700 million people. Today, close to 2.4 billion people still lack im-
proved sanitation facilities and 1 billion still defecate in the open (Unicef and
WHO [2015]). While the costs of these practices in terms of child health and
human capital accumulation are well understood (Prüss-Ustün et al. [2014]),
improvement in sanitation coverage is still slow. In this Chapter we analyse
a randomly assigned information campaign called Community Led Total San-
itation (CLTS) in Nigeria. Nigeria faces enormous challenges in the field of
sanitation, with 34% of its population practising open defecation and slightly
falling toilet ownership rates over the last decade (Unicef and WHO [2015]).
The study was implemented in the states of Enugu and Ekiti, and accompanied
by three surveys of a random sample of 4,671 households from 246 clusters,
distributed evenly across the two states (covering around 9% of the population
in the area). The CLTS intervention provided no subsidies or credit. It was
designed to promote private toilet construction and reduce open defecation
levels in rural Bangladesh, and has been adapted to the Nigerian context. The
key event, a village meeting, explained visually and graphically the potential
water contamination risks associated with open defecation.
Our study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First,
we show that the information campaign increased toilet ownership by 3 pp,
from a baseline level of 36%.3 These impacts are concentrated on the short
term, six to twelve months after the intervention. Similar to Guiteras et al.
[2015b] we conduct our analysis using a random sample of all households in
Maluccio [2003], Udry et al. [1995]).
3Ownership of functioning toilets of any kind. Treatment effects on other outcomes will
be discussed further in Section 4.5.
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the area of study. Other studies have instead focused only a selected sample
of households with at least one child at the time of interview. Our estimates,
while small, are to the best of our knowledge, the first to show positive and
statistically significant CLTS impacts among a representative sample of house-
holds.4
Recent evidence from other randomised experiments provides mixed ev-
idence on the effectiveness of information provision as a way to increase safe
sanitation adoption. In Ethiopia, an information-only campaign was found
to increase ownership of toilets with stable flooring by 9 percentage points
(Crocker et al. [2016]) from baseline levels below 23%. Other authors find
larger impacts from similar campaigns in Mali (Pickering et al. [2015]) and
India (Clasen et al. [2014]). Using evidence from four cluster randomised field
experiments designed to reduce the prevalence of open defecation in India,
Indonesia, Mali and Tanzania, Gertler et al. [2015] show that information
campaigns were effective at promoting household investment and behavioural
change. On the other hand, Guiteras et al. [2015b] find improvements in toilet
ownership in Bangladesh driven by subsidy provision but no effects from an
information campaign nor from supply-side incentives. Our estimates show
that information campaigns can indeed increase toilet ownership, but are low
compared to most other studies.
This seemingly contradictory evidence suggests that it is important to
identify more precisely the mechanisms that enable or constrain the effective-
ness of sanitation programs and other health investment initiatives. As our
second contribution, we exploit rich household level data to investigate the dif-
ferent channels through which an information campaign such as CLTS could
operate. We analyse whether CLTS increased expected benefits from sanita-
tion, increased social capital, or spurred institutional sanctions. We find that
the intervention was successful at increasing expected emotional benefits from
sanitation, relating to pride and social status. It did not, however, change the
4Crocker et al. [2016] also includes all types of households, but is not a randomised
experiment, and is therefore not directly comparable.
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household’s perceptions on other private benefits, such as health or privacy,
nor increased awareness of the externalities deriving from toilet ownership and
usage. At the same time, program impacts appear to be stronger for house-
holds that perceived toilets not to be too expensive to build: increasing the
perceived benefits of toilet construction was more effective among households
with low initial perceived costs. We find no evidence that the impact of CLTS
on toilet construction and open defecation reduction is driven by changes in
social capital nor institutional sanctions.
Finally, we investigate the effect of the information campaign on house-
holds with low initial access to sanitation: lower education or asset poor house-
holds. Because inadequate sanitation might affect women and children dispro-
portionately, we also consider female headed households and households with
children. In contrast to Gertler et al. [2015], we find no evidence of larger
program impacts among households with children compared to the rest of the
sample. On the other hand, we find that CLTS program impacts are concen-
trated among female-headed households, and households with lower levels of
education and asset wealth. Treatment effects are in the neighbourhood of
5-6 pp among these groups, which also have lower levels of toilet ownership at
baseline: between 33% and 21%.
These findings have nuanced implications for sanitation policy. First of
all, programme impacts suggest that an information-only campaign may help
reduce the sanitation gap. In countries such as Nigeria, where toilet coverage
in our study areas is below 50%, it may however not suffice on its own to close
it. Second, we find that CLTS changed status concerns around sanitation,
but fell short in its effort to increase households’ understanding of the private
benefits and externalities associated with toilet ownership. Finally, by identi-
fying population sub-groups where CLTS was more effective, we provide input
for a more precise targeting of the policy, that avoids wasteful treatment of
non-responsive populations.
This Chapter is structured as follows. In the next two sections, we describe
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the intervention and the experimental design, respectively. Section 4 discusses
the empirical methods and section 5 shows the main set of results. Section 6
explores alternative channels of behavioral change. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Community Led Total Sanitation
4.2.1 Background
The concept of Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) was first developed by
Kamal Kar and the Village Education Resource Centre (VERC) in Bangladesh,
in 2000.5 While carrying out an impact assessment of WaterAid’s decade-old
water and sanitation strategy in Bangladesh, they noticed that the existing
strategies, heavily reliant on subsidies for toilet construction, fell short of their
objectives. Though toilet uptake had increased, new construction was mostly
concentrated among middle and high income households. Additionally, open
defecation remained common practice, even among households with toilets
(Kar [2003]). To tackle this problem, they developed the new ‘no subsidy
community empowerment approach’ (Kar [2003]). It focused on asking every
member of the community to first consider the sanitation situation in the
village, and then agree on a collective action plan to change it. Since its
first trials in Bangladesh in 2000, CLTS has been rolled out to several Asian
and African countries. It has been the sanitation approach of choice for the
Nigerian Government’s Strategy for Scaling Up Sanitation and Hygiene since
2007.
WaterAid conducted piloting activities along with UNICEF and local gov-
ernment authorities (LGAs) before scale-up of CLTS in Nigeria commenced in
2008. Within the states in our study, Wateraid Nigeria has been implement-
ing CLTS in selected, mostly rural communities since 2012, and has tailored
the intervention to the local context. In the next section, we describe the
intervention that we study as it was implemented in Nigeria since late 2014.
5See http://www.communityledtotalsanitation.org/page/clts-approach for more
details.
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4.2.2 The intervention
The first stage of the intervention consisted of an advocacy and sensitisa-
tion visit in which a team of facilitators met with community leaders, village
chiefs or other important local decision makers.6 In this meeting, the potential
benefits of CLTS in achieving sustainable behavioural change and the health
implications of open defecation were presented. Facilitators and civic leaders
then arranged an appropriate date and time for the triggering meeting, which
involves the whole community. Local leaders then spread the word around the
community, and persuaded as many members as possible to attend.
The triggering meeting is the main component of the intervention. Facil-
itators engage attendees in a series of activities to inform and involve as many
members of the community as possible. First, they carry out a mapping exer-
cise of the village. Each attendee marks their household location and regular
open defecation site, if any, on a stylised village map. Second, facilitators trace
the community’s contamination paths of human faeces into water supplies and
food in a crude fashion. Facilitators are given some flexibility how to best
emphasize this point, also depending on timing. They could choose from a list
of possible activities to illustrate the contamination effect. For example, they
carried out calculations of what each household’s contribution of faeces to the
village environment was. In some cases, they even relied on examples using
fresh stool to contaminate a bottle of sparkling water, to make the point as
graphic as possible.
As a closing task, attendees were asked to draw up a community action
plan, based on the contributions of as many members as possible. The plan’s
objective was for the village to achieve open-defecation-free (ODF) status. It
was written down by a volunteer, assisted by facilitators and village leaders.
6Wateraid Nigeria worked with two partner NGOs in the implementation of CLTS. Facili-
tating teams consisted at least two members of a partner NGO, and four government officials
from the LGA’s water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) unit. Each LGA has its own WASH
unit that receives support, financial or otherwise, from WaterAid Nigeria, and is responsible
for the CLTS implementation and follow up. Facilitators were trained by WaterAid Nigeria
staff in conducting CLTS triggering meetings, and participated in the triggering of several
villages in their assigned LGA.
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The plan was then posted in a public spot. Volunteers were chosen to follow
up regularly on the commitments each attendee made towards implementing
the plan. After the triggering meeting, WASH unit officials regularly visited
the villages to follow up on their advances. If a village reached ODF status,
it obtained certification by the LGA’s WASH unit, the national Rural Water
Supply and Sanitation Agency (RWASSA) and the National Task Group on
Sanitation (NTGS).
4.2.3 Components of CLTS
CLTS provides neither subsidy nor credit to finance toilet construction. In-
stead, it was designed as a tool to i) promote private toilet construction through
information on the benefits of sanitation, and ii) to stop open defecation by con-
veying information about its health implications. Special attention is placed,
for example, on correcting the widespread misconception that pit latrines are
infectious, particularly to women. In this sense CLTS acts as a standard in-
formation delivery intervention. As part of its information content, CLTS
emphasises that as long as a small number of people in the community contin-
ues to defecate in the open, all community members are at risk of contracting
sanitation related diseases. Thus, it is delivering information regarding the
importance of sanitation externalities for individual health.
CLTS also promotes a collective sense of disgust and shame around the
practice of open defecation, and of pride attached to toilet ownership. CLTS
activates these feelings to transform social norms and to change sanitation
standards in the community. This second aspect of CLTS goes beyond simple
information delivery and seeks to leverage the power of social interactions.
4.3 The experiment
We use evidence from a cluster-randomized trial carried out in Nigerian states
of Ekiti and Enugu, implemented by WaterAid Nigeria. These states were
chosen in collaboration with Wateraid Nigeria because of their relative low
toilet coverage and the fact that they comprehend both urban and rural areas
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(see Figure 4.1). At the same time, within each state, the LGA’s selected where
those in which there were enough communities with no recent experience of
CLTS-like interventions, by WaterAid or any other NGO, to achieve a large
enough control sample.7
Figure 4.1: Geographical location of study areas in Enugu and Ekiti states
(a) The Nigerian states of Ekiti (left) and Enugu (right), in blue
(b) Ekiti state
(c) Enugu state
Note: CLTS (black) and control (white) clusters in the states of Ekiti and Enugu.
Below, we first describe the randomisation and implementation strategy
(Section 4.3.1), then the sampling process, data collection and follow-up mea-
7In Enugu, the LGA’s included were Igbo Eze North, Igbo Eze South, Nkanu East and
Udenu. In Ekiti, the LGA’s included were Ido Osi, Ikole, Moba, Irepodun Ifelodun and Ekiti
South West.
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surement timing (Section 4.3.2), key outcome measurements (Section 4.3.3)
and finally present summary statistics from the baseline survey to demonstrate
balancedness (Section 4.3.4).
4.3.1 Randomisation design and implementation
The unit of randomisation was defined by the nature of the intervention. CLTS
is a village-wide intervention that invites all households within a community
to the triggering meeting described above. A cluster randomized design was
therefore deemed appropriate. At the same time, there are constraints on
the minimum and maximum number of households that can be ‘triggered’ in a
single CLTS meeting. Taking these constraints into account, our implementing
partner, Wateraid Nigeria, divided the study sample into triggerable units,
or clusters. These clusters are comprised of small villages, neighbourhoods
or quarters, depending the type of settlement they are located in. Clusters
do not match Nigerian administrative units, but are smaller or equivalent
to Settlements/Autonomous Communities. On average, clusters consist of 1.7
villages or quarters, and their composition is similar in both states.8 Triggering
units consist of geographically close villages since all villages or neighbourhoods
in a cluster would be triggered together. Additionally, clusters were designed
to be self-contained, and not share markets or large public areas with each
other, so as to avoid program spillovers. CLTS meetings were carried out once
in each treatment cluster, and households from all villages in this cluster were
invited to attend.
Randomisation of clusters was performed after stratifying by LGA, in or-
der to ensure balanced treatment and control samples at this level. Within
each LGA, half of the clusters were randomly assigned to receive CLTS treat-
ment and half to remain untreated as control clusters. The result of this
randomisation was then shared with Wateraid Nigeria.
8The median and modal number of villages or quarters within a cluster is 1. The maxi-
mum number of villages in a cluster is 7, occurring only once.
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4.3.2 Sampling and data collection
The study frame was established in October 2014 by first carrying out a house-
hold census in the nine LGAs in Ekiti and Enugu. The census collected basic
household information from all 50,333 households in the area (27,888 from
Enugu and 22,445 from Ekiti).
To ensure representativeness within a limited budget, we randomly se-
lected 20 households from each cluster for interview in our baseline survey.
This pre-treatment survey was carried out between December 2014 and Jan-
uary 2015. We restricted the frame to areas with no history of past CLTS
activities carried out by Wateraid or the Nigerian Government nor, to the best
of our knowledge, by any other NGOs. Our final sample consists of 4,671 house-
holds from 246 clusters, distributed evenly across the two states, or around 9%
of the population in the area, according to our census.9
After baseline data collection was complete, households were randomly
assigned to either treatment or control. CLTS was implemented in treatment
areas during the first half of 2015. Follow up data was collected in two waves.
The first follow-up took place between December 2015 and February 2016,
in what we call the First Rapid Assessment (RA1). It measures outcomes
between 6 and 12 months after the intervention, i.e. short term impacts.
Medium term impacts are captured in the Second Rapid Assessment (RA2),
which was carried out in March and April 2017. These two post-treatment
measures allow us to study the dynamics of CLTS impacts over time. Figure
4.2 summarises intervention and data collection timings.
4.3.3 Key outcomes and covariates
At baseline, detailed information regarding all household members in our sam-
ple was collected. This includes basic demographics such as age, gender and
level of education, as well as employment status, income and expenses, sani-
9Written consent was obtained from every household before interviews were carried out.
An external partner, InDepth Precision Consult, was in charge of all data collection rounds
and was blinded to treatment status. Baseline questionnaires were carried out by pen and
paper, while RA1 and RA2 surveys were carried out using an electronic survey system.
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Figure 4.2: Project timeline: implementation and data collection waves
Note: CLTS implementation, above, in green. Baseline (bl), first rapid assessment
(RA1) and second rapid assessment (RA2) surveys in grey. CLTS implementation
was not carried out in a given location until baseline data was collected.
tation practices, health status and characteristics of the dwelling. A series of
questions were also included to measure respondents’ expected benefits from
sanitation, as well as their beliefs about social norms and their awareness of
health externalities.
The main aim of CLTS is to increase ownership rates of private toilets
and reduce or eliminate the practice of open defecation. Toilet ownership
can be measured along dimensions of quantity and quality. The simplest out-
come measure is whether a household owns or is constructing a toilet of any
kind. Keeping track of construction (rather than counting finished toilets)
is important as many of the households in our sample are likely credit con-
strained, hence construction efforts may involve several smaller investments
that are spread over a longer period. Our second measure reflects quality.
Since precarious pit latrines are filled frequently and require regular emptying
(hence allowing for toilet divestment through lack of maintenance), it measure
whether households own a functioning toilet. Since a functioning toilet is a
necessary condition for a household to abandon open defecation, it will be our
main outcome of interest. Given the pervasiveness of unimproved, unsafe san-
itation in rural Nigeria, we include a third, stricter quality measure: whether
a household owns a finished, functioning and improved toilet. A toilet will
be considered improved if it satisfies the criteria used by the WHO/UNICEF
Joint Monitoring Program.
Finally, we ask respondents about their sanitation practices, and whether
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they perform open defecation. There is a risk of systematic over-reporting of
toilet ownership and under-reporting of OD habits in treatment areas when
measures are self reported. We cannot rule out such measurement error with
respect to our two sanitation practice measures. To validate our toilet owner-
ship measurements, interviewers at RA1 asked households whether they could
see the latrines at the end of each interview. 68% of households who declared
to own a toilet allowed interviewers to inspect them - 70% in CLTS and 65%
among control households. Inspection did not yield discrepancies between
self-reported and actual ownership levels. We interpret both - the similar con-
sent rate for inspection that is - if anything- higher in treatment areas, and
the truthful reports of those that consented as evidence that there is no sys-
tematic measurement error in latrine ownership across groups. Our results are
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar across the three measures of toilet
ownership, and closely mirrored by reverse results on open defecation practice.
Together with the information on outcomes, we have gathered rich data
on household characteristics, which we will use as control for increased preci-
sion in the estimation, and in the exploration of heterogeneous impacts. One
important dimension we will be looking at is household wealth. We mea-
sure this using a relative wealth index, built using information on household
asset ownership, at baseline, by principal component analysis. As described
in McKenzie [2005], this is a useful, and accurate, way of measuring rela-
tive wealth, in developing country contexts, where income and expenses show
significantly higher levels of volatility. The index was normalized to have a
maximum value of 1 and a minimum of 0, with a standard deviation of 0.12.
Details on the assets included in the construction of the index, and their factor
loadings, are presented in Table C.1, in the Appendix.
4.3.4 Summary statistics
Our sample consists of 4,646 households from nine LGAs in Ekiti and Enugu.
Table 4.1 shows that treatment and control group are balanced in terms of
mean outcomes and on a series of controls. The only exception is household
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size which is slightly larger in the control group. We will include this variable
in our regressions to confirm that they do not affect our results.
Table 4.1: Balance between Treatment and Control groups at Baseline
Control Treatment P-value
Toilet Ownership
HH has (or is constructing) a latrine (%) 37.52 37.49 0.99
HH has a functioning latrine (%) 36.19 35.87 0.92
HH has a functioning, improved toilet (%) 32.68 33.01 0.91
Toilet Usage
All members of household use toilet (%) 34.09 33.78 0.91
Main respondent performs OD (%) 61.66 61.22 0.89
Head Characteristics
HH head age 55.60 54.32 0.15
HH head male (%) 64.04 62.47 0.38
HH head employed (%) 76.79 76.04 0.69
Highest education level attended by HH head 1.439 1.451 0.88
HH size 3.991 3.733 0.03∗∗
Children under the age of 6 0.486 0.472 0.69
Household Characteristics
HH primary activity is farming (%) 45.05 48.69 0.32
HH income, past year (th. USD) 0.528 0.574 0.25
Relative asset wealth index 0.00 0.00 0.54
HH has any savings (%) 22.50 22.73 0.92
HH has any debt (%) 20.63 19.50 0.50
Home-owner (%) 62.08 64.04 0.56
Renter (%) 15.10 14.00 0.63
F-Test - All variables F(18,245)= 1.46 0.10
F-Test - Exc. HH size F(17,245)= 0.89 0.59
Observations 4667
Notes: Mean values measured at baseline. Statistically significant differences be-
tween CLTS and control households appear at the expected rate and are found only
for household size (at the 5% level). Improved toilets defined using the classification
in Unicef and WHO [2015]. Relative wealth index constructed by principal compo-
nent analysis of a series of questions regarding asset ownership, following for example
McKenzie [2005]. The excluded category for household tenure is free tenure, in the
form of squatting, or borrowing. Source: Baseline questionnaire.
Additionally, we ran a simple OLS regression taking treatment status as
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a dependent variable, and included all variables in Table 4.1 as controls. We
then performed an F test of joint significance for the whole set of regressors,
and found that we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level (as shown
in the bottom row “F-Test = All variables”). Once we removed household size,
the single variable for which we observe an imbalance, the explanatory power of
the remaining variables falls significantly (see next row in table). This supports
our claim that treatment and control samples are on average identical, except
for their size.
4.4 Empirical method
We measure the program’s impacts using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
estimation. The difference between ANCOVA and a standard difference in
difference (DID) approach is that in the former we introduce the outcomes
measured at baseline as a control variable, instead of treating them as a pre-
treatment survey wave. McKenzie [2012] describes the efficiency advantage of
the ANCOVA estimator compared to both DID and simple difference (SD)
estimators, and shows that ANCOVA is always preferable in experimental
contexts if pre-treatment information is available. Indeed, in our case with a
baseline and two post-treatment waves, the ratio of DID to ANCOVA esti-
mator variances is equal to 31+2ρ , where ρ is the autocorrelation of outcome
variables across survey waves. For example, in the case of toilet ownership or
construction, ρ = 0.57 between baseline and first follow-up, so that the vari-
ance of the DID estimator is 40% higher than that of ANCOVA.10 We chose
ANCOVA as our preferred estimator due to this significant increase in power.11
In our first specification, we do not distinguish between short- and
medium-run impacts and pool both follow-up waves. We compare average
10Given that toilets are lumpy investments in household infrastructure, we expected to
observe higher autocorrelation between outcomes. Latrine inspections by interviewers and
consent rates to do so suggest that this moderate ρ is not driven by measurement error
across groups.
11 We also present DID and simple difference estimates for the main results in the appendix
(see Table C.3). They are virtually identical to the ANCOVA estimates.
4.4. Empirical method 105
outcomes between CLTS and control households as follows:
yivgt = γCLTSv + θyivg0 +X ′iβ+ δt+µg + ivgt (4.1)
Where yivgt is the outcome variable for household i, located in LGA g in
cluster v, measured at follow-up t = {1,2}. CLTSv is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the cluster is part of the CLTS group. The coefficient of interest
will be γ, the causal impact of the CLTS treatment. yiv0 is the value of
the outcome variable and X ′i is a vector of household characteristics, both
measured at baseline (t = 0). In most of our specifications, the covariates
included in the regressions will be: gender, age, age squared, employment
status and education attainment of the household head, as well as household
size and a dummy indicating whether farming is the household’s main economic
activity. Finally, we introduce a time fixed effect δt, which is a dummy for RA2,
and for LGA fixed effects µg to remove level differences across LGAs.
An alternative approach to ours is the one used by Cameron et al. [2015],
who use DID specifications but run it only on the sub-sample of households
that did not have a toilet at baseline. We believe that our approach is a more
comprehensive one, because besides persuading non-owners to construct toi-
lets, CLTS informs households who already own a toilet, about the importance
of its maintenance and usage. At baseline, more than 70% of the toilets in our
sample were pit latrines of different sorts. These pits require regular emptying
(annual or biannual, generally), and will sometimes collapse and become un-
usable. It is therefore a margin that we think should be contemplated in our
estimations, which is why we include the whole sample of households and use
an ANCOVA specification to control for baseline outcomes.
In a second specification, we explore how CLTS impacts evolve over time,
and estimate impacts separately for the short and the medium-run. In this case
we will have two coefficients of interest γ1 and γ2, corresponding to impacts
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as measured at RA1 and RA2 respectively. The specification changes to:
yivgt =
2∑
t=1
γt (CLTSv× It) + +θyivg0 +X ′iβ+ δt+µg + ivt (4.2)
In further analysis, we look into heterogeneous program impacts. We will
do this by allowing CLTS impacts from both Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2
to vary for specific sub-populations. Given the geographical distribution of
our study areas, we will estimate standard errors robust to correlation at the
cluster level, which is also the level at which the treatment was randomised.
4.5 Results
Table 4.2 presents estimates of CLTS treatment effects on the four key out-
comes capturing toilet ownership and open defecation. We use the two specifi-
cations described in Section 4.4. Results in panel A are based on Equation 4.1
which pools observations across the two both follow up periods. Programme
impacts are allowed to vary over time in Panel B which shows results from
the specification detailed in Equation 4.2. All specifications include household
controls, LGA fixed effects and a dummy variable for the second follow up pe-
riod.12 In this ANCOVA specification, we drop all observations at baseline but
include the value of the dependent variable measured at baseline as additional
control.
Panel A shows that CLTS increased toilet ownership in all three specifica-
tions by 3 pp, significant to the 10% level. Average toilet ownership in control
areas at RA1 was 45%-35% according to the outcomes used, so this represents
an increase in coverage of 7%-9%. The equality of estimated coefficients across
the first two measures of toilet ownership, suggests no change in toilet main-
tenance patterns, a common concern in areas like those in our study, where
pits require regular emptying and reinforcing. By the same token, the similar
estimates from Panel A, Columns (2) and (3), reject a second concern regard-
12For further reference, Table C.2 in the Appendix reproduces the results from Panel A
and include the estimated coefficient for all control variables.
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Table 4.2: CLTS impacts on toilet ownership and open defecation, ANCOVA
LHS: Toilet/OD Cons./Finished Functioning Improved OD (main resp.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.02 -0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.61
F-test γ1 = γ2 (p-value) 0.29 0.79 0.70 0.54
No. of TUs 247 247 247 247
No. of HHs 4,555 4,555 4,555 4,555
No. of obs. 9,110 9,110 9,110 9,110
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment
status of the HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at
the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household
surveys.
ing community-led sanitation interventions: that they might be effective at
stimulating unimproved sanitation only. Open defecation, as reported by the
main respondent in each household, followed the trend of ownership variables
and fell by 4 pp, or just below 7%, significant to the 5% level.13
CLTS aims to reduce open defecation by a) promoting investment in toilets
among non-owner households, and b) stimulating behavioural change among
households that own toilets but perform open defecations anyway. In some
contexts, these pathways may be hard to tease out due to the existence of
public toilets that non-owning households may use, or, as in the case of India,
the low levels of usage observed among toilet owners. In our study area, public
toilets are rare and usage of private toilets is high. Indeed, at baseline, 95%
of non-owners declared to defecate in the open, while among toilet owners,
only 4% did it. At RA2, open defecation rates for households who owned
13 All results presented here are robust to using DID or simple difference estimators instead
(see Table C.3).
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functioning toilets at both baseline and RA2, and for those who only had
one at RA2 (e.g. new toilet owners), were 4% and 5% respectively. These
two pieces of evidence as suggest that toilet construction is the main channel
through which open defecation was reduced in this area.
Panel B presents the results of using specification 4.2, where impacts are
estimated separately for the short and medium terms. We see stronger short-
term improvements in the outcomes constructing or owning a toilet, owning
a functioning toilet and performing open defecation in the short-run (com-
pared to the pooled estimation). Medium term impacts, on the other hand,
are only observed for open defecation. This suggests that two years after
the intervention, when RA2 data was collected, differences in toilet construc-
tion or ownership between CLTS and control areas were no longer detectable.
Nonetheless, when a Wald test for equality of coefficients is run comparing γ1
and γ2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Given that impacts are small,
we do not have enough power to assert that they are indeed different.
As discussed in the introduction, evidence from other recent CLTS-like in-
terventions has shown both extremely high impacts and no statistical impacts
at all. Table 4.2 above provides a middle ground: while it appears that CLTS
had some effect on toilet construction, these impacts appear to be relatively
small. At the same time, we observe that, in the case of Nigeria, construction
increased at similar rates than ownership of improved toilets. Furthermore,
we find reductions in open defecation that mirror the increase in toilets. This
rejects two concerns regarding CLTS, namely that a “no subsidy approach”
might mostly stimulate the construction of unimproved toilets, and that con-
struction and usage might be independent. Our results reject both hypotheses.
Next, we compare our results to other studies evaluating similar inter-
ventions. Our estimates of CLTS impacts are dwarfed by those published in
some recent studies from other developing countries. For example, Pickering
et al. [2015] report increases in toilet ownership of 30 percentage points from
a cluster-randomized CLTS intervention in Mali. Clasen et al. [2014] carried
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out a similar trial in 100 rural villages in Odisha and report CLTS-driven im-
pacts of 50 percentage points in toilet ownership. However, both studies are
not directly comparable to ours since the researchers targeted a specific set
of households to interview. While our study sample is composed of a random
draw of all households in the selected LGAs, Pickering et al. [2015] surveyed
just households with at least one child below the age of ten, and only included
villages with toilet coverage of less than 60% in the study frame. Similarly,
Clasen et al. [2014] only surveyed households with at least one child under the
age of 4 or with a pregnant woman.
Two studies report smaller programme impacts, whose magnitude is closer
to the results of our study. Both focus on a similarly selected sub-sample of
households with small children. An evaluation of the Total Sanitation and
Sanitation Marketing (TSSM) campaign in Indonesia, which contained a CLTS
component, found that toilet coverage increased by only 3 pp (Cameron et al.
[2013]). Their sample of households was restricted to those with at least one
child under the age of 2. Briceño et al. [2015] evaluated a similar TSSM
campaign in Tanzania, interviewed households with children under the age of
5, and found impacts of 8 pp. This focus on families with small children is based
on the presumption that parents of small children have stronger preferences for
health investments due to their lifetime returns when such investment improves
childhood circumstances.
To our knowledge, the only study that also interviewed a random sam-
ple of households in a village, was carried out by Guiteras et al. [2015b] in
Bangladesh. The authors find no evidence of a statistically significant im-
pact from a CLTS-like intervention in the absence of subsidies. The positive
and significant impacts of CLTS we report from the Nigerian experiences are
therefore a novel finding.
To compare our findings to studies that use selected groups, we replicate
the sample selection criteria used in the above studies and estimate treatment
effects for each sub-group in our sample. At baseline, we identified all house-
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holds with at least one child below the age of 6, and estimated CLTS treatment
effects for that subset of households separately. For comparison purposes, we
repeated the same exercise on households without children. Columns (1) and
(2) in Table 4.3 present the results of this analysis on the outcome of owner-
ship of a functioning toilet. CLTS treatment effects are only slightly higher
for the sub-sample of households with children. Pooled treatment effects for
households with and without children are both significant to the 10% level. A
single regression that interacts treatment with a dummy for presence of chil-
dren does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that programme impacts
are identical among the two groups, as shown in the row labelled “F-test γ
Yes=No (p-value)”. Not only are the effects virtually identical between the
two groups, the level of ownership of functioning toilets were also similar at
baseline. Tables C.6, C.7 and C.8 in the Appendix confirm these findings for
our other outcome measures: the presence of children does not seem to strongly
determine how households react to CLTS.
4.5.
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Table 4.3: Heterogeneous CLTS impacts on ownership of functioning toilets
LHS: Functioning toilet Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x Post (γ) 0.03∗ 0.04∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.03 0.04∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Control Mean (BL) 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.28 0.48 0.21
F-test γ Yes=No (p-value) 0.88 0.25 0.09 0.19
F-test γ1 Yes=No (p-value) 0.64 0.20 0.07 0.10
F-test γ2 Yes=No (p-value) 0.85 0.52 0.29 0.50
No. of Triggerable Units 247 238 246 238 244 240 232 245
No. of households 3,201 1,354 2,888 1,667 3,104 1,451 2,037 2,025
No. of observations 6,402 2,708 5,776 3,334 6,208 2,902 4,074 4,050
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment status of the
HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
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A second important target population discussed in the health investment
literature are female headed households. With respect to CLTS, Kar [2003]
poses that women are “one of the greatest internal forces for mobilisation and
promotional activities in the villages”. The literature presents two rationales
why female headed households may react stronger to CLTS and may invest
more into health (here: sanitation) in general. first, there is some evidence
suggesting gender-specific preferences in certain domains, such as health and
children’s welfare; second, women may enjoy larger returns from sanitation in
terms of personal safety and privacy. The intra-household bargaining literature
has established that when preferences of household members over expenditures
or investments differ, observed choices will be the result of a bargaining process.
In consequence, even if the demand or health investments is higher among
females (compared to males), it may only be converted into investment in
combination with female decision power. Miller and Mobarak [2013] provide
supportive evidence for this. They conduct a field experiment designed to
separate between female preferences and health technology adoption decisions
in the household.14 They show that the adoption of a technology, that faces
higher demand from women than men, is constrained by the level of female
decision making authority within the household.
As a first approach to this, we estimated CLTS impacts separately for fe-
male headed households and non-female headed households, i.e. those in which
women have decision versus those where they do not. As Columns (3) and (4)
in Table 4.3 show, it is indeed female headed households who experience the
strongest treatment effects from CLTS. Note that at baseline, female-headed
households had lower toilet coverage rates, meaning that the information cam-
paign seems to be more effective in households where women have the decision
power to build a toilet and helps them catch up with male-headed house-
holds.15 Thus, while we do not separately observe preferences from decisions,
14 The health technology they study is an improved cooking stove that emits less indoor
smoke.
15At baseline, toilet ownership rates in female headed households are 5 percentage points
lower than in male headed households. CLTS levels this difference.
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our results are consistent with both, higher sanitation preferences of females
and higher sanitation investment in households where females hold decision
power.
We test for the robustness of this result through two additional measures
of female decision power. In the first, we define households with female decision
power as those which are female-only (e.g. no adult males), female headed,
households in which a women has the highest level of educational attainment,
and households in which at least one adult woman is employed while no men
are. At baseline, 54% of our sample entered into this category. In a second
approach, we consider households with female decision power as those in which,
when asked who in the household decides about major household investments,
the respondent (the eldest woman in the household), answered that it was her
who decided.16. 21% of our sample fell into this category at baseline. Table
C.4 in the Appendix shows that the parameter estimates are identical to those
for the more restrictively defined female headed households. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first quantitative evidence of the differential impact
of CLTS according to female decision power within the household.
A common concern regarding lumpy investments in developing countries,
is that underinvestment may be concentrated among households with scarce
financial resources, e.g. due to liquidity constraints, leading to a prominent
role of subsidies or micro-loans in interventions aimed at fostering investment.
India’s Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), for example, aimed at increasing
investments by providing large construction subsidies to eligible households.
A unique trait of the CLTS approach is that it does not include any subsi-
dies or credit for toilet construction. This has been hailed by its creators as
a fundamental aspect of its design, since it avoids creating a “culture of de-
pendence on subsidies” (IDS [2011]). At the same time, evidence has shown
that this lack of financial support might undercut its effects. As mentioned
above, Guiteras et al. [2015b] found no evidence of CLTS impacts on toilet
16Alternative answers were her partner, her and her partner jointly, or someone else in
the household
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ownership unless combined with subsidies, while Cameron et al. [2013] find
that toilet construction in non-poor households explain most of the impacts in
their evaluation.
We therefore investigate whether CLTS has heterogeneous impacts ac-
cording to household wealth levels. We use two different measures to proxy
for wealth: the level of education of the household head, and an index of rel-
ative wealth. Notice that, at baseline, ownership of functioning toilets was
significantly lower among the least educated (28% v 40%), and among the
relatively less wealthy households (21% v 48%). Columns (5) to (8) of Table
4.3 show that households whose head has not finished primary education and
households with below median wealth experienced CLTS program impacts of
7 percentage points in the short term, significant at the 5% level. Given these
groups’ initially low rates of toilet coverage, these impacts represent an increase
in toilet ownership of 25% (among low educated households) and 33% (among
households with below median wealth). For below median wealth households,
we also find medium term impacts that are economically and statistically sig-
nificant. Their toilet coverage rates are 5 percentage points higher than those
of households in the control group in RA2. On the other hand, households
with educated heads and above median wealth appear to have experienced no
significant programme impacts, even though their coverage rates were below
50% at baseline.
A reasonable concern at this point, might be that the different household
characteristics being used to compare programme impacts so far, are corre-
lated, and proxies for other, underlying characteristic that is not observed.
While we cannot reject the latter statement, Table C.5 in the Appendix present
the pairwise correlations between each group of households presented in Table
4.3 above. The presence of children is negatively correlated with the remain-
ing three categories: female head, uneducated head and below median asset
wealth. Having a female head is positively, although not strongly, correlated
with the head having no primary education and being asset poor. These three,
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non-identical but overlapping groups, have an important characteristic in com-
mon: they all exhibit lower toilet coverage at baseline than their complements.
This could explain why we observe stronger impacts among them than in the
rest of sample.
This is a novel finding, given that CLTS provides no subsidies. Tables
C.6, C.7 and C.8 in the Appendix confirm these findings for the remaining
outcomes: while the presence of children does not seem to determine how
households react to CLTS, households with below median wealth (or low ed-
ucation) experienced the highest impacts. A reasonable concern is that these
households might construct lower quality toilets, i.e. unimproved ones, which
would undermine the health benefits expected. We do not, however, find ev-
idence supporting this concern. Table C.7 shows that CLTS increased the
ownership of improved toilets by 4-5 pp in the short term and by 6-5 pp in the
medium term, when considering uneducated heads of households or households
with below median wealth.
4.6 Channels of impact
Having established that households with lower education, lower wealth and
those with a female head react more strongly to a health information cam-
paign such as CLTS, we proceed to study the channels through which the
intervention worked. Several mechanisms have been discussed in the health
investment literature, or have been suggested by anecdotal evidence from the
field. The aim of this section is to shed light on the constraints dampening
health investments in a developing country context, as revealed by the patterns
of adoption and non-adoption brought about by CLTS.
First, we will investigate information about its costs and benefits as a
channel to investment. In Section 4.6.1, we investigate whether the expected
(rather than actual) cost of constructing a toilet affects investment decisions,
and whether CLTS may have corrected price misconceptions. In Section 4.6.2),
we explore whether expected benefits from sanitation played a role in toilet
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adoption, and whether these were changed through CLTS. A second chan-
nel is that CLTS may have been more effective in communities with higher
social capital, as proposed by Cameron et al. [2015], and that CLTS may
have affected social capital and associativity through its coordination approach
(Section 4.6.3). Finally, we consider whether CLTS program impacts can be
explained by institutional sanctions on open defecation that may have been
imposed by village leaders following CLTS (Section 4.6.4).
4.6.1 Expected costs
Sanitation investment decisions are likely driven by expectations about its
costs and benefits. (Initial) misconceptions about the cost of installing a toilet
may therefore lead to suboptimal investment decisions (underinvestment by
those who overestimate its costs and vice versa). Correcting misconceptions
on the cost of installing a toilet could be a mechanism by which CLTS may
increase toilet ownership in programme areas, as suggested in Alzua et al.
[2017]. The CLTS activities do not cover any aspects of construction costs,
hence misconceptions at the household level could only be corrected through
CLTS’ collective nature. By triggering conversations and information exchange
between members of the community, CLTS could have helped households with
overly high expected costs of construction to learn that it was, in fact, a
relatively affordable investment.
At baseline we collected information on actual and expected prices of
toilet construction. Figure 4.3 plots the distribution of both minimum and
maximum expected construction costs for building a ventilated improved pit
latrine. The cost question was posed to all households in the sample. The
blue line plots average construction costs as reported by households who own
a toilet and recalled the total cost of its construction. Average expected costs
closely match actual costs. However, there is significant variation in expected
prices which leads to a fraction of households overestimating actual costs, and
another fraction underestimating them.
The CLTS intervention carried out in Nigeria did not explicitly include
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the provision of accurate cost of construction data. If, however, CLTS corrects
cost misconceptions, and moves expected costs closer to actual ones, then we
would expect to see an increase in investment among those who initially over-
estimated costs at baseline (and potentially, a decline in investment among
treated households who underestimated them). In contrast, if CLTS does
not change cost expectations, but costs play a role in the investment decision,
then we should observe higher toilet construction levels among households with
lower expected costs at baseline than by those who expect high construction
costs, in both treatment and control groups. This is because, if CLTS suc-
cessfully increased expected benefits from toilet ownership among households,
these would still be compared to the expected costs of investing.
Two simple testable predictions follow: first, at baseline, households with
higher cost expectations should ceteris paribus be less likely to have con-
structed a toilet, than those with lower cost expectations. Indeed, we find that
having cost expectations equal to one standard deviation above the mean, is
associated with a 4 pp lower likelihood of owning a functioning toilet.17 Sec-
ond, if CLTS corrects misconceptions of cost, then we should observe a stronger
CLTS impact among those with initially high expectations of cost and a nega-
tive impact of CLTS on those whose estimate was too low at baseline (relative
to the control group whose misconceptions are not corrected).
We construct a discrete variable equal to one if, at baseline, a household
reported expected costs above the median actual cost of construction. Median
construction costs are calculated at LGA level, to control for regional price
variation that might be correlated with baseline toilet ownership rates (Augs-
burg and Rodriguez-Lesmes [2015]). Interacting this variable with our treat-
ment indicator variable, we are able to estimate program impacts separately
for households with expected costs above and below the median. In order to
avoid extreme values, expected cost of construction answers were truncated at
a maximum of USD 1,000, which affected less than 2% of the households in
17See Table 4.7. The standard deviation of the natural logarithm of expected prices is
equal to 0.63.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of actual and expected toilet construction costs (in 2015
USD)
(a) Ekiti state
0
.0
00
5
.0
01
.0
01
5
.0
02
.0
02
5
D
en
si
ty
0 500 1000 1500
Expected cost (in 2015 USD)
Minimum Expected Price Maximum Expected Price
(b) Enugu state
0
.0
00
5
.0
01
.0
01
5
.0
02
D
en
si
ty
0 500 1000 1500
Expected cost (in 2015 USD)
Minimum Expected Price Maximum Expected Price
Note: Blue line indicates average actual construction costs, as reported by toilet
owning households, for any type of toilets. Expected minimum and maximum prices
are average expected prices over four different toilet models presented to respondents.
Source: Baseline household surveys.
the sample. Table 4.4 shows the results of this analysis.
Although the question regarding expected construction costs was directed
at all households, we only obtained 2,011 valid responses, from our sample
of 4,600. This explains the lower number of observations in the regressions
presented in Table 4.4, and the smaller precision in its estimates. Nonetheless,
point estimates from Panel A in the table suggest a larger treatment effect
among households with lower expected costs. This is line with the idea that,
given that CLTS did not aim to correct these perceptions, high expected costs
will be a barrier to adoption. While not statistically significant, treatment
effects from Panel B are consistent with those observed for the whole sam-
ple: higher point estimates are found in the short term (RA1) than in the
medium term (RA2). The sign and magnitude of short term point estimates
also suggest a stronger CLTS response from households who underestimated
construction costs. Taken together, these results suggest that there was no cor-
rection of mistaken beliefs regarding prices at baseline, but that high expected
costs were an impediment that CLTS did not overcome.
Next, we split the sample into the groups for whom we found heteroge-
neous treatment impacts (households with children, low education, low wealth
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Table 4.4: Impact of CLTS by baseline levels of Expected Cost
Dep var: Cons./Finished Functioning Improved OD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x High Expected Cost -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CLTS x Low Expected Cost 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 x High Expected Cost 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CLTS x RA1 x Low Expected Cost 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 x High Expected Cost -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
CLTS x RA2 x Low Expected Cost 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test (p-value) 0.25 0.99 0.78 0.76
F-test RA1 (p-value) 0.37 0.91 0.87 0.42
F-test RA2 (p-value) 0.28 0.89 0.55 0.78
No. of TUs 238 238 238 238
No. of HHs 1,958 1,958 1,952 1,952
No. of Observations 3,916 3,916 3,904 3,904
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and ethnicity
of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic activity. Errors
clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and
RA2 household surveys.
or a female-head) and repeat the estimation of interaction effects between
CLTS and expected costs. Our intention is to find out whether, within the
sub-samples where we observed the strongest treatment effects, high expected
costs were similarly inhibiting of toilet adoption and their consequent reduc-
tions in open defecation. Each panel from Table 4.5 shows the results for each
of our four main outcomes. Comparing the point estimates of households with
high and low expected prices, among our four sub-samples of interest, we see
that in most of the cases, the CLTS response in these groups is concentrated
among those with low expected construction costs at baseline. For example,
from Panel A, showing results for the construction or ownership of toilets,
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we see that households whose head had no primary education, saw treatment
effects 14 pp larger, if they had low expected costs of construction than other-
wise. The size of the sample in all these regressions is reduced due to missing
responses, which affects our power and the statistical significance of our esti-
mates. Nevertheless, these results suggest that the information campaign only
managed to persuade households with initially low sanitation uptake that, at
the same time, did not think that building a toilet would be extremely oner-
ous. Secondly, they imply that there is room for a complementary intervention
that provides cost information and targets households with excessively high ex-
pected costs, who might be willing to invest if their cost misconceptions were
corrected.
4.6.2 Expected benefits
We next explore the role that new information about the benefits of sanitation
may have in fostering sanitation. CLTS triggering meetings focused extensively
on the dangers of open defecation, its consequences for the whole community,
and on the individual health benefits of sanitation improvements. It also aimed
at attaching feelings of disgust and embarrassment to the practice of open
defecation, and of pride to the ownership of a private toilet. CLTS might have
thus increased expected benefits from private sanitation investments, leading
to increased demand for them. Affordability is defined by the net benefit of
a good: the difference between expected benefit and cost. The information
provided by CLTS facilitators might have led to an upwards revision of benefit
expectations, tipping treated households at the margin towards construction.
Our rich survey data from both baseline and RA2 allows us to construct
three indices of expected benefits from private sanitation and costs from open
defecation. These indices separate benefits along the dimensions of i) private,
mostly health-related benefits and costs, ii) a set of subjective rewards in terms
of social status and pride resulting from toilet ownership and embarrassment
associated with open defecation, and iii) externalities. Table 4.6 lists the ques-
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Table 4.5: Heterogeneous Impact of CLTS by baseline levels of Expected Cost
LHS: Child <6 y/0 Fem. HoH Uned.d HoH < med. wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Cons/Fin. toilet
CLTS x High Exp. Cost -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
CLTS x Low Exp. Cost 0.05∗ -0.00 0.00 0.11∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗ 0.01 0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
F-test (p-value) 0.11 0.88 0.97 0.04 0.74 0.04 0.82 0.21
Panel B: Funct. toilet
CLTS x High Exp. Cost 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
CLTS x Low Exp. Cost 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.10∗∗ 0.00 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
F-test (p-value) 0.93 0.71 0.37 0.25 0.50 0.15 0.26 0.34
Panel C: Improved toilet
CLTS x High Exp. Cost 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
CLTS x Low Exp. Cost 0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
F-test (p-value) 0.61 0.53 0.44 0.70 0.50 0.44 0.13 0.48
Panel D: Open defecation
CLTS x High Exp. Cost 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
CLTS x Low Exp. Cost -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.12∗∗ 0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
F-test (p-value) 0.54 0.77 0.90 0.62 0.73 0.13 0.30 0.34
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of TUs 231 201 235 190 234 178 219 196
No. of HHs 1,329 629 1,410 548 1,494 464 1,071 707
No. of Observations 2,658 1,258 2,820 1,096 2,988 928 2,142 1,414
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and ethnicity of the
HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the
cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
tions that we use for these indices.18 We aggregate the questions listed in the
18The last question included in the private benefit index might also be considered as part
of the externalities associated with toilet ownership. Because we were more interested in the
household’s understanding of the true costs and benefits of toilet ownership, we included it
here and not in the externality index. However, including it in the externality index leads
to identical results.
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table using principal component analysis. The advantage of PCA over equally
weighed indices is that the former puts more weight on questions that present
a higher variance over the population, and therefore helps us create a richer
ranking within our sample (McKenzie [2005]). We standardize responses so
that positive values imply higher expected benefits/costs from toilet owner-
ship/open defecation, and then extract one factor via principal component
analysis. We observe most, but not all question items at baseline and at RA2,
so we estimate the three indices at baseline and RA2 separately.
Table 4.6: Definition of Expected Benefit Indices
Index/Questions BL RA2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private costs & benefits
If a neighbour built a toilet for the first time, do you think his/her family...
...will be healthier because of the toilet/latrine? X 0.45 X 0.46
...will be more productive because of this toilet/latrine? X 0.35 X 0.27
...will feel that women in the family will be safer with this toilet/latrine? X 0.43 X 0.47
...will save time because they now have this toilet/latrine? X 0.37 X 0.31
...will get sick more easily when using this toilet/latrine? X 0.43 X 0.45
...will see the women getting infections because of this toilet/latrine due to pit heat? X 0.41 X 0.42
You (most people in your community) believe that
...defecating in the open is unhealthy X 0.06
...defecating in the open is dangerous X 0.10
...defecating in a toilet is dangerous X 0.09
...if a household has a toilet/latrine, neighbours will come to use it X -0.03
Emotional benefits
If a neighbour built a toilet for the first time, do you think his/her family...
...will be happier because of the toilet/latrine? X 0.48 X 0.48
...will be less embarrassed when family and friends come to visit? X 0.50 X 0.45
...will feel proud because of having this toilet/latrine? X 0.54 X 0.54
...will be have a higher status in the society because of the toilet/latrine? X 0.48 X 0.41
You (most people in your community)
...would feel proud of owning a toilet X 0.00
...would feel embarrassed to defecate in the open X 0.25
...believe that it is acceptable to defecate in the open X 0.20
It is acceptable to defecate in the open X 0.02
Health externalities
You (most people in your community) believe that
...the use of toilets by neighbours protects you from sickness. X 0.64
...if your neighbours use a toilet/latrine, the environment you live in is cleaner X 0.65
...the use of toilet/latrines by any of your neighbours may cause you harm X 0.41
The use of toilets by any of your neighbours protects you from sickness X 0.65
If my neighbours use a toilet/latrine, the environment I live in is cleaner X 0.61
The use of toilet/latrines by any of your neighbours may cause you harm X 0.45
Note: Questions included in each of the three expected benefit indices. Columns (1) and (3) indicate whether
each question was included at Baseline or RA2, respectively. For each index and period, we carried out a principal
component analysis including all available questions, and constructed an index using the first factor. Columns (2)
and (4) indicate the loadings with which each of these questions enter the baseline or RA2 indices, respectively.
Questions containing “You (most people in your community)” were randomly assigned to households with either the
“You” or the “Most people in your community” formulations. There were no significant differences in the answers
to these questions, on average, according to their phrasing so for this purpose, we include both types of questions
indistinctly. Source: BL and RA2 household surveys.
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The first index covers health and non-health private benefits accruing to
individuals from the ownership and usage of private toilets. This index cap-
tures a household’s understanding of the private costs and benefits from toilet
ownership, and the dangers (to themselves only) involved in performing open
defecation. The second index, termed emotional benefits, captures subjective
benefits in terms of social status and pride resulting from toilet ownership and
embarrassment associated with open defecation. This second index reflects
the following components of CLTS: CLTS puts a strong emphasis on asso-
ciating toilet ownership with a sense of pride and accomplishment, framing
private sanitation as an aspirational good. Equally, the intervention seeks to
associate open defecation with strong feelings of shame and disgust. In describ-
ing an activity during which attendees show CLTS implementers around the
village, identifying areas where community members regularly perform open
defecation, Kar [2003] states that [t]he initial embarrassment experienced by
the community during the “walk of shame” gave way to a strong desire to stop
open defecation and to get rid of these areas. Our third index captures these
aspects of “emotional” benefits from toilet ownership, and also the expected
status gain from toilet ownership. The third index includes questions that refer
directly to negative externalities, such as the negative externalities in terms
of health and soil pollution that open defecation by neighbours causes onto
oneself.
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Table 4.7: Correlations between Expected Costs, Benefits and Toilet Ownership at Baseline
LHS: Cons./Finished Functioning Improved OD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private Benefit Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01∗ 0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Emotional Benefit Index -0.02∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Externality Index - High -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Expected construction costs) -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean Dep.var. (BL) 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.61 0.58
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of HHs 4,542 1,955 4,542 1,955 4,542 1,955 4,530 1,949
Note: Questions included in each of the three expected benefit indices. Columns (1) and (3) indicate whether
each question was included at Baseline or RA2, respectively. For each index and period, we carried out a principal
component analysis including all available questions, and constructed and index using the first factor. Columns (2)
and (4) indicate the loadings with which each of these questions enter the baseline or RA2 indices, respectively.
Questions containing “You (most people in your community)” were randomly assigned to households with either the
“You” or the “Most people in your community” formulations. There were no significant differences in the answers
to these questions, on average, according to their phrasing so for this purpose, we include both types of questions
indistinctly. Source: BL and RA2 household surveys.
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Expected benefits from sanitation at baseline did not correlate with either
higher levels of toilet ownership or lower levels of open defecation, as seen in
Table 4.7. In fact, Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) show that there is statistically
significant negative correlation, between high levels of expected emotional ben-
efits and all our sanitation outcomes. This finding lends support to the idea
that safe sanitation is marginally more valued, in aspirational or social-status
terms, by those who do not have access to it. The inclusion of expected costs
in these regressions eliminates the statistical significance of this correlation, as
seen in even-numbered columns. This might be driven by the restricted size
of the sample, which is less than half the size due to limited answers to the
expected price questions, but point estimates are comparable.
Since treatment status was assigned at random, the average values of
these indices at baseline were not significantly different between CLTS and
Control areas, as seen in Table C.9, in the Appendix. Moreover, Table C.10
shows that average values of all three indices were mostly balanced across the
different types of households discussed in the previous section. So the first
question we ask is whether CLTS, which aimed to increase knowledge and
perception along all three domains, changed these expected benefits indices
in significant way.19 Table 4.8 presents the result of an ANCOVA regression
of each index at RA2 on a treatment indicator and host of control variables,
including the index value at baseline. Note that changes in expected benefits
are only observed over the medium term, not the short term.
We find no evidence of statistically significant impacts of CLTS on private
benefits (Columns (1) and (2)) or on awareness of externalities (Columns (5)
and (6)) 2 years after the intervention, although point estimates for this last
index are quite large. Columns (3) and (4), on the other hand, show that CLTS
significantly increased the average emotional benefit index of households. The
magnitude of this effect is economically meaningful: 0.15 is equivalent to 10%
19 We recorded these answers at baseline and RA2, so our post-treatment measure is from
two years after the intervention.
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of a standard deviation in the expected emotional benefit index.20
Table 4.8: CLTS Increased the Emotional Expected Benefit Index, mea-
sured at RA2
Dep var: Index of Private benefits Emotional benefits Health externalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CLTS 0.05 0.05 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 0.16 0.17
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Index at BL No Yes No Yes No Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of TUs 242 242 242 242 242 242
No. of HHs 4,125 4,118 4,125 4,115 4,125 4,117
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and
ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic
activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Source: RA2 Household survey.
The index of emotional benefits includes questions around the aspirational
nature of sanitation investments, and the shame of performing open defeca-
tion. Other sanitation campaigns that leveraged perceived status and social
norms to achieve their objectives have been shown to have positive effects on
toilet construction in the past. Stopnitzky [2017], for example, shows how a
campaign that associated toilet construction with social status and marriage-
ability of young men, had large impacts on toilet adoption in India. Similarly,
using a panel of poor households from Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, In-
dia, Augsburg and Rodriguez-Lesmes [2015] show that 80% of the toilet owners
report to have increased their status in the community after building the toi-
let. The results presented in Table 4.8, are, to the best of our knowledge, the
first attempt at estimating program impacts on social status considerations di-
rectly. At a first glance, our results seem to suggest that CLTS was successful
at attaching a higher social value to toilet ownership.
We now turn to the question of whether this increase in expected emo-
tional benefits from sanitation, is behind the higher toilet construction rate
observed in CLTS areas. A natural channel to suggest would be that CLTS in-
20The index has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.54.
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creased the expected benefits from sanitation of a certain group of households,
who then went on to construct toilets at higher rates than in control areas. But
this is certainly not the only channel through which expected benefits could
be operating. There is also the possibility, for example, that expected social
benefits increased evenly over the whole population, but that only households
with certain characteristics, such as higher purchasing power, or young chil-
dren, reacted by constructing toilets. Alzua et al. [2017], for example, suggest
that the changing expectations of households who already owned toilets, al-
lowed them to put pressure on others who did not, who then proceeded built
toilets.
As a first test, we check whether CLTS had differential impacts according
to baseline levels of each of these indices. Perhaps an information campaign
such as the one under study is more effective when the agents have lower
expectations regarding the benefits of sanitation to begin with. This effect
could operate at the household level, e.g. among households with lower (or
higher) expectations, or the community level. Tables C.11, C.12 and C.13,
in the Appendix, show no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects along
these lines. Therefore, if expected benefits indeed play a role in mediating
CLTS impacts, it is not determining the correct “initial conditions” in which
CLTS is successful. Instead, the CLTS might be affecting toilet construction
via its ability to change these expectations.
Next, we study what the impact of CLTS was, on each expected benefits
index, according to household type. If CLTS increased expected benefits for
the same groups of households for which it also increased toilet construction,
then this would be informative about the channel through which CLTS af-
fects households’ investment decisions. We again take the indices of expected
benefits at the household level as dependent variables, and regress them on
a treatment indicator equal to one if the household is assigned to CLTS and
complies with each of our four sub-samples of households. A second indicator
variable will be equal to one if the household is assigned to CLTS but is not
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part of this sub-sample, in order to capture CLTS impacts on the rest of the
households. Results for this approach are shown in Table 4.9. In the Table,
PBI stands for private benefit index, EBI for emotional benefit index, and Ext
for Externalities index.
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Table 4.9: Heterogeneous Impacts of CLTS on Emotional Benefit Index
Dep var: Index of Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PBI EBI Ext. PBI EBI Ext. PBI EBI Ext. PBI EBI Ext.
CLTS x Yes -0.01 0.21∗ 0.25∗ -0.01 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.16∗ 0.21∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
CLTS x No 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.21∗∗ 0.17 0.05 0.20∗∗ 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.08
(0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Index at BL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test Yes=No (p-value) 0.48 0.44 0.32 0.43 0.12 1.00 0.96 0.14 0.76 0.59 0.88 0.26
No. of TUs 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 241 241 241
No. of HHs 4,118 4,115 4,117 4,118 4,115 4,117 4,118 4,115 4,117 3,692 3,690 3,692
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure
and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: RA2
Household survey.
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The first three columns from Table 4.9 present CLTS impacts on each of
the three expected benefit indices, according to the presence of children un-
der the age of 6. We see that CLTS increased both emotional benefits and
externalities indices in a statistically significant way, among households with
children. A similar pattern is observed in Columns (10) to (12), where CLTS
increased the values of the same two indices among households with below me-
dian wealth, but did not affect those of wealthier households. As we have seen
in Section 4.5 above, households with children and with below median wealth
reacted more strongly to the CLTS intervention than the rest of the sample.
In these two cases then, CLTS appears to have increased expected benefits and
promoted toilet construction among the same groups of households, supporting
the idea that construction was triggered by increased expected benefits.
Results by level of education (Columns (4) to (6)) and gender (Columns
(7) to (9)) of the household head, do not paint the same picture. In these two
cases, CLTS only appears to have affected expected emotional benefits in a
significant way, and this only for the population that showed the lowest im-
pact in terms of toilet construction: households whose heads have completed
primary school and who are male. This second finding opens up two important
questions. First, why did the increase in expected benefits among these groups
of households not lead to increased toilet construction? Toilet ownership was
40% and 38% among households with male heads and educated heads, re-
spectively, so construction of new toilets could have been expected. However,
CLTS was an information only campaign, and other constraints might have
been binding in this case, such as affordability or imperfect credit markets.
In turn, the second question raised by Table 4.9 is, why did households
with uneducated or female heads increase toilet construction if their expected
benefits from sanitation remained the same? Barring other channels of impact,
which as we will see in the following subsections, do not appear to play a
significant role, one possible explanation is that these households reacted not
to changes in their own beliefs, but in the beliefs of the rest of their community.
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We have seen that the increased valuation of toilets by the families of would-
be wives increased toilet construction among families of marriage-able men
in India (Augsburg and Rodriguez-Lesmes [2015], Stopnitzky [2017]). By the
same token, CLTS may have persuaded uneducated and female household
heads to build toilets, by increasing their desirability among the rest of the
community. This motivates a more nuanced interpretation of the impacts of
CLTS and other community-led sanitation and health efforts, by highlighting
the effective, but understudied role of social pressure.
4.6.3 Solving coordination problems
The community-driven nature of the CLTS intervention is an important as-
pect to consider when identifying the channels through which it works, and
the constraints faced by the communities it was applied in. By coordinat-
ing the attention and efforts of the whole community (or at least of all those
who attended the meetings), CLTS triggering meetings could be addressing
sanitation bottlenecks at both community and household level. CLTS could,
for example, coordinate the efforts of young and capable members of a vil-
lage to help in the construction of toilets for widows or seniors. In this sense,
CLTS could help coordinate efforts and shift villages away from detrimental
but absorbing equilibria.
To gauge the relevance of this channel we asked all households who owned
toilets at RA2 whether they had received any help, financially or otherwise, in
its construction. We then offered several alternative sources of help, including
family or neighbours, village officials, friends or family from outside the village,
etc., to which respondents could answer yes or no in each case.21 This question
was not asked at RA1, which included a shorter questionnaire, but was directed
at all toilet owning households at RA2. We find no significant difference in the
21The full list of options is the following: “Did any of the following people help you, finan-
cially or otherwise, in constructing your toilet?” a) Family or neighbours, b) Village officials,
c) Villagers other than near neighbours or village officials, d) Friends/family members out-
side the village, e) Village leaders, f) Member of the same church, g) LGA officials / WASH
unit, h) Other government officials, i) Members of a non-governmental organization/charity,
and/or j) Others.
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answers to these questions between CLTS and control households.
A second related channel previously discussed in the literature is that
CLTS will be more effective in areas with higher levels of social capital.
Cameron et al. [2015] show that program impacts from a CLTS intervention
in Indonesia were higher in villages where on average, households were more
likely to participate in religious, female or other kinds of groups. The authors
pose that this higher degree of participation in social activities increases pro-
gramme impacts by providing the structure with which households are able
to exert social pressure on each other, and achieve the objectives agreed upon
during the CLTS triggering meeting. Alternatively, social capital may also
help disseminate information delivered by CLTS within the community.
Table 4.10: Definition of Social Capital Index
Index/Questions BL RA2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Capital
How often, over the past 12 months, have you...
... worked on a community project? X 0.31 X 0.13
... donated blood? X 0.05 X 0.01
... attended any public meeting to discussion of town or school affairs? X 0.29 X 0.29
... attended a political meeting or rally? X 0.25 X 0.28
... attended any club or organizational meeting (not for work)? X 0.32 X 0.30
... had friends over to your home? X 0.36 X 0.43
... been in the home of a friend of a different race/ethnicity
or had them in your home? X 0.31 X 0.34
... been in the home of someone of a different neighbourhood
or had them in your home? X 0.36 X 0.43
... been in the home of someone you consider to be a
community leader or had one in your home? X 0.37 X 0.29
... volunteered? X 0.32 X 0.04
... attended religious services (not including weddings and funerals)? X 0.06 X 0.24
... had relatives over to your home? X 0.31
... served as an official or served on a committee of any local
club or community association? X 0.22
Note: Questions included in the social capital benefit indices. Columns (1) and (3) indicate whether
each question was included at Baseline or RA2, respectively. For each period, we carried out a principal
component analysis including all available questions, and constructed an index using the first factor.
Columns (2) and (4) indicate the loadings with which each of these questions enter the baseline or
RA2 indices, respectively. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
We measure social capital using detailed information on participation in
social activities around the community, gathered in two separate rounds. As
in the case of expected beliefs, this was measured both at baseline and RA2.
So we create two separate indices using principal component analysis, each
including the complete set of questions which were part of the questionnaire
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in each wave. The questions included and their respective factor loadings are
presented in Table 4.10. We test whether programme impacts vary according
to our index of social capital at both the cluster and household levels, and the
results are presented in Table 4.11. Column (1) reproduces the baseline results
from Table 4.2. Column (2) interacts the CLTS treatment indicator with the
social capital index at the cluster level. We find no significant difference in
programme impacts between clusters with high and low social capital, as can
be seen from the statistically insignificant coefficient in the third row. Column
(3) presents estimates using household-level variation in social capital instead.
We do not find that CLTS impacts are enhanced nor diminished by household
social capital. Finally, Column (4) includes both social capital indices. Over-
all, our results show that there is no statistically significant evidence of social
capital affecting CLTS programme effects on average ownership of functioning
toilets. For better comparison with Cameron et al. [2015], we repeat this anal-
ysis using an equally weighted index of social capital as used by the authors.
Results, shown in Table C.14 in the Appendix, are similar and our conclusions
unchanged.
Finally, given the participatory nature of the CLTS intervention, it is not
unreasonable to think that CLTS might have had an impact on social capital
at the household or village levels. The intervention brought together multiple
members of the community and proposed a collective challenge (getting rid of
OD) to them. This could have in turn triggered more community engagement
on behalf of households. Exploiting the fact that social capital questions were
asked both at baseline and RA2, we check whether CLTS modified the levels
of social capital at the household or cluster levels. Table C.15 in the Appendix
provides no evidence for this hypothesis. The treatment coefficient is small
and standard errors large in all the specifications. Overall, we see no evidence
that CLTS households or clusters exhibit higher levels of social capital at RA2.
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Table 4.11: CLTS impacts by baseline levels of Social Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cluster SC (BL) 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Treated × Cluster SC (BL) 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Household SC (BL) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Treated × Household SC (BL) 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (RA1) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
No. of Triggerable Units 247 247 247 247
No. of households 4,555 4,555 4,113 4,113
No. of observations 9,110 9,110 8,226 8,226
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status,
literacy and ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and
farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster
level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: RA2 Household
survey.
4.6.4 Institutional sanctions
A final possible channel we explore is that CLTS activities in the community
have influenced local authorities or traditional rulers to impose new sanctions
on open defecation. Anecdotal evidence from the field suggested this had
occurred in at least one village, where after the CLTS triggering meeting,
traditional rulers imposed in-kind fines to any member of the community seen
performing OD. In order to test whether this could be a possible mechanism
of CLTS impacts, we again rely on the rich data collected from households at
RA2.
We asked every household in our sample whether sanctions or fines existed
in their village, for individuals found performing open defecation. Using this
as our dependent variable, we estimated CLTS treatment effects and found
no impacts. Both sanctions and fines appear to be a common institutional
trait of the communities in our sample, with 40% of households declaring
that they exist, but CLTS does not seem to have motivated an increase in
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Table 4.12: Did CLTS bring about Sanc-
tions or Fines for OD?
Dep var: Sanctions Fines
(1) (2)
CLTS -0.04 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
HH controls Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes
Control Mean (Baseline) 0.40 0.40
No. of observations 4,555 4,555
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender,
employment status, literacy and ethnicity of the
HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as
the main economic activity. Errors clustered at
the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p
<0.01. Source: RA2 Household survey.
their prevalence. If anything, point estimates, albeit statistically insignificant,
point towards the contrary.
4.7 Conclusion
Sanitation remains an urgent concern for policy makers in the developing
world. Effective policy design requires a nuanced understanding of the con-
straints that households face when deciding whether to carry out lumpy invest-
ments such as the construction of a private toilet. This Chapter contributes
to this effort using findings from a cluster randomised experiment carried out
in the Nigerian states of Ekiti and Enugu.
We have shown that CLTS, an information only campaign designed to
curb open defecation levels, had positive but moderate effects. While toilet
construction increased and open defecation fell in the short run, these effects
become undetectable two years after the intervention. We find that CLTS was
most effective among households with female heads, households whose heads
did not finish primary school, and household who are asset poor, all of whom
had below average toilet ownership levels at baseline. Asset poor households
in particular, show lasting impacts of CLTS, with treated households being 5
pp more likely to own a functioning toilet than control households, two years
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after the intervention.
Increasing the effectiveness of such a policy will require lifting other bind-
ing constraints, not affected by this policy. CLTS successfully increased ex-
pected benefits of sanitation related to pride and social status but did not
affect an index which includes health and other private expected benefits, nor
households’ awareness of sanitation externalities. Stronger messaging in these
two aspects might improve program outcomes. Our findings also suggest that
price expectations could be one of these constraints. Toilet ownership was
lower among households with high price expectations at baseline. This group
also appears to be less likely to construct toilets as a result of the intervention,
although not in a statistically significant way. The provision of accurate cost
information could be a valuable addition to the CLTS programme.
Finally, we discuss to alternative channels through which CLTS could
have acted. We show that there is no evidence of CLTS effectiveness being
affected by baseline levels of social capital, at the household or cluster level,
and that the intervention did not affect social capital levels. Also, institutional
sanctions or fines, to punish open defecation, are not more common in CLTS
areas after the programme.
Chapter 5
General Conclusions
The three Chapters of my thesis aim at understanding how poor households
make decisions, how they react to shocks, and what constraints they face in
their production and investment decisions. A common theme appeared dur-
ing the course of this research: households decisions are subject to multiple
constraints, and they define the way these households react to shocks or pub-
lic policies. Some of these constraints, such as access to credit or imperfect
labour markets, are well studied and reasonably understood by the develop-
ment economics field. Others, such as the degree of adaptation possible by
subsistence farmers to weather shocks, or the factors limiting investment in
health enhancing technologies, still provide challenges for researchers and pol-
icy makers. The accumulation of evidence, combining an increased availability
of data with nuanced economic models, can contribute in the search for these
answers.
In this thesis I have tried to provide some of this evidence. In the first
Chapter, I documented the usefulness of remotely sensed weather data to study
temperature shocks on a sample of Tanzanian farmers. I showed that while
these households are strongly affected by seasons with hot days which reduce
their yields of staple crops, this does not seem to translate into lower con-
sumption per capita. There is evidence of some risk coping mechanisms being
used, such as increasing the share of sweet potato, incurring in mostly informal
subsistence loans or the migration of some of the household members. How-
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ever, these adjustment mechanisms apply to a small share of the whole sample.
While unobserved, I suggest that the build up (and depletion) of stocks is a
likely candidate for consumption smoothing for the majority of the households.
In the second Chapter, my co-authors and I dig deeper into how farmers
react to temperature shocks. Using a sample of Peruvian farmers from 2007
to 2015, we find that short run reactions are region-specific, and also highly
determined by the level of consumption. Constrained households, living close
to a subsistence level of consumption, react to negative productivity shocks by
increasing the amount of land cultivated to buttress their overall output. On
the contrary, less constrained households absorb the shock and see their output
reduced. Interestingly, using projections from two global climate scenarios, we
find that predicted yields for each of the two regions under analysis will on
average, evolve in opposite directions: they will fall in the warm, dry coast,
and increase in the high, wet highlands.
In the final Chapter, my co-authors and I analyze the results from a ran-
domized controlled trial carried out in two Nigerian states aimed at increasing
investment in safe sanitation. We find that even in a context of rural poverty,
information only campaigns can effectively increase toilet ownership, albeit by
a moderate amount. We explore the possible mechanisms by which the in-
tervention worked, and find that while it did not change the expected health
and safety benefits of sanitation, households exhibit higher levels of expected
status-related benefits associated with toilet ownership. Additionally, we find
that although CLTS did not provide any financial incentives or assistance,
the intervention had the highest treatment effects among households with low
asset wealth and low levels of education.
The recurrent theme in these Chapters is the importance of understanding
the constraints under which households operate. This is a necessary step for
the design of successful policy, and not always evident without the use of
detailed data and economic theory.
Appendix A
Additional Results - Chapter 1
Table A.1: No lagged effects of weather conditions on
yields
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature:
Average DDs 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Average DDs, t-1 -0.05 -0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
Average HDDs -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Average HDDs t-1 -0.04 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Controls:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,621 12,621 12,621 12,621
Notes: Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correla-
tion following Conley [1999], using code from Hsiang [2010] and
adapted by Thiemo Fetzer, in parenthesis. They assume a dis-
crete cut-off for spatial correlation of errors at 500 km and six
period lags. Stars indicate statistical significance: *p <0.10, **
p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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Table A.2: Crop choice and area planted for three selected crops
Crop: Maize Paddy Sweet Potato
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable: 1=Yes ln(ha) 1=Yes ln(ha) 1=Yes ln(ha)
Temperature:
Average DD (t-1) 0.03∗∗ 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02∗∗ 0.11
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10)
Average HDD (t-1) -0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Controls:
Growing season FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% HH who grow crop 66.17 22.21 9.87
Observations 7,588 4,946 7,588 1,657 7,588 737
Notes: Standard errors robust to spatial and serial correlation following Conley
[1999], using code from Hsiang [2010] and adapted by Thiemo Fetzer, in paren-
thesis. They assume a discrete cut-off for spatial correlation of errors at 500 km
and six period lags. Stars indicate statistical significance: *p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01.
Figure A.1: Average migration rates by gender and age group
Note: Individual propensities to move districts, as deduced from the migration
histories detailed in the NPS questionnaire.
Appendix B
Additional Results - Chapter 2
B.1 Methodological appendix
B.1.1 Optimal temperature thresholds
Our first step in the analysis is to combine weather and agricultural output
data from our sample of Peruvian farms to determine the threshold between
DD and HDD. To do so, we estimate equation 3.5 varying the value of τhigh
in 1 degree intervals from 20℃ to 40℃. We record the R-square and select
the threshold value the produces the best fit. We perform this analysis using
the whole sample and splitting it by climatic region. Our specification uses
log of output per hectare as main outcome but results are robust to using
log of agricultural output, controlling for input use, or adding a richer set of
fixed effects (department-by-growing season). Figure B.1 shows the results of
this exercise. The best fit for the whole sample is achieved with a value of
τhigh = 32℃. This value is different by region. In the case of the coast, the
best fit is achieved with a threshold of 27℃, and of 35℃ in the case of the
highlands.
Differences in region-specific thresholds may be due to the lower avail-
ability of heat mitigation strategies for the farmers in our sample or a host of
other geography, climate and socio-economic factors. Our estimates are likely
to capture not only the botanical relationship between plant growth and tem-
perature, but also the reduction in labour productivity experienced by higher
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temperatures. In a meta-review of task performance studies, Seppanen et al.
[2006] find that the optimal air temperature for office type work is 22℃, so our
thresholds could feasibly be averaging a higher botanical threshold and lower
human productivity threshold. Given the non-experimental nature of our data,
we are unable to distinguish between the two. Our estimated thresholds, in
any case, are the policy relevant parameters given the production function
prevalent in, and mitigation strategies available to, each region.
Once the optimal thresholds for each region are established it is useful
to return to the distribution of temperatures over the growing season. We
can observe how average daily temperatures over the growing season have a
higher mean and variance in the coast than in the highlands. This in turn
means that the coast experiences more average degree-days, harmful degree
days, and more frequent ‘hot’ days (i.e. days with positive HDD) than the
highlands. This differing distribution of temperatures will reflect in a different
estimate of the impact of temperatures on yields, and thus must be taken into
account when interpreting coefficients. Since coefficients are estimated using
the average number of DDs and HDDs over the whole growing season, our
estimates smooth out the real impact of temperatures on yields [Burke et al.,
2015]. This will be accounted for in the interpretation of our results. At the
same time, highlands experience almost four times as much rainfall as the coast
so we expect to see stronger negative effects of heavy rainfall in this region.
B.2 Additional results
B.2.1 Impacts within the growing season
A closer look at the impacts within a particular growing season can potentially
address important questions regarding the nature of the impacts described in
the previous section. A common challenge faced by most studies focused on
human-natural systems such as agriculture, is the difficulty to determine what
part of the system is the one being affected. In our case, we would be interested
in knowing whether the negative impact of high temperatures observed is in
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Figure B.1: Model fit (R2) of weather regressions with different temperature
thresholds
Notes: Figures plot model fit (R2) for regressions of Equation 3.5 using different
values of τhigh, the thresholds to split between DD and HDD. Controls include
household head’s characteristics ( age, age2, gender and education attainment), pre-
cipitation, its square, indicators of soil quality, and district and growing season fixed
effects. Each plot present the results of using a different sample.
fact a negative productivity shock to human productivity, or whether it is
affecting the quality of inputs or the botanical process of plant development
and growth. Any of the three alternatives could be driving our results and
have potentially very different consequences regarding what the appropriate
policy response is.
We investigate this further by breaking down degree-days and harmful
degree-days by month within a growing season. The Peruvian growing season
runs from October to March, but different activities take place each month,
according to region and crop grown. For example, the National Agricultural
Calendar states that the sowing of crops takes place mostly between October
and December, with some activities also taking place during September [MI-
NAGRI, 2007]. By studying the months within a growing season during which
temperature shocks affect farmer yields the most, we can understand what
part of the agricultural cycle is most vulnerable.
Our next step is therefore to run a regression similar to our baseline spec-
ification but in which we split DDs and HDDs by month within a growing
season to relax the assumption that their impact must be identical. Results
are shown in Figure B.2, where we see that the strongest negative impacts
144 Chapter B
Figure B.2: Harmful degree-day impacts by month
(a) Coast (b) Highlands
Notes: Point estimates for the impact of additional harmful degree days by
growing season month. The specification also includes degree-days by month
and is otherwise identical to our baseline specifications with household and soil
quality controls in columns 1 and 4 in Table 3.3). Spikes (bars) indicate 95%
(90%) confidence intervals.
originate in the month of January for both regions. This is a month in which
sowing is mostly finished and where plant growth and development is already
in process. While we cannot discard impacts via reduced human productivity,
this month is not one in which the hardest labour is performed which sug-
gests that impacts are mostly botanical and/or driven by lower input quality.
Nonetheless, estimation is imprecise and these results must be interpreted with
caution given the large variation in agricultural practices and calendars in our
sample.
B.2.2 Effects by month of interview
An argument could be made that weather impacts might not be uniform over
time. For instance, one could argue that households interviewed right after
the end of a growing season, could be more affected by the recent growing
season’s temperature than a household being interviewed six months later.
This second household will have been exposed to six months of temperature
and precipitation that do not enter our estimations, so their agricultural output
might not be affected by weather conditions during the past growing season,
or could be affected by mitigation behaviour. Similarly, households may be
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better able to recall agricultural production soon after a growing season. These
factors could introduce measurement error and bias our estimates.
To examine the importance of this issue, we interact the degree day and
harmful degree-day coefficients from Equation 3.5 with a variable indicating
the month in which the interview was conducted. Figure B.3 shows the re-
sulting coefficients for the interaction with the HDD term. Estimates suggest
that a growing season’s hot temperatures have the hardest impact four to five
months after its end, between the months of July and August. This is the pe-
riod in which all output being harvested was exposed to the hot weather season
and is therefore where the low yields effectively kick in. A soft attenuation of
the effects is observed thereafter, once the new growing season begins.
Figure B.3: Effect of HDD by month of interview
Notes: Point estimates for the average number of harmful degree days over the
last growing season interacted with the month of interview. The specification is
otherwise identical to our baseline specifications (Columns (1) and (4)) in Table
3.3). Spikes (bars) indicate 95% (90%) confidence intervals.

Appendix C
Additional Results - Chapter 3
Table C.1: Components of the Relative Wealth Index and their Factor Loadings
Asset Loading Asset Loading
Bicycle 0.0174 Air conditioner 0.1048
Motorcycle/scooter/tricycle 0.124 Power generator 0.2559
Four Wheeler (Car, trucks, etc.) 0.2104 Sewing machine 0.1201
Chair(s) 0.1512 Electric iron 0.2918
Table(s) 0.1763 Pressure cooker 0.1286
Bed(s) 0.1095 Electric fans 0.2934
Cupboard(s) 0.1983 Steel and glass plates 0.1582
Other furniture 0.0766 Gold/diamond jewellery 0.1218
Refrigerator 0.2733 Other jewellery 0.1109
Washing machine 0.1569 Cow, Bullock 0.041
Micro-wave 0.1708 Calf 0.0178
Gas cooker 0.2182 Goat, Sheep 0.0731
Plasma (Flat Screen) TV 0.1943 Pig 0.0187
Other TV 0.2696 Poultry 0.0786
Satellite dish (monthly subscription) 0.2049 Fish 0.004
Other satellite dish (DSTV/ETC) 0.2134 Exotic Dogs 0.0601
Radio/CD/DVD Player 0.2145 Irrigation equipment 0.0224
Smart phones 0.1146 Other agricultural equipment -0.0108
Other Telephone(s) 0.0904 Any other assets not listed 0.0123
Computer 0.1965
Note: Questions included in the estimation of our index for relative wealth, measured at
baseline. We carried out a principal component analysis including all available questions, and
constructed and index using the first factor. Column (2) indicates the loadings with which
each of these questions entered the index. Source: Baseline survey.
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Table C.2: CLTS impacts on toilet ownership and open defecation, ANCOVA
LHS: Toilet/OD Cons./Finished Functioning Improved OD (mr)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH head male -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH head age 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH head employed 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH head education: Primary school 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
HH head education: Junior Secondary 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH head education: Senior Secondary 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH head education: Tertiary 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH size 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH primary activity is farming -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Owns or is constructing toilet at BL 0.49∗∗∗
(0.02)
Owns a functioning toilet at BL 0.54∗∗∗
(0.01)
Owns an improved toilet at BL 0.49∗∗∗
(0.01)
Performs OD at BL 0.51∗∗∗
(0.01)
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.61
No. of TUs 247 247 247 247
No. of HHs 4,555 4,555 4,555 4,542
No. of obs. 9,110 9,110 9,110 9,084
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment
status of the HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the
cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
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Table C.3: CLTS impacts, difference in difference and simple difference estimates
LHS: Toilet/OD Cons./Finished Functioning Improved OD (mr)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DD SD DD SD DD SD DD SD
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS (γ) 0.03 0.03 0.03∗∗ 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04∗∗ -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.04∗∗ 0.04 0.03∗ 0.03 0.02 0.02 05∗∗ -0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey round FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.38 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.33 0.353 0.61 0.5761
F-test γ1 = γ2 (p-value) 0.29 0.23 0.79 0.66 0.70 0.86 0.57 0.59
No. of TUs 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
No. of HHs 4,555 4,671 4,555 4,671 4,555 4,671 4,551 4,671
No. of obs. 13,665 9,342 13,665 9,342 13,665 9,342 13,652 9,342
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and ethnicity of the HoH;
HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster
level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: Household surveys.
150 Chapter C
Table C.4: CLTS impacts among households with female decision power
LHS: Functioning toilet Female HoH Female DP 1 Female DP 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x Post (γ) 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Control Mean (RA1) 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.34
F-test γ Yes=No (p-value) 0.25 0.12 0.55
F-test γ1 Yes=No (p-value) 0.20 0.29 0.43
F-test γ2 Yes=No (p-value) 0.52 0.16 0.85
No. of Triggerable Units 246 238 245 243 247 226
No. of households 2,888 1,667 2,132 2,423 3,620 935
No. of observations 5,776 3,334 4,264 4,846 7,240 1,870
Notes: Female DP 1: female-only (e.g. no adult males) or female-headed house-
holds, households in which a woman has the highest level of educational attainment,
and households in which at least one adult woman is employed while no men are.
Female DP 2: those in which, when asked who in the household decides about
major household investments, the respondent (the eldest woman in the household),
answered that it was her who decided. HH covariates: age, age squared, gender,
education attainment level and employment status of the HoH; HH size and farming
as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p
<0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
Table C.5: Pairwise correlations between household types at Baseline
Household type Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
Children <6 y/0 1.00 - - -
Female HoH -0.18 1.00 - -
Uneducated HoH -0.20 0.37 1.00 -
<median wealth -0.13 0.23 0.31 1.00
Note: Pairwise correlations between household types measured at baseline. Source: Baseline
survey.
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Table C.6: Heterogeneous CLTS impacts on ownership or construction of toilets
LHS: Const./Finished Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x Post (γ) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.05∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Control Mean (BL) 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.41 0.30 0.50 0.22
No. of Triggerable Units 247 238 246 238 244 240 232 245
No. of households 3,201 1,354 2,888 1,667 3,104 1,451 2,037 2,025
No. of observations 6,402 2,708 5,776 3,334 6,208 2,902 4,074 4,050
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment status of the
HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, **
p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
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Table C.7: Heterogeneous CLTS impacts on ownership of improved toilets
LHS: Improved Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x Post (γ) 0.03∗ 0.02 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04∗ 0.01 0.04∗ 0.02 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) 0.04∗ 0.02 0.02 0.05∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗ 0.03 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Control Mean (BL) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.26 0.45 0.18
No. of Triggerable Units 247 238 246 238 244 240 232 245
No. of households 3,201 1,354 2,888 1,667 3,104 1,451 2,037 2,025
No. of observations 6,402 2,708 5,776 3,334 6,208 2,902 4,074 4,050
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment status of the
HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
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Table C.8: Heterogeneous CLTS impacts on open defecation
LHS: Performs OD Children <6 y/0 Female HoH Uneducated HoH <median wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Pooled estimates
CLTS x Post (γ) -0.04∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.03∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.03 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel B: Impacts by period
CLTS x RA1 (γ1) -0.04∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.04 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CLTS x RA2 (γ2) -0.04∗ -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06∗ -0.00 -0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Control Mean (BL) 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.68 0.50 0.75
No. of Triggerable Units 247 238 246 238 244 240 232 245
No. of households 3,195 1,347 2,880 1,662 3,097 1,445 2,033 2,016
No. of observations 6,390 2,694 5,760 3,324 6,194 2,890 4,066 4,032
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, education attainment level and employment status of the
HoH; HH size and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, **
p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: BL, RA1 and RA2 household surveys.
154 Chapter C
Table C.9: Balance tests for Constructed Indices, at Baseline
Control CLTS P-value
Expected Costs of Construction
Average expected cost of a VIP latrine (2015 USD) 333.84 328.91 0.70
Expected Benefit Indices
Private Benefit Index, Household -0.03 0.03 0.51
Private Benefit Index, Cluster -0.03 0.03 0.51
Emotional Benefit Index, Household 0.01 -0.01 0.79
Social Benefit Index, Cluster 0.01 -0.01 0.78
Externality Index - Households 0.05 -0.05 0.33
Externality Index, Cluster 0.05 -0.05 0.33
Social capital indices
Social Capital, Household -0.07 0.07 0.27
Social Capital, Cluster -0.04 0.08 0.32
Observations 2,332 2,339
Notes: Mean expected benefit indices, by household type and measured at baseline.
Indices were constructed by principal component analysis, and have a mean of 0 for
the whole sample. The Table shows that at baseline, this index was mostly balanced
across treatment arms. There are two exceptions: households with below median
wealth appear to have slightly higher expected emotional benefit scores than wealthier
households; and households whose heads had completed primary school appear to have
slightly higher expected emotional and health externality benefits than households
whose heads had not. For each index and definition, we performed an adjusted Wald
test of equality of means comparing the average values of the index between WDP
and non-WDP households, and present the p-values from that test. Errors clustered
at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: RA2 Household
survey.
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Table C.10: Average Expected Benefit Indices at Baseline
Children <6 y/0 Uneducated HoH <median wealth Female HoH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Expected benefit indices (Baseline)
Private benefits -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.00
F-test Yes=No (p-value) 0.69 0.59 0.23 0.92
Emotional benefits -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.02 -0.03
F-test Yes=No (p-value) 0.98 0.90 0.01 0.29
Health externalities 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.03
F-test Yes=No (p-value) 0.05 0.10 0.45 0.24
Treatment status
Assigned to CLTS 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.51
F-test Yes=No (p-value) 0.83 0.78 0.47 0.39
No. of households 3,254 1,362 3,139 1,477 2,075 2,079 2,925 1,696
Notes: Mean expected benefit indices, by household type and measured at baseline. Indices were constructed by
principal component analysis, and have a mean of 0 for the whole sample. The Table shows that at baseline, this
index was mostly balanced by household type. There are two exceptions: households with below median wealth
appear to have slightly higher expected emotional benefit scores than wealthier households; and households whose
heads had completed primary school appear to have slightly higher expected emotional and health externality
benefits than households whose heads had not. For each index and definition, we performed an adjusted Wald
test of equality of means comparing the average values of the index between WDP and non-WDP households,
and present the p-values from that test. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Source: RA2 Household survey.
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Table C.11: CLTS impacts by baseline levels of Private Benefit Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Private Benefit, Household (BL) -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Treated × Private Benefit Index, Household (BL) 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Private Benefit, Cluster (BL) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
Treated × Private Benefit Index, Cluster (BL) -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
No. of Triggerable Units 247 247 247 247
No. of households 4,555 4,547 4,555 4,547
No. of observations 9,110 9,094 9,110 9,094
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and eth-
nicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic activity.
Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source:
Baseline, RA1 and RA2 Household surveys.
Table C.12: CLTS impacts by baseline levels of Emotional Benefit Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Social Benefit, Household (BL) -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Treated × Social Benefit Index, Household (BL) 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Social Benefit, Cluster (BL) -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Treated × Emotional Benefit Index, Cluster (BL) -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
No. of Triggerable Units 247 247 247 247
No. of households 4,555 4,543 4,555 4,543
No. of observations 9,110 9,086 9,110 9,086
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and eth-
nicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic activity.
Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source:
Baseline, RA1 and RA2 Household surveys.
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Table C.13: CLTS impacts by baseline levels of Externality Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Externalities, Household (BL) -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Treated × Externality Index, Household (BL) 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Externalities, Cluster (BL) -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Treated × Externality Index, Cluster (BL) 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (BL) 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
No. of Triggerable Units 247 247 247 247
No. of households 4,555 4,546 4,555 4,546
No. of observations 9,110 9,092 9,110 9,092
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status, literacy and
ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming as the main economic
activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Source: Baseline, RA1 and RA2 Household surveys.
Table C.14: CLTS Impacts by baseline levels of Social Capital -
Equally Weighted Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS (γ) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cluster SC (BL, EW) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Treated × Cluster SC (BL, EW) 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Household SC (BL, EW) 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Treated × Household SC (BL, EW) -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
LGA FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean (RA1) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
No. of Triggerable Units 247 247 247 247
No. of households 4,555 4,555 4,555 4,555
No. of observations 9,110 9,110 9,110 9,110
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment status,
literacy and ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property tenure and farming
as the main economic activity. Errors clustered at the cluster level. *p
<0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Source: RA2 Household survey.
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Table C.15: Impact of CLTS on Social Capital
Dep var: Household SC Cluster SC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLTS 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household SC (BL) No Yes No No
Cluster SC (BL) No No No Yes
No. of Triggerable Units 242 242 242 242
No. of observations 3,937 3,552 4,524 4,524
Notes: HH covariates: age, age squared, gender, employment
status, literacy and ethnicity of the HoH; HH size, property
tenure and farming as the main economic activity. Errors clus-
tered at the cluster level. *p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Source: RA2 Household survey.
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